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Public policy formation, and the resources needed to influence it, are examined in this 
study by looking at pressure group theory, the opinions of environmental activists, and 
the Clayoquot Land Use Decision. The study identified how an individual may influence 
public policy, and the resources necessary to influence the public policy process. The 
study results also identified what the necessary resources are in order for individuals 
(activists) to participate more effectively in pressure group activities. The Clayoquot 
Sound case study, analyzed using Kingdon’s policy model and Pross’ policy model, 
reveals a  correlation between what pressure group theorists and activists suggest are 
necessary resources in order to participate in the policy process. The research 
demonstrates that in order to fully participate in the policy process, the necessary 
resources (such as money, leadership, and expert advice, and most significantly political 
alliances) must be available to all participants. The research establishes that in order for 
all interests to have the opportunity to equally influence the policy outcome, there 
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1.1 Purpose of Study
Pressure group politics, as it is known today, is not a  new phenomenon. Interests have 
forever been served by the efforts of people within political systems. It is, like other 
forms of politics, concerned with interest, power, and advantage. Pressure groups are 
formed specifically because their members want to act together to influence public policy. 
They are generally defined as autonomous orgamzations which seek, as one of their 
functions, to influence the formulation and implementation of public policy in order to 
promote their common interest. Political scientists refer to this phenomenon as pluralism. 
Pluralism being the establishment of groups all seeking to have their members’ 
preferences reflected in public policy. The role o f pressure groups in Canadian society is 
to represent a multitude of interests; interests that are represented through formal and 
informal political channels. In spite of the fact that the power and influence of some 
pressure groups has been seen by some as a threat to opposing interests, most groups play 
an important role in Canadian democracy.
The purpose of the present research was to identify the resources necessary for an 
individual or group to influence public policy, to examine how individuals are able to 
apply these resources in order to influence public policy via pressure groups, and to 
realize if each of the interests had access to these necessary resources. The research 
traces a policy decision detailing the events leading up to the policy announcement. The 
focus, and the interest in pursuing this study, of the research is to address the issue of 
participation equality in the public policy process by looking specifically at the Clayoquot
Land Use Decision. The Clayoquot Land Use Decision was announced in April o f 1993. 
This policy was the cumulative effort of numerous individuals, agencies, and 
organizations. In spite of the time and effort invested in this land use decision, it was 
largely seen as an unsuccessful attempt at consensus-based decision making. It was also 
seen by many varied interests as a biased policy decision that best reflected the desires of 
industry interests instead of as a balanced policy representing all relevant interests.
To accomplish the research objectives, rindings from the literature were compared with:
1) the results from the case study of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, 2) the results from 
interviews with participants in the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, and 3) the results from 
a survey of activists from across Canada.
The Clayoquot Land Use Decision case study identified the following: 1) who the key 
players were in the decision-making process; 2) whose interests were served in the 
outcome of the policy decision; and 3) what resources were required by the participants in 
influencing the policy decision? The first two questions served to detail the policy 
process, and the third question’s results were compared with the results from the literature 
review, survey and interviews. These three areas of research serve to address the central 
focus of the thesis - the issue o f participation equality in the public policy process in 
Canada.
The strength of the research was in the application of pressure group theory to activism, 
followed by the application of these findings to a case study. The results from the
literature review and case study were followed by a survey and interviews. The research 
results identified who had the greater influence in the Clayoquot Land Use Decision 
policy process, and the necessary resources required to obtain such a position. The 
research results also identified what the necessary resources are in order for individuals 
(activists) to participate more effectively in pressure group activities.
Chapter Two: Methodology
The first part o f the research involved undertaking a literature review of both the 
Canadian environmental policy process and pressure group theory. A review of the 
literature suggested that there is a need for further study in the area of policy analysis as it 
applies to the Clayoquot Land Use Decision. More specifically, the review revealed a 
need for further study into the level o f participation by the main interests involved in the 
policy process. The literature also revealed a void in information pertaining to the 
influence interests have on the policy process depending on their access to the necessary 
resources, and the potential outcome if  the resources are not made available.
The second part o f the research involved a case study. The case study focuses on an area 
on the west side o f Vancouver Island, British Columbia known as Clayoquot Sound (see 
Appendix - Map). Clayoquot Sound is approximately 350,000 hectares in size consisting 
mostly of temperate rainforest. Since 1980, Clayoquot Sound has been the focus of 
intense public debate about land use and resource development (Province 1993a, 1). The 
debate has led to confrontation, civil disobedience, and economic uncertainty.
The objective of a case study is to highlight specific incidences, individuals, and issues 
(Yin 1989, 18). The case study was chosen because of the research objective. A case 
study is meant to draw out the “what” questions in the policy analysis. The case study 
focused on the Clayoquot Land Use Decision as an example of a public policy. There are 
several reasons for selecting the Clayoquot Sound forest logging issue, and specifically a 
moment in time (Clayoquot Land Use Decision - detailed in Chapter Six), for the case
study analyzed in the present work. The logging disputes in Clayoquot Sound have been 
going on for over two decades, thus providing a selection of pivotal moments from which 
to choose when studying the development of public policy. Along with selection is the 
availability of information. There has been a considerable amount of study done on the 
Clayoquot Sound issue, thus providing ample credible information to a researcher willing 
to sift through large amounts of data.
To analyze this policy decision Kingdon’s and Pross’ policy models (see Appendix: 
Models) were used. These two models were chosen because both were developed to look 
specifically at the details involved in the development of public policy. These two 
decision-making models were applied to the case study in order to analyze the 
development of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision (see Section 6.5). Additionally, a 
range of information sources such as government reports, the news media, and published 
texts were utilized that looked specifically at the Clayoquot Land Use Decision.
By applying Kingdon’s policy model and then Pross’ policy model, the Clayoquot Land 
Use Decision was examined to better understand the policy decision. Kingdon’s model 
provides an overview of the policy process, whereas Pross’ model provides greater detail 
into the policy decision. The steps of the policy process were outlined by first applying 
Kingdon’s model. The results from this first step were then applied to Pross’ model to 
detail further the participants and their role in the policy process, the interaction between 
the various participants, and the resources identified as essential when participating in the 
policy process.
In doing the Clayoquot Land Use Decision case study, numerous participants in the policy 
process were identifîed (see Appendix: Models - Pross’ Policy Communities Model). 
These participants were identified in various sources such as newspapers and periodical 
publications. To delve further into the policy process from a participants perspective, 
every individual and organization identified (who had a contact number or address) in 
doing the case study was contacted via fax or electronic mail requesting an interview 
(Appendix: Letter of Request - Interview). All (a total of four) replies of acceptance 
were followed-up on, resulting in four separate interviews. The interviews were done 
using a semi-structured interview methodology by either phone interview or electronic 
mail. The literature suggests that the use o f the semi-structured interview methodology 
can be an effective approach to data gathering of this nature (Baruah 1998, 67; Fontana & 
Frey 1994, 361). The semi-structured interview methodology allows interaction between 
the respondent and the questions asked. This approach allows the respondent to 
elaborate on any aspect of the area of focus unhindered (Bickman, Rog, & Hendrick 
1998, 22).
The questions asked of each of the interview participants were as follows:
1) Who do you think the main participants were in the Clayoquot Land Use Decision?
2) Identify the interactions/alliances between participants that may have influenced the 
policy decision.
3) Identify the resources that each participant needed in order to influence the policy 
decision.
4) Based on your response above, outline how you perceive the Clayoquot Land Use 
Decision was made.
The information provided by the above questions were essential in realizing what 
occurred in the policy process prior to the announcement of the Clayoquot Land Use 
Decision, from the perspective of the participant. Each o f the participants in the 
interviews were very much involved in the Clayoquot Land Use policy process. Each of 
the interviewees had the experience to make an informed assessment of the activity 
leading up to the announcement o f the land use decision.
The third part of the research involved a survey of activists from across Canada. This 
survey was included in the research in order to obtain the opinions of activists - the 
people in the field. These responses were then compared with the opinions of pressure 
group theorists - the more academic perspective. Activists were solicited for their input 
via electronic mail, accessed by using various mailing lists available through 
organizations such as the Canadian Environmental Network and the Environmental 
Studies Association of Canada (ESAC). These types o f lists were used because they were 
available, and they provided access to activists from all over Canada. All participants 
who responded to the general request, and accepted the conditions detailed (Appendix: 
Letter of Request - Survey), were included in the survey. The final question in the survey 
asked what they deemed as essential resources in order for activists to accomplish their 
goals. The survey was conducted as a  broader evaluation of the experiences of 
environmental activists in Canada. From this broad evaluation, the research effort then
focused on participation resources (Appendix- Survey, Question 11). The results from 
this question were then compared with the pressure group theory literature review to 
establish an essential list of resources (detailed in Chapter 7). This list of information 
was then compared with the findings from the case study.
Separate from the goal of the research was a  sociodemographic questionnaire (Appendix: 
Sociodemographic Questionnaire). This questionnaire simply provided a breakdown on 
details such as gender, age, level of education, occupation, and income (detailed in 
Chapter Seven). The results from the questionnaire provided a general context of the 
respondents.
There are certain limitations that are inherent in the methodologies chosen for this 
research. These limitations are intrinsic to the survey and semi-structured interview. The 
limitations include the following: existence of researcher biases, the limited 
generalizability of research results, and the imbalance in the origins of the information 
examined. Case study limitations also include the actual case chosen to be studied; a case 
study is time- and situation-specific. These limitations can be addressed in various ways 
such as in the design of the questions, interviewer skill, and objective reporting of the 
research results. By noting and accounting for the methodology limitations, the 
researcher was able to maximize the validity of the study’s findings (Yin 1998, 225).
The results from the survey, and the interviews, should be put into context. The 
responses are from the perspective of each of the participants. These responses should
not be seen as objective, value-free, or quantifiable. The responses are based on the 
experiences of each of the participants, and as such are subject to some variability. In 
stating this, the value of each of the respondent’s participation in the research results 
remains valuable to the conclusions drawn. The purpose in stating the above is solely one 
of clarification.
This concludes the section on methodology. The next section details the environmental 
policy process in Canada, looking specifically at the various stages of the process and 
issues regarding the process.
Chapter Three: The Canadian Environmental Policy Process
In its essential features, the Canadian political system has not changed since the 
nineteenth century. However, the social and economic conditions in Canada, and the 
agenda of the federal government, have changed dramatically (Lyon 1992, 127). hi the 
early 1990s, during a rise in public concern for the health of the natural environment, 
Canadian governments struggled to strengthen their institutional and legal capacities to 
protect the environment. Humans and other species depend on the diversity of complex 
ecosystems. Growing recognition of this has led to the transition of environmental policy 
from direct exploitation to an increasing environmental conservation focus (Hessing & 
Howlett 1997, 3). The policy process is gradually moving towards not only addressing 
the conditions and amounts of resource use, but also the larger biophysical context in 
which these activities take place. By the 1990s, the Canadian public perception of a 
global environmental crisis had had a significant influence on national environmental 
policy development (Hessing & Howlett 1997, 4).
There were, however, constitutional tensions and legislative uncertainties that raised 
doubts about whether government was able to attain a policy which would support a 
sustainable environment (Vanderzwaag 1992, 3). The Canadian Constitution makes no 
direct reference to the environment, and provides no guarantee of a clean, healthy 
environment (Vanderzwaag 1992,4). Canada’s Constitution provides no direction as to 
which level of government oversees environmental responsibility. The sharing of
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environmental responsibilities between the federal and provincial governments makes 
the issue of protection very complex. Each level o f government maintains various areas 
of power which potentially touch on the issue of environmental protection.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was added to the Constitution in 1982. It 
too lacks the explicit reference to a right to a  healthy environment (Vanderzwaag 1992, 
16). However, the Charter recognizes the rights of individuals' to life, liberty, and the 
security of person - except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice 
(Section 7 of the Charter). As a result, the Charter potentially provides an opening for 
individuals to contest governmental actions relating to the environment and public health. 
The breadth of the Charter is limited, however, for it applies only to laws and actions of 
federal and provincial governments and their public agencies, leaving the private sector 
largely without liability (Vanderzwaag 1992, 17).
The impact of the Canadian environmental movement on the public consciousness 
concerning the environmental effects of development has not been matched by equal 
influence in government policy (Wilson 1992, 110). The direct lobbying attempts of 
many within the environmental arena to extract firm policy commitments from the 
various levels of government have met with little success. Participants in favour of 
strengthened environmental regulations have found that in order to move politicians in 
the preferred direction, the focus should be on moving public opinion (Wilson 1992,
115).
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The first section of this review will focus on the environmental policy process in Canada. 
First, the actual stages o f the environmental policy process will be outlined. The section 
to follow delves into the various issues regarding development and implementation of 
environmental policy in Canada. One will notice that the formal structure of the policy 
process often does not reflect the actual process; some of the reasons will be detailed.
3.1 The Stages of the Policy Process in Canada
There are five stages of the policy process in Canada as outlined by Hessing & Howlett 
(1997,218-225). They are 1) agenda setting, 2) policy formulation, 3) decision-making,
4) policy implementation, and 5) policy evaluation. These steps map out the process 
through which an interest or objective ultimately becomes an implemented rule or policy. 
What follows is a discussion of each stage.
1st Stage: Agenda-setting
The agenda-setting stage of policy is the preliminary level. Self-identified and motivated 
groups or interests lobby governments to include their concerns in the consideration of 
any given matter. At this stage, ideas and interests are politically defined and judged as 
either appropriate or not appropriate for policy discussion. Government has the choice to 
either decline the request or to change the policy agenda. As new information comes to 
light regarding issues pertaining to the natural environment, it is assumed that interested 
groups, such as producers, labour, consumers, and health representatives, will bring this 
knowledge to the attention of policy makers so that the agenda can be modified 
appropriately.
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2nd Stage: Policy Formulation
The formulation of policy involves the collection o f general actors and interests into 
specific groups to articulate potential policy options on the part of these groups. Policy 
formulation begins with the identification of options by an organized set o f interests 
including production-based business organizations, environmental groups, the media, 
political parties, and other interest groups.
The collection of actors brought together to articulate potential policy options are referred 
to as "advisory groups" (Filyk & Cote 1992,60). Advisory groups share common 
features such as: all exist to serve government; all are institutionalized organizations; all 
are funded by, and report to, the government; all show organizational continuity and 
stable membership for varying periods of time, depending on the mandate; all have 
knowledge of, and access to, relevant members o f the environmental policy community; 
and all hold distinct mandates, objectives, and operating rules (ibid.). The advisory 
groups’ primary role is to advise: they/it hold little, if any, administrative powers.
3rd Stage: Decision-making
The decision-making stage consists of the production of decisions within formal stages of 
the policy process, after positions and alternatives have been articulated through the 
second stage. The Canadian decision-making style reflects the traditional force of
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productive interests, while other non-économie forces gradually wear away the policy 
hegemony and impact the decision-making stage.
4th Stage: Policy Implementation
The administrative process o f policy development is considered to be equally, if not 
more, important as the third stage of the policy process. Administrative processes include 
most of the routine activities through which policy is executed: laws, rules, regulations, 
and standards. These activities determine how policy is implemented by government
agencies.
Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980, 542) have identified a number of variables within this 
stage of the policy process which act as determinants of implementation. Many of these 
variables are found to be relevant in designing a response to policy problems. It was 
found that much depends on the tractability of the problem', including factors such as the 
extent and degree of behaviour change required of the target group. "Non-statutory 
variables' that can either facilitate or frustrate implementation o f a policy include things 
such as the degree of media attention, public support, and ties to executive support. As 
well, the statutory underpinning' of the process - including such variables as the clarity o f 
policy directives, financial resources, and the degree of hierarchical integration within and 
among implementing agencies - is also crucial to the successful implementation o f a 
policy.
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The degree of public support clearly has an impact on the level of support allotted to a 
problem by the members of government dealing with the issue. As well, the response by 
the executive also has an impact. This in turn will impinge on the strength of policy 
directives and the hierarchical ordering of implementing agencies (Brown 1992, 24). 
Therefore, ambivalence in public attitudes towards the environment, as seen during 
downturns in the economy, and the indifference in executive actions translates into 
ambiguity in policy directives, limited funding, and a peripheral status in government 
decision-making (Brown 1992a, 40).
5th Stage: Policy Evaluation
Policy evaluation in the environmental sector in Canada has relied to a large extent on 
formal administrative reviews. As a result, established policy networks continue to exert 
traditional pressures and the options considered for change tend to be pragmatic 
considerations about the merits of specific instraments for implementing policy rather 
than about generalized alternatives to them. The outcome is that the general policy 
framework tends not to be evaluated. The consequence of this can be the perpetuation of 
procedures that do not largely address the fundamental issues.
Environmental policy does not end with implementation o f policy. Regulation is part of 
an ongoing policy process, along with evaluation and modification (Hessing & Howlett 
1997, 223). However, although modification is part of the policy process following 
implementation and evaluation, it is often slow in coming and marginal in outcome.
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It is clear from the above that new environmental policy emerges in an evolutionary 
process. The success of this type of process is through the convergence o f several 
interests in the shape of events, authorities, literature, organizational support, and action 
by various jurisdictions which leads to new public policy (Brown 1992b, 177).
3.2 Issues Regarding the Policy Process in Canada
Canadian environmental policy has been subjected to increasing criticism by the public 
and by pressure groups concerned with the status of the natural environment due to the 
inadequacy of existing policy measures (Hessing & Howlett 1997, 7). The shortcoming 
of existing policy measures is shown in deteriorating environmental conditions and 
increasing resource scarci^. To date, most policies have been developed without due 
regard to public interest or ecological concerns (ibid.). As well, special interests, namely 
business, are given preferential treatment in the policy process. These criticisms of the 
present policy process have resulted in the legitimizing of many aspects o f the existing 
system of regulation. As well, they have led to demands for new policies and new 
mechanisms to implement them (ibid.; Stefanick 1996,230).
In order to address the concerns regarding the present policy process, there is a 
heightened demand for more public input by the public and various pressure groups 
throughout Canada. There is also the demand for a review o f government responsibility 
and the legitimacy of public institutions involved in policy development (Hessing & 
Howlett 1997,6; Skogstad & Kopas 1992,43). The review has been hindered due to the 
complexity and fragmentation of policy issues and jurisdictions; it has also deterred
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efforts to achieve a  comprehensive and unified analysis. The different levels of 
government, and a range of ministries, administrative arrangements, and statutes, 
represent a notable barrier to a comprehensive policy analysis (Hessing & Howlett 1997,
7).
Public involvement in the policy process has been driven in large part by the most recent 
waves of environmental concern generated by the public (Skogstad & Kopas 1992,49). 
The late 1960s and early 1970s constituted the first environmental awareness wave in 
Canada, with the second wave in the late 1980s and early 1990s (ibid.). It was the second 
wave of concern that has had a notable impact on the policy process in Canada because of 
the greater role played by environmental groups (Harrison 1996a, 155). This expansion in 
consultation has had a notable impact on the policy process and its outcomes. Previous to 
environmental organizations being involved, the absence of public demand for 
environmental programs, industry’s resistance to regulation, and the provinces’ 
protectiveness of their jurisdiction, collectively discouraged federal environmental 
initiatives (ibid.; Stefanick 1996, 230). However, by the late 1980s, the federal 
government was increasingly caught between hostile provinces and industry on the one 
hand, and environmental groups providing an effective voice for growing public concern 
on the other. As a result, the federal government was forced to resist many provincial and 
industry demands.
There were, however, many environmental groups suspicious of consultative policy 
processes. Traditionally, environmental groups operated in the peripheral zones of the
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policy communities (Wilson 1992, 120). Distead of participating, they would 
intentionally engage in organizational strategies that were contrary to the status quo 
(Hessing & Howlett 1997, 123). Direct action and media coverage are perceived by some 
groups to be more effective vehicles for influencing the policy process than inclusion on 
various boards, commissions, or tribunals (i.e. groups like Greenpeace, Earth First!, and 
Friends of Clayoquot Sound). The use of direct action and media by pressure groups 
serves to alert and educate the public, who then apply political pressure to influence the 
policy process (Stefanick 1996, 301).
There are groups, however, that choose to participate in the formal policy-making 
channels. This route has proven to be no less complicated and difficult than the routes 
chosen by other groups. Groups and individuals who choose to participate in institutional 
processes face numerous hurdles in attaining their ends; these hurdles may serve to 
postpone or divert public attention from the issue (Hessing & Howlett 1997, 124; 
Stefanick 1996, 244). For example, appointments to consultative bodies are short term, 
and the results often only provide general direction. As a result, the establishment of a 
commission may therefore serve to postpone or divert public attention. As well, the goals 
of environmental groups (public education, land protection and conservation, species 
protection, etc.) are often found to be too general, diffiise, radical, or philosophical to 
incorporate into specific policy agendas. Instead, members of environmental groups find 
themselves co-opted by the terms of reference, the influence of other board members, or 
the procedures themselves (Stefanick 1996,235).
IS
There is also often a lack of resources (i.e. money, staff, expertise) to support public 
involvement in the policy process (Stefanick 1996, 233). There are few Canadian 
environmental groups that have the resources adequate enough to consult with all of the 
government officials who play significant roles in the policy process (Wilson 1992, 116). 
Finally, the appointed body typically lacks substantive power to implement decisions, 
thus restricting their impact on the policy process.
The policy process is currently unable to adequately integrate a wide range of 
environmental interests (Stefanick 1996,234). Who speaks for what interest? The 
present discretionary character of practices o f public involvement may be inadequate to 
ensure the inclusion o f all interests (Hessing & Howlett 1997, 124). There is yet to be a 
mechanism for ensuring that a range of environmental perspectives are represented, and 
their relative importance to the natural environment properly assessed. In light of the 
barriers within the environmental policy process and to public involvement, these 
interests , although an increasing force in the policy process, remain secondary to 
traditional state and industry influences (Hessing & Howlett 1997, 134).
There is a complexity o f biophysical processes that complicates the policy process. The 
predictability o f biophysical processes is essential to environmental policy-making in 
order to attempt to establish sustainable levels of exploitation, and acceptable levels of 
pollution (Rogers 1997, 3). However, the increasing recognition of the unpredictability 
of the natural environment undermines this policy goal, thus making the policy process 
very difficult, if not impossible. In spite of this, policy-making attempts are in progress to
19
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I link regulatory frameworks that, in the past, have operated separately (i.e. forestry, 
transportation, urban planning, etc). In doing so, this effort can potentially create an 
integrated policy that may be able to address the multiple aspects of an issue (Rogers
1997, 3).
This attempt at integrated policy-making is complicated by the wide range o f participants 
all o f whom have a stake in the issues. There are considerable increases in the time and 
resources required to adequately integrate all participants and their interests in the policy 
process. In spite of the need for policies to be efficiently developed in order to ensure 
that the policy process is successful, these interests need to be consulted. The challenge 
is amplified when there is typically a  profound difierence in the political and economic 
power of participants, as well as difference in point o f view (Rogers 1997, 3). Creating a 
workable environmental policy will involve contesting these unequal power relations.
3.3 Public Participation and the Policy Process
Public participation, environmental groups included, is required within the policy process 
from the primary stage to the final stage. Public participation not only requires 
consultation and interdisciplinary approaches to policy-making, but also a challenge to 
the interests and power relations that typically generated the perceived environmental 
problem in the first place. Environmental policy-making needs to address the complexity 
of the historical policy process if it is to challenge the difficulties in managing and 
governing the many environmental problems Canada is faced with.
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With recent significant changes to the policy process in Canada, and with the 
accommodation of some public participation, environmental interests have been able to 
increase their influence. In doing so, there has been an expansion in the scope of issues. 
In the late 1980s, the scope o f consideration in Canadian environmental policy was 
dramatically expanded when consultation mechanisms, traditionally limited to federal and 
provincial governments and regulated industries, were opened up to include 
environmental groups. Environmental organizations are now able to provide a voice for 
diffuse public concerns, and to some extent, are able to limit the federal government’s 
ability to substitute symbolism for substance.
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Chapter Four: Pressure Group Theory
"...the state's power is not a  given thing, it stands in constant need o f 
legitimization. Different political actors take part in this struggle over the limits 
of the state's legitimacy... it becomes an extremely important task for political 
groups to question where [the] authority begins and ends. By challenging the 
authority of the state ..., political groups seek to construct themselves a powerful 
position, a  position ffom where they can set [influence] the political agenda " 
(Hjelmar 1996,7).
The essence o f govenunent in Canada is the struggle of competing interests to persuade 
decision-makers to frame acceptable public policies (White 1998, 160). Canadians 
organize in numerous and novel ways to influence the government's decision-making 
process. Some work through political parties, some prefer to act individually, some hire 
lobbyists to act for them, while others join groups in order to participate in and enjoy the 
benefits of collective action (Jackson 1998,469). A large portion of the Canadian 
population belongs to some organization or another (i.e. professional organization, labour 
union, community group, church group) which seek to influence governments (Jackson 
1998, 469; White 1998, 160). Large or small, these groups are active in pressing their 
needs, principles, and desires on other Canadians. When such groups act in the political 
arena without becoming full-fledged political parties, they are usually referred to as 
interest groups or pressure groups (Brooks 1993, 72).
Pressure group politics, as it is known today, is not a new phenomena in Canada. The 
1960s was a decade of frantic activity in public-policy formation (Pross 1992, 66). The 
three major movements that influenced the national public sphere during this time were 
the women's, the environmental and the consumer movements. The groups within these
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movements began to demand government attention. As a  result, pressure groups became 
a new political force, surprising the industry-business sectors with their influence on new 
legislation and regulation.
In spite of the activity of the 1960s and onward, pressure group politicking is a well- 
practiced but little-understood art (Jackson 1998,479). The groups themselves are 
certainly not a new phenomenon in politics, but the academic recognition of pressure 
groups is more recent (Ball 1993, 104). hi fact, pressure groups have a long history in 
Canada. Evidence o f their work can be seen in the colonial period and in the Erst years 
of Confederation (Pross 1994, 178). However, it has been since the mid 1960s that the 
growth and presence of pressure groups have transformed the country's political
landscape (Wilson 1990, 142). These groups have become more prominent actors in j
j
political debates. The reasons for the shift are not entirely clear. A root cause is believed I
to be fundamental changes in social attitudes (in particular women’s rights, 
environmental concerns, and the anti-war stance) that have been taking place since the 
Depression (Pross 1994, 179). Another reason is the impact of television, which taught
I
many Canadians how they could use the media to influence public decisions. Richard ^
!
Simeon (1995, 37) suggests that domestic pressure groups, particularly single-issue 
groups, have proliferated in Canada and other western countries with the decline of 
political parties as legitimate organizers of public opinion.
The Canadian state has been faced with the challenge of responding to a  host of new and 
assertive pressure groups attempting to address a multitude of issues. As well, the
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increasing diversity of interests and identities in Canada, and the difGculty for politicians 
of representing, accommodating, and transcending the diversities, has resulted in the need 
for further representation (Pal 1997, 209). As a result, pressure group politics have 
acquired a more prominent place in Canadian politics and is considered by some as a 
force to be reckoned with (Pross 1992, xi). Considerable importance has been afforded to 
the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 to explain the 
success and prominence of pressure groups, and to the ensuing process of "Charter 
politics" (Alan Cairns 1992). Gagnon & Tanguay (1989, 2-11) assert that the increase in 
citizen participation in pressure group politics is due to the decline of political parties and 
their representational capacity. Theories abound as to why pressure groups have 
multiplied exponentially.
Along with the growth in the numbers o f pressure groups in Canadian politics, these 
groups have also harnessed the most sophisticated tactics in their drive for political 
influence (Presthus 1978,68). It is difficult to find any social activity or interest that 
does not have representation. However, in spite of having representation, there is no 
guarantee of equal representation. Substantial variations exist in the political and 
organizational resources amongst pressure groups. The industrial-business and 
professional groups tend to monopolize the instruments o f political influence: political 
alliances, resources, and sophistication of tactics (Presthus 1978,68).
The next section of the literature review will look at pressure group theory, both ffom a 
general perspective and specifically as it applies in Canada. The review will begin by
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defining what pressure groups are, as well as attempt to both differentiate between and 
reconcile interest group theory with pressure group theory. Once defîned, the purpose of 
pressure groups will be explored from numerous perspectives, as well as the limitations 
and requirements of pressure groups. The policy process in Canada will be detailed as it 
applies to pressure group politics. Following is a look at the various actions of 
environmental pressure groups, using both formal and informal channels. It is at this 
point that the review will focus in on one area of pressure group politics - environmental. 
The final area of focus is on the future of pressure groups in Canada, and the potential 
roles pressure groups will play on the Canadian political scene.
4.1. Pressure Groups Defined
"...there are very real limits on the ability of any one individual to move the 
policy process. What is generally needed is some form of collective action, and 
it is here that organized interest groups come into play " (Gibbons 1994, 396).
Movements are tied to ideologies involving broad social change. They are borderless
currents of interest that flow easily across political boundaries because of their broad and
inclusive philosophies. The message of a movement can be prevalent across countries as
well as continents. Movements are not composed of single, unitary actors. Instead, they
are informal networks that link different players - organizations as well as individuals -
through joint interaction (Phillips 1994, 190). They are socially constructed. Movements
are typically composed of four main characteristics: 1) an informal network of
organizations and individuals who, 2) on the basis of collective identity and shared
values, 3) engage in political and or cultural struggle intended to expand the boundaries
of the existing system, and 4) undertake collective action designed to affect both state and
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society (Phillips 1994, 189; Stefanick: 1996, 16). Movements have become a powerful 
force in changing societal attitudes and influencing governments (Jackson 1998,499). 
Because of their inclusiveness, movements often help to unify people by embracing 
national and international issues or points of view.
hiterest (pressure) groups typically spring from a general movement (i.e. from the social 
movement springs Amnesty International) in order to focus on a  specific issue, piece of 
legislation, or location. Pressure groups tend to reside inside specific countries, although 
some do not (i.e. Sierra Club, Greenpeace, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals - 
PET A). Political parties can also spring fi-om a movement when a group of individuals 
decide that the interests o f the group can be best served by pursuing change through 
formal political channels.
What are Pressure Groups?
Pressure group formation is considered to be a  natural occurrence in any democratic 
society where individuals with a  common interest often form a group to pursue that 
interest (Knight 1991, 6). Group theory implies that the constellation of pressure groups 
participating in a policy process would represent all the interests that could be affected by 
the process. All groups would actively participate in the process, attempting to influence 
the outcome of the process. Groups are, in fact, viewed as rational, natural components 
of democratic society by various political scientists.
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Power' can be either direct or indirect. Direct power is exercised directly on government. 
Groups affect, or seek to affect, government by effectively possessing and/or employing 
political resources as constraints upon government's autonomy (Pyrcz 1994, 329). For 
example, a pressure group lobbying the provincial government to influence a change in a 
specific policy is exercising direct power. Indirect power refers to those circumstances in 
which groups employ political resources to gamer support from the citizens and groups 
who themselves have power over governments. Examples of indirect power include the 
shaping of public opinion via newspaper articles, the distribution of information leaflets 
to the general public, and the use of the Internet to disperse information.
Pressure groups are "... any group of citizens seeking to bring about or preserve their 
preferred state of a^airs by means of power, directly or indirectly affecting governments, 
without standing for elected office," (Pyrcz 1994, 329). Pressure group politics involve 
the political promotion of interests and values. Eckstein (1960, 26) describes pressure 
group politics as the intermediate level o f activity between the political and the apolitical. 
Pross (1992, 152) refers to this intermediate level as the "attentive public ".
Pross (1993, 146) believes that in order to begin to understand pressure group life, one 
must arrange what is known about them into meaningful patterns. One pattern, applied 
by many scholars, is to classify all groups according to the kinds of causes they promote. 
Two broadly defined groups used are the ones that pursue the self-interest o f their 
members (i.e. Canadian Medical Association, Canadian Bar Association, British 
Columbia Teacher's Federation, etc.), and the groups that pursue more general, public
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interest (i.e. Canadian Standards Association, Western Canada Wilderness Socie^, 
Planned Parenthood, etc.). This type o f classification may be too broad because most 
groups work simultaneously for both selective benefits and the public interest. For 
example, the Canadian Medical Association's standards imposed upon their members are 
there to theoretically safe guard the general public.
Pross (1992, 3) believes that the chief characteristic of the pressure group is that it tries to 
persuade governments to pursue the policies it advocates. The act o f persuasion takes 
many forms with nearly all of them intended to exert political pressure. The 
characteristics that separate pressure groups from a mob or movement are continuity and 
organization. Continuity is required in order to have a lasting effect. The public and 
government require reminders in order to develop a  recognition for both the identity of 
the pressure groups as well as their issues. A mob is a temporary thing, a  product of 
chance. The mob may gain clearly stated and inunediately realizable goals, but it does 
not have the ability to provide for future objectives; a mob is unable to provide for its 
own continued existence (Pross 1992,4). A movement consists of many distinct 
elements that differentiate it from the more coherent unit of a pressure group.
The distinction has been made between pressure groups , mobs, and movements. There 
should also be a distinction made between political parties and pressure groups. Erickson 
provides an succinct comparison between the two terms: "... parties are organizations 
that put forward candidates to compete for publicly elected office under a  particular label 
and that campaign for votes for their candidates " (Erickson 1994, 277). The electoral
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activities distinguish parties from pressure groups; pressure groups form separately from 
the electoral system. Because candidates compete for votes in elections, the constraints 
parties confront tend to be different from those facing pressure groups.
In defining the term pressure group, one may find it helpful to have a  concise list of 
characteristics which distinguish pressure groups from other types of groups. Pross 
provides four prime characteristics of pressure groups (Jackson 1998,470):
- They have a formal structure of organization that gives them continuity. 
Organization is found to be essential to allow pressure groups to determine their 
objectives and strategies for action.
- They are able to articulate and aggregate interests.
- They attempt to act within the political system to influence policy outputs.
- They try to influence power rather than exercise the responsibility of government
themselves.
Similar to pressure groups, interest groups are defined as "... organizations whose 
members act together to influence public policy in order to promote their common 
interest (Pross 1992, 3). David Truman's (1951, 33) definition of interest group is "...any 
group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other 
groups in society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms o f 
behaviour that are implied by the shared attitudes ". Interest groups are organizations that 
attempt to further their common interest by affecting public policy (Jackson 1998,470). 
Like pressure groups, there are varying types o f interest groups. Gibbins looks at the
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interest groups that have a  single theme of focus and describes them as pursuing non- 
negotiable interests which are much more difQcult for the political system to handle 
(Gibbins 1994, 397).
In looking at both interest groups and pressure groups, their expectations are seen to 
override any expectation o f the general populace. Because the group believes that the 
claims being made are of paramount importance, they also believe that the general 
populace should support the efforts of the group. Fortunately for many o f the 
interest/pressure groups and the public, their focus is a collective good in that not only 
will the members within the group benefit, but also the populace as a whole (i.e. through 
pollution abatement measures, protection of a recreation area, etc.). O f course, there are 
other interests held by varying pressure groups that only benefit the group requesting it 
(i.e. pharmaceutical groups pushing for longer patent rights on products to monopolize a 
specific market) (Gibbins 1994, 397).
In spite of the lengthy definitions provided for both pressure groups and interest groups, 
by now one realizes that the dissimilarities are slight enough that one may consider the 
two terms interchangeable. Sidle (1993,218), for example, states that although the 
expression pressure group' is common in the political science literature, his preference 
leans towards the use o f the term interest group' because it is more usual in current 
political discourse, public debate and media reports. The assumption is then that the 
terms pressure group' and interest group' are interchangeable. Pross (1992,68) also uses 
the terms interchangeably. However, Pross also goes on to differentiate pressure groups
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from all other interest groups; the other groups arc latent interests, solidarity groups, 
social movements, political parties, and government affiliated organizations (Pross 1992, 
11). He provides a  "test to determine if  an organization is a pressure group" which 
provides simple questions and criteria to guide the answers (Appendix: Pross’ Test). 
Pross' use of the term interest group' could then be described as the groups involved in 
the policy process'.
Eckstein (1960, 9) defines both pressure groups and interests groups with hardly a 
differentiating stroke; the deviation is that interests groups do not involve themselves in 
formal politics, for if they do, they are then called pressure groups. White's (1998, 154) 
distinction is based on the relative permanence of interest groups versus the more 
temporary, spontaneous nature of pressure groups. White (1998) believes that an interest 
group consists of people who recognize that they share certain characteristics and 
consequently seek goals that will improve their common situation. In contrast, pressure 
groups spring up in response to some current or public policy that is considered to have 
fairly drastic repercussions for those impacted. Once the pressure group achieves their 
goal, the members disband, having no further common thread to hold it together (White 
1998, 154).
Upon reviewing the definitions of both interest group and pressure group, there are few 
notable distinctions between them. As a result of the interchangeability of terms, the 
term pressure group will be used from the outset o f the review simply because it is the
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most recognized term academically. Where the term interest group has been used in the 
current literature, it will apply to pressure groups as well.
Types o f  Pressure Groups 
There are various types o f pressure groups based on the focus, issue, membership, and 
who gains from the outcome of the effort. The types of pressure groups may be 
elaborated by making a  distinction between primary pressure groups (groups whose 
primary purpose is political) and secondary pressure groups (groups whose objectives 
lead them into political action from time to time) (Grant 1989, 10). O f course, this 
distinction is not always clear. For example, the Catholic Association may provide a 
service for members, but the association is also very political with issues such as abortion 
and sexual education.
Similar to Pyrcz (1994) and Grant (1989), Pross (1975, 12) also makes a distinction 
amongst certain pressure groups based on their focus and actions. The distinction Pross 
draws is between institutional groups' and issue-oriented groups'. Institutional groups 
are those having organizational continuity, cohesion, stable membership, concrete and 
immediate objectives, and a  preference for organizational goals over particular objectives 
(i.e. the Canadian Medical Association, the Sierra Club, and the Canadian Broadcasters' 
Association), histitutional groups are concerned about protecting their access to 
government, and are thus unlikely to become embroiled in election campaigns that might 
fragment their membership base and disrupt their access (Gibbins 1994, 397). Their 
contacts with the federal and provincial bureaucrats are carefully nurtured. Issue-oriented
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groups, on the other hand, form exclusively to pursue one major policy change, and 
typically have the opposite qualities o f that of the institutional groups; limited 
organizational continuity and cohesion, lack of organization, knowledge of the 
government is minimal and often naive, and membership is extremely fluid. Issue- 
oriented groups typically are involved with issues that are capable of resolution and could 
potentially be removed from the nation's political arena once addressed (Gibbins 1994, 
397). As stated earlier, there are single-issue groups under this umbrella that often pursue 
non-negotiable interests, which are much more difficult for the political system to 
address.
Within the two types of pressure groups, there are groups described as advocacy 
organizations (Pal 1993, 122). As mentioned, these types of organizations are a subset of 
the larger group of pressure groups, and seek a  collective good, the achievement of which 
would not selectively benefit only the membership of the organization. Instead, a 
collective good is any public policy whose benefits may be realized equally by many 
people (i.e. world peace, clean air), regardless of their membership in, or support for, a 
given organization (Pal 1993,123).
Canadian Aspects
Canadian pressure group politics, although similar to pressure group politics in other 
countries, maintains a level of uniqueness when compared with other countries in the 
western hemisphere (Pyrcz 1994, 346). This next part of the review will look at the 
uniqueness of Canada's pressure group politics, looking specifically at the Canadian
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legislature and how it functions, and how this, in turn, dictates the actions of pressure
groups.
The actual number of registered pressure groups in Canada proliferated between 1965 
and 1984, similar to pressure group growth in the United States (Pyrcz 1994, 348). Much 
of the Canadian pressure group growth was due to the support and encouragement that 
new groups received from the federal government of the period. This is one of the ways 
that Canadian pressure group politics are distinctive from other countries. Canadian 
governments (provincial and federal) went out of their way to provide access for pressure 
groups to Cabinet and to the public service. Governments also sought to develop close, 
co-operative, consensus-building relationships with many groups (Pyrcz 1994, 349). By 
providing the resources for the proliferation of pressure groups, the various levels of 
government believed that the multitude of interests within Canada would be represented 
in policy without the implementation of expensive government bureaucracy. 
Unfortunately for pressure groups in Canada, the subsequent federal government, led by 
Brian Mulroney, strove to undo much of the work that the previous Trudeau (and Clark) 
administrations had done in building a  larger theatre for pressure group politics (Pyrcz 
1994, 350).
The contact between individual legislatures and pressure groups is believed to be the 
most significant and persistent difference between Canadian and American pressure 
group tactics (Pyrcz 1994,337). The difference in government between the two countries 
explain the contrast in levels of contact. Many observers of Canadian politics argue that
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the acceptance and support of the various political players (including pressure groups) 
has resulted in a particularly Canadian brand o f politics that is more tolerant of 
differences and promotes greater inclusion of diverse voices when compared with the 
United States (Phillips 1994, 199). Presthus believes that the uniqueness o f the Canadian 
policy process is simply due to Canadians being much more respectful than Americans, 
thus formally enshrining the various points of access to different groups within a  
democracy (Pross 1996,43). Because of this respectfulness, Canadians are said to be 
more inclined to accept the decisions of the elite.
The debate over the role of pressure groups in public policy formation has been 
conducted within the framework of a pluralist understanding. It is this understanding that 
has a Canadian twist with its origins in our traditional view of the state (Pross 1996, 36). 
Pross believes that Canadian-style pressure group politics is unique to this country (Pross 
1993, 152). Canada has no public forum in which pressure groups, politicians, and the 
public may meet and realize all aspects of an issue at center stage. Debate in Parliament 
has been tightly controlled by government with functions like committee hearings 
offering few opportunities for debate, much less changing, a policy. As a  result, pressure 
groups, and others wishing to influence public policy, opt to approach and attempt to 
persuade civil servants and Cabinet ministers, leaving parliamentarians with few options 
(Pross 1993, 153). In the United States, however, there are public debates involving 
committee hearings where rival demands are vigorously presented and where every lobby 
concerned with the issue has the opportuni^ to put its case to the general public as well 
as to the policy makers. The unique' Canadian system results in the legitimate, wealthy.
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coherent interests, having increased access to the legislative process, as well as more 
influence, compared to the less legitimate, poor, and diffuse interests, who have few 
sources o f access to the legislative process (Pross 1993, 153). A policy system like 
Canada's, where legislatures do not have a large say in policy development, will 
encourage pressure groups to develop quite differently from those that emerge in the 
United States. Canadian legislature, and thus pressure group politics, are unique 
compared to other countries like the United States. Canadian pluralism has distinctive 
characteristics that requires focused understanding in order to know how to best apply 
these characteristics (Pross 1996, 34).
4.2 The Purpose of Pressure Groups
After 1965, the Canadian government, like its counterparts across the western world, was 
faced with the challenge of responding to a  host of new types of pressure groups (Wilson 
1990, 141). With the arrival of groups articulating a variety of public interest positions, 
the political landscape was transformed. The electoral process is a process in which 
citizens are able to cast a retrospective judgment on government performance (Gibbins 
1994,400). The electoral process, however, does not enable citizens to direct the course 
of public policy. To address the everyday actions of government, pressure groups have 
come to serve as alternative policy instruments.
Political parties and other agencies of representation do not seem as attentive to the task 
of respecting diversity and multiplicity as do pressure groups (Pyrcz 1994, 330). Li fact, 
Canadian political parties have proven to be less and less successful at carrying out their
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üindamental duties. Some of the more predominant reasons for this have to do with the 
emergence o f the mass party, the impact of the electronic media, changes in the way 
economic and social life is organized, and the rise of specialized bureaucracies (Pross 
1994, 183). Political parties have become proficient at running elections, but steadily less 
proficient at organizing communication with the grassroots (ibid., 184). Government 
policy can only serve as public policy if it is based on consultations with an interested 
public. At a time when many citizens are understandably disenchanted with political 
parties, involvement in pressure group activity has become increasingly attractive as an 
alternative means of influencing government (Grant 1989, 164). Pressure groups have a 
growing importance as a source of constructive opposition to government policy, and as a 
means of ensuring that the distance between government and the governed does not 
become too great. Pressure groups have also attempted to All the representational 
vacuum at the grassroots level; groups have developed to address the needs of specialized 
interests. As working relations developed between grassroots groups and specific 
agencies, the formal political system became less and less important as a required ally. 
Instead, political interventions were reserved for major issues. As members of the public 
found it difficult to address large public issues through party channels, the public began 
forming advocacy groups which found ways to attract national attention and provoke 
public debate (Pross 1994, 184). The overall success of these advocacy groups led to a 
growing public conviction that an individual has a greater chance of influencing policy 
through a pressure group than through a political party.
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Pressure groups are a major source of mediation between the government and the 
individual, articulating aggregated opinions and protecting the individual from excessive 
control by the state (Jackson 1998,472). Pressure groups provide a mechanism for 
political representation which supplements the electoral process. This service assists the 
political system by marshaling support for various issues and providing ideas for public 
policy. Pressure groups enable the political process to be more responsive to social and 
economic differences in society than the electoral process. Groups provide government 
with information, both fact and opinion, that can potentially be used to help formulate 
policies, or discontinue a policy effort. This cycle of communication provides a valuable 
link between citizens and public policy by enabling government to keep in touch with 
fluctuations in public opinion (Jackson 1998,472; Gibbins 1994, 398; Tanguay & Kay 
1991, 102-3; Knight 1991,3). As well, pressure groups help to disseminate and interpret 
state policies to their members, and assist the state by expanding the range o f information 
available to the state for planning and management (Knight 1991,4). Groups also act as 
agents of government by undertaking activities which would normally be a function of 
the state, such as licensing and regulating their members (Canadian Medical Association, 
Canadian Bar Association, Professional Biologist Association, etc.).
As Knight details, pressure groups perform these functions in vastly different ways and 
with varying levels of effectiveness (Knight 1991,4). There are numerous factors which 
impact in the effectiveness of the functions of pressure groups. These factors will be 
discussed further on in the review.
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4.2.1 The Role of Pressure Groups: Past, Present, and Future
The purpose of pressure groups in terms of their role in Canadian society, in the country’s 
politics, and in its policy development, is the focus o f this part of the review. With a  firm 
idea of what a  pressure group is, one may now delve into the question o f why pressure 
groups exist and why they are important; what is the purpose of pressure groups in 
Canadian society?
Pressure groups are social constructs with varying levels of cohesion and shared aims 
which attempt to influence the political decision-making process (Ball 1993, 103). They 
can be identified in all political systems and serve in various capacities, both formally 
and informally. Pluralist theorists place particular emphasis on the role of pressure 
groups in liberal democracies. They argue that the competing group interaction 
determines the outcome of many political conflicts, provides wider avenues of political 
participation, and also ensures a wider distribution of power (Ball 1993, 104). In 
promoting their members interests, groups perform four socially and politically 
significant functions. They administer, regulate, communicate, and legitimate (Pross 
1994, 175). Pressure groups promote the conunon interests of their members as the 
central and foremost important function. If they do not adequately serve their members 
they generally cease to exist. Pressure groups serve to widen the range of interests that 
are taken into account in the legislative process. Wilson claims (1984, 22) that pressure 
groups counterbalance two inherent weaknesses in democracy (Grant 1989, 156). The 
first weakness is that democracy does not work for all people. The second inherent 
weakness is that electioneering encourages a short-term perspective on issues.
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The hrst weakness emphasizes the fundamental link between the existence of pressure 
groups and the very survival o f a system of democratic government. Freedom of 
association is a fundamental principle of democracy. Democracy permits the existence of 
groups, and these groups are seen to contribute to the qualiQr of the decision-making 
process (Ball 1993, 21). Pressure groups enable citizens to express their views on 
complex issues which affect their lives. Ball believes that democracy cannot be 
simplified to a head-counting exercise. Instead, it must also take into account the 
strength of feelings expressed, and of the quality o f the arguments advanced. Pressure 
group participation provides a  voice, as well as an mechanism for citizens to participate 
in the experience of ruling and being ruled.
The following is a summary of the eight roles pressure groups play according to Pyrcz
(1994, 340-5):
1) Pressure groups as agents of interest: The first role pressure groups perform is 
to identify, collect, express, and represent the interests and opinions of citizens.
2) Pressure groups as the agents of community: The second role of pressure 
groups is to develop a sense of community among citizens who share an interest and who 
consider this interest to be important to their identities.
3) Pressure groups as agents of power: Pressure groups effectively possess and 
exercise power over governments. Many political agents believe that they get more value 
from the political resources they expend in advancing their interests and concerns via 
pressure groups than they do ffom resources spent in political parties.
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4) Pressure groups as the agents o f Judicial Review: The fourth role o f pressure 
groups is to use the authoriQr and power of the law to protect and advance their members'
interests.
5) Pressure groups as the agents of information: Pressure groups provide 
information to government and society. This information is of two sorts - political 
information and nonpolitical information. Both sorts o f information are useful in 
representative democracies. Political information provides an indication of which 
interests and opinions citizens consider to be salient and important to their core interests. 
Nonpolitical information is information provided by the pressure group on the matters 
that affect their group's interests and opinions.
6) Pressure groups as agents of leeitimacv: The sixth role of pressure groups is 
to provide legitimacy for governments. Cabinet members, bureaucrats, oppositions, 
elected representatives, political parties, and even journalists. In doing so, pressure 
groups run the risk of legitimizing the actions o f government while government opts for 
the opposite of the pressure groups' desired result.
7) Pressure groups as the agents of leadership: Pressure groups provide political 
leadership, hi doing so, they shape public opinion and often politicize the electorate - 
causing the public to become interested and active in politics and government.
8) Pressure groups as agents of advantage: Pressure groups seek and often 
achieve an advantage for the interests they represent.
Some pressure groups choose to devote all or most of their efforts to influencing 
government policy. Other groups may only rarely seek to influence government, instead
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they concentrate mainly on other activities. However, despite the area of focus, it can be 
said that those who belong to an organization or a  group can be presumed to have a 
common interest. Along with the common interest, each individual also brings their 
purely individual interests, different ffom those of the others in the organization or group. 
It is the common interest, however, that brings people together to form a pressure group. 
And in spite of all the different interests held by the numerous different pressure groups, 
what each individual has in common, regardless of the group or organization they 
"belong" to, is the desire to influence government policy, legislation, regulation or 
expenditures (Jackson 1998,470). Aside from the obvious potential political role of 
pressure groups, they also perform a more subtle task of political communication by 
helping to create civil society. Groups are able to do this by fostering public spiritedness 
and motivation, increasing knowledge about public issues, promoting innovation, and 
helping to mobilize the public (Pross 1994, 177; Gibbins 1994, 398). In fact, in a study 
of local pressure groups, and how they were viewed by local Members of Parliament, 
revealed that even those groups with so-called offensive tactics or unrealistic demands 
were seen as serving an important communications function in the political system, as 
well as sparking much-needed debate on issues of public policy (Sidle 1993, 196).
Political parties are primarily instruments of governance rather than instruments for the 
transmission of policy preferences from the electorate to the government. As a result, 
other ways of transmitting information are required. Individuals are able to express 
themselves in a number of ways, however, the impact of an individual is very limited in 
terms of policy development. Where the individual is found to have little impact.
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pressure groups perform. Gibbins (1994, 396) uses the example o f Greenpeace when 
comparing the impact of the individual with the impact of the pressure group. As an 
individual, one would be powerless to impact the policy process if it were not for groups 
like Greenpeace. On one's behalf, Greenpeace can lobby internationally, sail boats in 
front of whaling fleets, raise concern for whales in newspapers and magazines around the 
world, and organize consumer boycotts. Greenpeace becomes one's hired gun' with no 
more demand than the short time it takes to write a cheque. This minimal requirement, 
when considered cumulatively across thousands of individuals, provides the foundation 
for an effective political organization.
Pross (1992, 2) believes that pressure groups are essential in any modem state, hi fact, he 
goes so far as to state that the rise in the number and proliferation of pressure groups in 
Canada has enhanced Canadian democracy (ibid.). Pressure groups provide information 
both to the government and the general public, thus serving as an information conduit. 
The provision of information also serves as a  connector between government and the 
governed.
Because pressure groups are accepted within the political culture, there are legitimate 
channels for complaints and frustrations (Jackson 1998,498). Citizens are provided an 
opportunity to articulate viewpoints and defend them, hi doing so, most citizens do not 
have to resort to extra-legal behaviour to be heard. When citizens are part o f a 
legitimized group, they are committed to acting within the system. When the purpose of 
pressure groups are presented in this fashion, they act as a safety valve for individual
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frustrations by allowing the possibility of joining with others to influence legislation. 
Thus, pressure groups provide a crucial and culturally acceptable link between citizen 
and public policy. Because of the important role pressure groups are said to play within 
the political arena. Pal believes that legislative committees should bring groups out of the 
background and provide explicit opportunities to support or reject bills (Pal 1993, 122).
In spite of the now obvious need for pressure groups in the Canadian political arena, there 
are limitations to the growth of pressure groups. If pressure groups were allowed to 
accumulate too much influence, there would be a risk to democracy. However, pressure 
groups operate in a political system in which they are checked by other political forces 
(Grant 1989, 163). The first check is public opinion; public opinion strongly influences 
the context in which pressure groups operate. The second check is political parties. The 
more broadly based political parties have to appeal beyond the relatively narrow concerns 
of most pressure groups to win elections. Because of these two controls', pressure 
groups' power is limited, for their power is based on the ability to persuade and to 
influence, rather than to make decisions or veto them.
4.2.2 Requirements and Limitations Experienced by Pressure Groups
Up to this point in the review, one is left with the understanding of the importance of the 
pressure group in Canadian politics, both formally and informally. However, there is a 
small portion of pressure groups who are able to exercise their democratic role to its 
fullest. The rest of the groups, desperate to play a larger role in the policy process, are 
denied from doing so. The reason for the denial is not necessarily a legislated one. In
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fact, restrictions come in the form of resources; they lack the necessary resources to fully 
participate in the Canadian policy process. This next part of the review will look at the 
limitations most groups experience, as well as some o f the requirements that are thought 
to be essential in order for groups to be effective and successful in their endeavors. The 
first and largest section of this portion of the review is resources', with legislative' and 
legitimacy' to follow.
Participant Resources
Gibbins (1994, 397) asserts that one cannot assume that all interests within society will 
rind adequate expression through organized groups. An effective organization requires 
resources. The resources referred to here, as well as throughout this research, are the 
resources cited by both activists and pressure group theorists as necessary to participate 
in policy development. The use of resources should not be confused with the term as it 
applies to natural resources such as forests and water. The term ‘resources’ as it is used 
in this research refers to the resources necessary to participate in the policy process in 
Canada; participant resources. Participant resources (referred to in this research here on 
in as ‘resources’) include things like money, leadership, and membership.
As a result of the unequal distribution of resources, group politics may extend the 
political influence of already powerful interests as much as they open up the political 
arena to a wider array of competing interests. According to Pal, power can be derined by 
the level of resources (such as membership, money, strategy, and leadership) that an 
organization (or group) maintains. The groups with the best mix of resources are
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presumed to win what they want from the political process (Pal 1994,42). This approach 
assumes that politicians respond to the configurations of group power, and that 
government is not simply a neutral force.
Substantial variations exist in political and organizational resources, with industrial- 
business and professional groups tending to monopolize the instruments o f political 
influence, both in numbers and resources (Presthus 1978, 68). As well, when one 
analyzes the relative political effectiveness of pressure groups, industrial-business types 
tend to rank highest. This is largely due to these groups having the greatest amount of 
resources, including the exceptional legitimacy that governmental elite’s provide to 
economic actors. As a result of the generosi^ of government, both access and influence 
vis-à-vis legislators and bureaucrats, are easier for the industrial-business and 
professional pressure group’s to obtain when compared to, for example, women's or 
ethnic groups (Presthus 1978, 69; Pyrcz 1994, 335).
The need for leadership and expert advice is unavoidable when a pressure group needs to 
know what government is thinking about, what it needs to know, and how to get the 
information to the right place at the right time, and in the most acceptable form (Pross 
1993, 148; Ball 1993, 110). hi order to accomplish the objective of communication, 
pressure groups must have an expert stafr, or at least a  well-informed membership, able 
to communicate with government officials at bureaucratic as well as elected levels, on a 
continuous basis. The lack of staff in general is a serious deficiency within the pressure 
group setting because it generally means that the group does not have expert knowledge
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about what government is doing or thinking about the issue of concern. As a result, 
members tend to work in a vacuum (Pross 1993, 150).
When considering resources, Jackson & Jackson (1998,478) have provided an overall 
summary o f what are necessary ingredients for success for pressure groups:
- An appealing issue; one that will gamer very broad public sympathy/support, 
and increase the size of the group, or at least increase its support.
- Good leadership is important; a strong, vocal, and prestigious leader brings 
valuable publicity and direction.
- A  high-status general membership further increases the chance o f success. 
Distinguished, influential people bring contacts and other resources, as well as having 
easier personal access to bureaucrats and politicians.
- A  permanent organizational structure is important because it helps the group act 
cohesively. Internal divisions weaken the group. Sections of society that have common 
interests but are unorganized usually have little long-term impact on public perceptions.
- Large budgets naturally assist in achieving and maintaining access to policy­
makers. Property does not guarantee success, but it does increase its possibility.
- Flexibility is another important factor in achieving success, since it is often 
necessary to compromise one part of a demand to achieve another. The need for 
flexibility also includes the value of developing networks with other like-minded groups 
to share resources and amplify the support behind an issue.
- The final important condition of success consists of knowing where and when 
access to policy-makers can be achieved.
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Ball adds to this list the importance of co-operation; governments want advice, technical 
information, as well as co-operation from strong pressure groups (Bail 1993, 111). By 
not securing at least a minimal amount of the necessary resources, these disadvantaged 
groups will remain underrepresented as will their interests in the policy process (Knight 
1991, 11; Pal 1997, 194).
The above summation does not cover the entire spectrum of necessary resources, because 
these vary with the societal and cultural considerations. For example, what is deemed as 
absolutely necessary in Canada, may not completely apply to pressure groups politics in 
other countries. One could even go so far as to say what is found to be essential pressure 
group requirements in western Canada or British Columbia, does not completely apply to 
the east coast of Canada.
Legislature
The introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms into Canadian society in 1982 
redefined the relationship between the individual and the state (Sidle 1993, 189). In fact, 
the Charter has clearly, and in some cases dramatically, changed the Canadian policy 
process (Pal 1993, 152). The academic literature supports the view that the state is less 
than it used to be, in light of the implications of the Charter (Pross 1996,43).
In spite of the lessened importance of the state, the legislature remains a prominent player 
in the policy process. Because of this, pressure groups must be aware of procedure when
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dealing with a legislature in order to efficiently utilize resources. When choosing a 
lobbying strategy, a group must consider the extent of its resources, as well as the extent 
of its lobbying efforts. A group may choose to not only lobby legislators and 
bureaucrats, histead, they may lobby in concert with arousing public opinion. However, 
no amount of persuasion o f the government by pressure groups will be effective unless 
public opinion is in agreement with a  lobby, or at least not hostile to its demands 
(Jackson & Jackson 1998,482; White 1998, 118). As well, pressure groups must be 
aware of the policy process within the legislature. Policies are made before they reach 
Parliament, therefore, lobbying MPs at this point is not the most effective use of group 
energy and resources. Instead, the most beneficial form of lobbying is probably to target 
key bureaucrats and ministers while policy is in the development stage (Jackson & 
Jackson 1998,483).
With the realization of the procedure of the policy process, pressure groups work towards 
their goals in vastly different ways with varying levels of effectiveness. There are 
numerous factors that cause this variation in effectiveness, however, theorists have 
suggested that access and legitimacy are the most important (Knight 1991,4). Access is 
determined by the level of legitimacy bestowed upon a group by members of the policy 
process.
Seeking Legitimacy
Pressure groups are not strongly oriented towards Parliament because o f the limited 
capacity groups have in influencing public policy within this forum (Sidle 1993, 190). In
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addition to limitations on the ability to influence, it was found that even if the newer, 
issue oriented groups, or those speaking for previously underrepresented elements, opted 
for the legislative path to address their interests, they lack the privileged access to 
government (Sidle 1993, 193). In the attempt to overcome these limitations, groups have 
accessed the power to reach the public via dramatic demonstrations carried on television 
and in other media.
In Canadian politics there are many represented interests, and over time a  considerable 
number of people representing these interests exert influence in the policy process. 
However, unless these groups of interests have access to more resources than most 
individuals and the majority o f companies, they lack the ability to sustain their influence 
(Pross 1993, 145). The end effect of a system persisting with unequal distribution of 
resources is that legitimate, wealthy, coherent interests, having multiple access to the 
legislative process, will tend to be more influential than less legitimate, poor, diffuse 
interests, which have few sources of access to the legislative process (Pross 1993, 153; 
White 1998, 160).
It is important for pressure groups to use the access points provided within the political 
system and establish a framework for mutual consultation (Jackson & Jackson 1998,485; 
Ball 1993, 109). Legitimacy may be obtained by working within the established system. 
These types of actions indicate that the group has obtained recognition as the 
representative for its particular interests. The established interaction is a symbol of the 
compatibility of the groups' goals and tactics with both Canadian political culture and the
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goals of the government (Ball 1993, 109). The legitimacy established by a group 
provides further access to the bureaucracy and Cabinet during the pre-parliamentary 
stages of a bill where the most change is possible.
The rewards of legitimacy for pressure groups is the knowledge that policy-makers 
acknowledge that the groups speak for a significant portion of the general population. 
With this acknowledgment comes power. Policy-makers recognize that the pressure 
group(s) speaks for a part of the public that can be mobilized into political action should 
its interests not be accommodated in public policy. This legitimacy bestowed upon a 
pressure group serves as a useful group-governmental bargaining tool (Pross 1992,9; 
Pyrcz 1994, 334; Eckstein 1960, 20; White 1998, 158).
The importance of gaining and maintaining legitimacy, however, can result in groups 
compromising their principles and goals. For example, Greenpeace began as a direct 
action group applying civil disobedience as the mainstay for garnering support.
However, in their efforts to gain political legitimacy, Greenpeace has increasingly 
devoted more resources to research, report-writing, and to more conventional lobbying 
techniques than to direct action. As a result, Greenpeace has alienated members who 
have been supporters from the outset. It is these supporters who feel that Greenpeace has 
compromised their purity and effectiveness in their drive to gain mainstream legitimacy 
(Grant 1989, 20).
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Compromise also occurs in other forms. There are pressure groups who are either largely 
or partially funded by government and industry. The pursuit of organizational 
development through these types of financial support has obvious limitations. The 
groups in these situations can feel constrained when their agenda challenges the 
orientation of government and of the corporate sector (Coleman & Skogstad 189, 9). If a 
group takes their challenge too far, they risk losing their funds as well as their capaci^  to 
act. However, if they back down from their agenda established by their members, they 
risk group legitimacy and face eventual disintegration. As a result, state sponsorship of 
pressure groups appears to be as much a method for controlling dissent as it is for 
assisting the disadvantaged. The possibilities for government supported groups to initiate 
policy changes are clearly limited.
4.2.3 The Operating Structures of Pressure Groups
The functions of pressure groups have much to do with their internal organizational 
structure (Pross 1993, 145). The operating structures of pressure groups can take on two 
general forms: hierarchical/leader-led or grassroots/consensus-based. Most pressure 
groups would fall under both at varying degrees depending on the issue and available 
expertise. The structure, in turn, is greatly influenced by variables such as the kind of 
resources made available by the group's members, members' determination to promote 
their conunon interests through exerting influence, as well as the characteristics of the 
political system itself. The structure of the pressure group in terms of decision-making 
affects its ability to respond to inunediate issues. The pluralistic nature of our society 
creates many cross-pressures within individuals and makes it difOcult for larger groups to
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consolidate their membership for concerted action (White 1998, 156). Hjelmar states that 
in hierarchical organizations, the right to exercise power is centralized which makes these 
types of organizations capable of reacting more promptly to urgent issues (Hjelmar 1996,
5). However, organizations that operate with a  grass-roots, consensus based decision­
making model are unable to react promptly, histead, they must take the time to inform, 
discuss with all interested members, and then try and arrive at a consensus based 
decision.
Most pressure groups progress through an organizational life cycle, beginning their 
existence as a relatively ill-equipped, under-financed and naive organization concerned 
with the resolutions of one or two issues or problems (Tanguay & Kay 1991, 83). They 
tend to seek publicity or media attention more than access to key political decision 
makers. If the once new groups are able to adapt to the political system, they then 
expand their membership base and increase their access to knowledge of the workings of 
government. The most important determinant of the selection of channels for pressure 
group activity in any political system is the stmcture of the decision-making processes 
(Eckstein 1960, 16). By gaining further insight into the workings of government’, 
pressure groups are able to influence policy decisions more effectively.
Since the profile of pressure groups has increased over the past three decades, there has 
been open criticism regarding various structural attributes. There have been concerns 
about pressure groups and the degree to which they actually represent the people they 
claim to represent (Pross 1994, 181). The internal decision-making processes are said to
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be frequently undemocratic and dominated by an elite and not the membership at large. 
As well, the tactics used by some groups are believed to be an abuse of the general 
principles of civil discourse in politics. Opinion has gone so far as to state that some 
groups unnecessarily polarize issues and encourage their members to take extreme 
positions and to refuse compromise. In taking the position of no compromise', these 
pressure groups' interests cannot be met within the Canadian political stmcture.
Pressure groups, as well as other organizations, can also develop momentum that goes 
beyond the intentions and interests of key actors, even when organizational action 
initially unfolds in an orderly and rational fashion (Hannan 1989,6). Organizations can 
take on lives of their own, which can be largely independent of the wishes and interests 
of those who created them. Another way that an organization can lose sight of the initial 
objectives is when organizations face potential demise or the status quo is threatened. 
This may be due to changes in social, economic, or political systems, which will affect 
organizational stmctures and practices, as well as changes in membership. When faced 
with the need to preserve status quo, an organization's goals may be displaced in favour 
of the aim of simply maintaining the organization and its hierarchy o f power and 
privilege (Michels 1915, 49). As a  result, the private goals of the more powerful 
members tend to dominate the public goals as an organization ages (Pross 1994, 181). 
The politics of resource allocation in an organization prevents these members from 
responding quickly to pressures to alter organizational practice or to initiate new kinds of 
action (Hannan 1989, 6).
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Organizations, especially the larger and more powerful, rarely change strategy and 
structure quickly enough to keep up with a constantly changing social, political, and 
economic environment (Hannan 1989,12). Pross describes most pressure groups as 
"chameleons"; they take their lobbying role seriously and will adapt their internal 
organizations and structure to suit the policy system in which they happen to operate 
(Pross 1993, 147). The smaller, newer organizations, however, are far more flexible. 
Organizational change occurs in response to environmental changes, threats, and 
opportunities. Where the smaller and newer organizations have the advantage of 
flexibility in organizational structure and adaptation, the larger more established groups 
have superior capacities for creating specialized units to deal with emerging 
environmental problems. As well, the larger, more established groups have the 
membership and notoriety to forestall or direct change. In light of the advantages and 
disadvantages of both the large structures of some organizations and the smaller, newer 
organizations, one can see the potential strength in developing networks amongst 
organizations that share common goals. One can also see the need for both types of 
groups on the political scene.
4.2.4 The Co-Existence of Pressure Groups
In political life there are many interests requiring representation to ensure they are 
represented in the policy process. In order for organizations to be a part of this extremely 
complex process, they must have access to more resources than most individuals and the 
majority of companies in order to sustain their influence (Pross 1993, 146). For most 
organizations who want to take part in the process, the only feasible way to do so is to
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band together with other like-minded organizations to share costs and to deploy at 
appropriate times the numerous talents that participation in the policy process requires 
(Coleman & Skogstad 1989, 85).
In liberal democracies, such as Canada's, pressure groups thrive within pluralist systems; 
such systems allow a  diversity of interests to be pursued by a  wide variety of associations 
(Jackson & Jackson 1998,473). Within the pluralist allowances, pressure groups often 
unite together both formally and informally. A policy community consists of numerous 
actors or potential actors who share a common policy focus and help shape policy 
outcomes over time. Pressure groups, within this regime, maintain a relatively narrow 
focus and tend to be part of only one policy community but can, with the strength of a 
network, be quite a force within the one policy community. As a  result, it is often the 
notably successful groups who opt to join, at least temporarily, with other groups to 
bolster each other’s claims (Jackson & Jackson 1998,478). As well, networks offer 
greater flexibility and capacity to accommodate differences within a movement. 
Organizations within themselves may become specialized, but collectively, as a network, 
the movement covers a diversity of issues (Phillips 1994, 191). In light of the potential 
benefits of networking, groups must maintain flexibility in order to make use of all the 
access points available to them.
56
4.3 Pressure Groups in the Policy Process
This section of the literature review will focus on pressure groups within the policy 
process; what generally happens, why it happens, and any recent changes that have 
occurred in the policy process regarding the role of pressure groups.
Pressure groups are impressive democratic bodies due, in large part, to their diversity and 
multiplicity (Pyrcz 1994, 332). And, in spite of the media's general presentation of a 
coupe type approach by pressure groups, their participation in the policy system is 
thought to be generally continuous, discreet, and multifaceted (Pross 1993, 153). The 
existence of pressure groups in Canada, as stated in the introduction, has a fairly long 
history for such a relatively young country. However, it was not until the late 1960’s that 
pressure groups grew in number and prominence (Pal 1993, 148). This is due to the 
advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, which created new 
opportunities for pressure group politics in Canada. It is believed by some students of 
policy development that pressure groups have functions to perform that are just as 
necessary to the development of government policy as those performed by other political 
actors such as political parties, executives, and courts (Pross 1993, 147). One must 
consider, however, that the way in which pressure groups perform those functions is as 
much determined by the shape of the policy system as it is by the knowledge, the 
enthusiasm, the financial capacity, and other intemal characteristics of individual groups 
(ibid.).
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There are basic rules regarding the task of government in the policy process. At its most 
basic, the task of government is to hold societies together. To do this, Richardson 
believes that the major sections of society must somehow be accommodated in the policy 
process as part of the basic role of government. If the state is unable to accomplish this 
basic requirement, then society itself is threatened (Richardson 1993, 15). As stated by 
Jackson, the interaction of pressure groups within the political system requires mutual 
accommodation at all points (Jackson & Jackson 1998,492). In fact, it has been found 
that government agencies find it helpful to have friendly pressure groups endorsing 
government policies, programs, and budgets before Parliamentary conunittees and the 
media (Pross 1994, 179). There is the realization by all parties involved in the policy 
process that all other parties have an investment in the outcome of the legislative process, 
and therefore have a legitimate share in the formulation of public policy. This type of 
accommodation is referred to as "elite acconunodation" (Presthus 1973,4). Elite 
accommodation is a structural requisite of any democratic society in which policy 
decisions are the result of negotiation and consultation among the parties (the elite) 
concerned. Presthus considers elite accommodation as inherent in the process of 
democratic government.
As mentioned, unlike political parties, pressure groups do not run candidates for public 
office under their own organizations label. Pressure groups are active in influencing 
election outcomes by vocalizing their support for candidates who support their cause. 
Between elections pressure groups' primary focus is directed toward cabinet where policy 
formation takes place. However, with the growing presence of the courts o f law in
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politics, pressure groups are using the courts to pursue political objectives (Gibbins 1994,
397).
Aside from the organizational considerations such as financial resources, membership 
commitment, and knowledge requirements, there is also the role of government in the 
pressure groups' effort to convince policy-makers of the rightness of their cause. 
Government affects pressure groups behaviour just as much as organizational 
considerations like structure, resources and legitimacy. In fact, those pressure groups 
who take the lobbying role seriously have been found to adapt their intemal organizations 
and structure to suit the policy system in which they operate (Pross 1993, 147). Because 
of this need to be flexible on the part of pressure groups, the groups working at the 
provincial level in Canada are often quite different from those groups who concentrate 
their efforts at the federal level. To go further, this is why both groups are found to be 
quite different from their counterparts in other parts of the world, including the United 
States.
The potential limitations experienced by pressure groups, as outlined in a previous 
section, are typically experienced by the new, small pressure groups; they either continue 
to exist in spite of these limitations, or they no longer exist. Because of the limitations 
(financial, organizational, leadership, and expert knowledge), there are pressure groups 
who resort to confrontational tactics in order to gain a voice in the policy making 
decisions. Pross believes that confrontation is dysfunctional for groups in the long run, 
but does recognize that in the early life of a group it can be very important and sometime
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essential (Pross 1993, 151). Because groups generally emerge in response to a  policy 
issue, chances are these groups have not participated in the actual policy development 
that led to the decision they are concerned about. Therefore the group is entering at a  
point in the policy process when events have moved beyond the stage of participation by 
the group. As a result, the development of a pressure group over the formation or demise 
of a policy provides groups with few options as to how to respond. Under these 
circumstances, confrontation may be the best available strategy.
The pressure groups who progress from this placard carrying' stage are believed to do so 
by changing its relationship to its members by adapting to the policy system (Pross 1993, 
151). Pross believes it is at this point that a group is required to get past the single issue 
focus, instead they must take up various causes. This is a  common progression for 
environmental groups. They begin with a single-issue focus, gain notoriety, membership, 
and financial resources, then progress from there to focus on more general environmental 
issues. In doing so, the group is able to gamer a larger membership base and potentially 
increase the level of finances. The larger membership base may provide further access to 
expert knowledge, as well as political clout with membership numbers representing 
voting citizens. This growth includes the financial capacity to hire professionals such as 
lawyers, public policy experts, and public relations experts. These professionals and 
experts provide the means for a pressure group to better participate in the policy process. 
The growth also signifies the first step in institutionalization of the pressure group. Pross 
believes that from this point on the organization does not change in structure, focus, or 
approach. The growth allows the organization to become more complex, more capable of
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responding and adapting to changes in the policy system, and - to the disappointment to 
grassroots minded people - Qrpically more remote and professional, guided increasingly 
by paid staff (Pross 1993, 151).
The move towards institutionalization provides the pressure group more readily the 
attention of government officials, hi doing so, the level o f legitimacy - both political and 
societal - afforded the group also increases, thus projecting the group further along the 
institutional path. This progression steers the pressure group in its chosen actions. As 
the group becomes more intimate with the details of bureaucratic decision-making, it is 
less likely to utilize the media as a tool to influence the public and politicians (Pross 
1993, 152).
An example of a pressure group which fits the above progression is Greenpeace. 
Greenpeace began with seven students concerned about nuclear testing. They began with 
a single issue, and garnered tremendous support via the local, national, and international 
media. The public became aware overnight o f this single issue, and a new pressure group 
was bom. Now Greenpeace is an international organization with offices on every 
continent, millions of members, a multi-million dollar budget, hired experts, and a 
sophisticated public relations effort.
With the progression of pressure groups comes specialization. This specialization occurs 
in all areas of management including government, private companies, and pressure 
groups. To specialize is to focus on one specific area and to come to know that area of
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focus entirely so that one may serve as a source of information for others not specializing 
in this area. Specialization within the political community results in what is called 
"policy communities" - groupings o f government agencies, pressure groups, media 
people, and individuals who, for various reasons, have an interest in a particular policy 
field and attempt to influence it (Pross 1993, 154).
The presence of policy communities limits the participation of others in any policy 
debate. As mentioned previously, Pross describes those who are excluded from the 
policy debate as the "attentive public" (Pross 1993, 155). The attentive public lacks the 
power of the state, but still plays a  vital role in policy development. From its strategic 
territory between the government and the public at large, the attentive public has the 
power to force the emergence of issues from the policy community into the larger 
political system (Gardner 1990,4). Another role of the attentive public is to maintain a 
perpetual policy review process. In other words, the attentive public plays the role of the 
scmtinizers; constantly ensuring that the inclusive policy players are performing as 
expected. In doing so, the policy process should never at any point become static or 
unchanging. One may look at the attentive public as the catalyst for constant progression.
Pressure groups and members of the attentive public are the most mobile members of the 
policy community. Via informal networks, they are able to cross the organizational lines 
that formal players within the policy development circle cannot. These networks, and 
their role in evaluating policy and developing opinion, make pressure groups important 
members of the policy community (Pross 1993, 155-6). There are times when this
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generally predictable policy relationship is altered. When circumstances occur beyond 
the control of both the formal and informal policy community, such as economic 
changes, technological change, or a shift in public concern, the usual procedures are not 
equipped to handle these changes, histead, the issue will be resolved at the highest 
political levels. When this occurs, the policy community, and the policy itself, is often 
altered well beyond its original state.
Another way that pressure groups are able to participate in the policy process is via the 
committee system (Jackson & Jackson 1998,487). A  committee is a  body o f people 
appointed for a special function by a larger body like the government or a  branch of 
government. The objective o f a  committee is to gather information and either arrive at a 
decision, or provide information or choices to an appointed body. Some examples of 
committees within the Canadian political arena are the Agriculture Conunittee, the 
Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada, and the Canadian Arctic 
Resources Committee. These examples do not even begin to represent the multitude o f 
committees and the subjects of interests within the Canadian political system. It is 
through committees that pressure groups often serve, representing their interests amongst 
numerous other interests.
Similar to the duration of time that serving on a  committee can require, passage of 
legislation is a very lengthy process, often taking years. Knowing this, pressure groups 
are able to utilize this wait of passage lobbying government and conducting public 
relations campaigns, especially if they are opposed to the proposed legislation (Jackson &
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Jackson 1998,488). This effort by pressure groups often results in the delay of a 
proposed bill, which can often be just as effective as working to have a proposed bill 
thrown out.
In spite of the growing realization of the crucial democratic role pressure groups play in 
the Canadian political society, there is a  growing concern that pressure groups have too 
much influence in public decision-making (Pross 1994, 173, 180). This concern derives 
from the belief that too often the special interest that pressure groups speak for overrides 
the general public interest. As a result, pressure groups are seen to pose a threat to the 
Canadian, constitutionally established, representative institutions - the legislatures. So 
then, one is faced with the question of how the Canadian political system is able to make 
effective use of these relatively new machines for political communication, while 
respecting Canada's traditional, party-based system of democratic government (Pross 
1994, 173). One suggestion has been to simply impose limits on the media and their 
coverage. In order to offset the level o f coverage a pressure group receives, the media 
could establish equity between those who are elected and accountable to the people and 
those who have a special interest (Pross 1994, 180). Presthus (1973) suggests that for 
political markets to be competitive, and yield plans that promote the public interest rather 
than favour particular interests, there are five important considerations that must be 
satisfied (Knight 1991, 10):
1) power must be difiuse in the system;
2) all interests must be represented in the process;
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3) pressure group leaders must accurately reflect the goals and aspirations o f the
group's members;
4) individuals must possess a multiplicity of overlapping membership so that 
narrow self-interests are tempered; and
5) the political market place must have multiple points of access (therefore 
equality of opportunity) and a government that is open and receptive to all interests.
Presthus' requirements to ensure pressure groups' interests are not given priority over the 
general publics’ appears to be somewhat of a wish list'. Each point's relevance would be 
difficult to argue, but the feasibility of obtaining the degree o f openness, accountability, 
and access proposed by Presthus is optimistic to say the least.
Regardless of Presthus' optimistic criteria for attempting to equalize the 
representativeness of all interests in the policy process, there exists a  perception that 
groups desiring attention to influence the public will use whatever means in order to 
dictate what the media considers news.
4.4 Pressure Groups in Action
The "pressure groups in action " section will be looking at the specific actions employed 
by pressure groups. To accomplish this task, the focus will be to look at actions that have 
been utilized, as detailed in pressure group theory.
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Critics of the present system of policy development assert that the public interest is not 
represented by those who make major decisions in socie^  (Knight 1991, 13). Instead, 
the participants involved in policy development are accused of being motivated by their 
own self-interests or class interests versus the interests o f the general public. As a result, 
there is an elite group maintaining the policy-making power while groups outside the 
elite are forced to adopt radical measures to initiate even small changes in the status quo 
(Eckstein 1960, 21). In spite of the apparent realities, pressure groups place a high 
priority on access to upper-level bureaucrats. To gain access to this level of decision­
making, a pressure group obtains highly valuable information that other groups do not 
have (Knight 1991, 15). The pressure groups who secure such a privileged position do so 
because they are not a direct threat to the government and the status quo, otherwise the 
government would not find it in its best interests to allow such an elitist position.
Jackson believes that the most fundamental ingredient for the political success of a 
pressure group is that its values, goals, and tactics are compatible with the country's 
political culture, thereby being perceived as legitimate (Jackson & Jackson 1998,478). 
Gaining public support is essential for without it a group has very little chance of 
receiving government recognition. Groups who employ violent demonstration tactics, 
rather than negotiation, meet rigid resistance within the Canadian system. The same can 
be said of those who approve goals foreign to the Canadian political culture such as the 
concept of state controlled family planning.
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In light of the position o f most pressure groups, who are members o f the attentive public 
with no access to high level decision-making, there is hope that the force of logical and 
well-prepared arguments will be sufficient to convince reluctant ministers and skeptical 
bureaucrats to adopt their proposals. When this fails, these pressure groups resort to 
other ways of garnering support. Many groups, especially the newer groups, look to the 
public by arousing emotional support to persuade govenunent that general support for the 
pressure group's proposal exists (Pross 1992, 3; Sidle 1993, 193). The pressure groups 
may also appeal to the unions for support, or initiate economic boycotts, or get industry- 
business on side in order to sway govenunent. The choice of tactics of persuasion is as 
extensive as the relationship between government and the society it serves (ibid.). 
Persuasion is the underlying objective of any action employed by pressure groups; to 
persuade agreement or support for their views and interests.
Persuasion depends on various attributes such as organization, persistence, the level of 
knowledge regarding the issue at hand, as well as the fînancial resources available to 
pressure groups. Aside from the necessary attributes that enable pressure groups to 
accomplish their goals, there are certain steps that are deemed necessary (Pross 1992, 3): 
common objectives must be identified, strategies worked out, procedures adopted, 
responsibilities assigned, and consistent positions formulated, if a group is to persuade 
government to take specific action. Pross believes that, above all, pressure group activity 
must have continuity if it is to have lasting effect.
67
The policy process in Canada, like other countries, is highly bureaucratic. As a result, 
most successful pressure groups are those that know who to talk to - and when - and are 
able to communicate in a bureaucratic fashion, with briefs, working papers, and 
professional consultations, as opposed to the use of placards and demonstrations (Pross 
1992, 15).
The term successful, when looking at the pressure groups and those admitted by the 
bureaucracy, would include considerations such as access, impact, and overall level of 
representation of a group's interests and concerns by the bureaucracy. To encourage the 
odds of success, some major pressure groups in Canada have established themselves as 
federations in order to influence the local, provincial, and federal governments within the 
Canadian political structure (White 1998, 157). Some examples of established 
federations are the Canadian Bankers Association, the EC Federation o f Teachers, and 
the Canadian Construction Association. These are just a  sample of the numerous 
federations in Canada that exist solely to represent the interests and values o f their 
members, and to increase their access to the policy making process.
In looking at levels of access, Leon Dion (1971, 335) found that the groups who were 
afforded the best access to government were those that neither wholly opposed nor 
wholly endorsed the policies of governments. Whereas, the groups that were denied 
effective access to governments were either those that embraced governmental policy or 
those that were wholly opposed to government. Participation in the democratic process 
requires some degree of equal access, balanced debate, diversity of expression, and the
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absence of overwhelming bias favouring one side or another (Danielian & Page 1994, 
1057). Public debate in which important voices were silent or drowned out could mislead 
the public and would also ill serve democracy.
This next part of the "pressure groups in action" section of the review will look at specific 
actions of pressure groups in general, as well as at tactics used by specific types of 
pressure groups.
Media Use and Advertising 
Media coverage has clearly had an important role in promoting concern about various 
pressure groups, especially those concerned with environmental issues. There is strong 
circumstantial evidence that the priorities of policy-makers and the general public are 
influenced, though not determined, by the issues stressed in news coverage (Fletcher 
1992, 180). There have been a number of case studies done that have shown that 
sustained media attention has forced government action on a particular issue or problem. 
One is then able to conclude that media coverage influences public perceptions and the 
responses of politicians by framing issues as economic or social, personal, or political 
(ibid.).
Media use and advertising is a mainstay for pressure groups at some point or another. 
Groups influence public opinion through advertising, via direct lobbying, by capturing 
media attention, and by exploiting Parliament (Pross 1992, 166). Media use and 
advertising serve as a way of getting in touch with members of the general public who
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may be sympathetic to a group’s cause. As well, politicians o f every rank are also 
susceptible to the influences o f media and advertising, serving as a potential sympathetic 
ear to the cause (Cook et al 1983, 25). The general public and politicians, with their 
newly formed opinions, are able to serve pressure groups by providing the information. 
This service can be in various forms. For example, a number of people of the general 
public may sit down and write a  heart-felt letter to their local politician, providing copies 
for the provincial and national representative, voicing their distaste for the particular 
action or bill that was presented to them via the media, with the original information 
gained from a pressure group utilizing media. Perhaps the politician will go to work the 
next day and make a few calls to influence the issue at hand. Either way, the use of 
media and advertising can be an especially gainful option for any pressure group with a 
well-worded message. But as pointed out in an earlier portion o f the review, most 
pressure groups are limited in their venues due to the lack of financial resources.
The lack of resources will indeed limit the extent of advertising done by a group, but the 
use of media remains an option. Therefore, groups with many willing volunteers but 
little cash have come to rely on the fiee advertising provided by the media. One may 
think that the only real limitation in using media is the imagination of the members of the 
group in deciding how to grab the attention o f reporters and television cameras. Actually, 
this has been found to be untrue. Theories o f biased pluralism have revealed that the 
level of media coverage is proportional to material resources, especially money, 
organization, and media-related skills (Danielian & Page 1994, 1059). Because most 
corporations and business associations have far more resources than most other pressure
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groups, one is able to assume that there is a  dominance of corporate and business interests 
in public debate and media coverage. Journalistic emphasis upon the novel, the 
spectacular, and the contentious provides the resource-poor pressure groups little choice 
but to draw media attention with protests, demonstrations, and other such activities 
(Danielian & Page 1994, 1060). With the corporate pressure group bias, the notion of 
balance in terms of representation in media coverage is just that, a notion.
In spite of the hard-earned, potential benefits o f media use and advertisement for pressure 
groups, Pyrcz believes that groups are most active, and often most effective, when they 
are out of the news; nurturing their access to public decision-makers (Pyrcz 1994, 333). 
Pyrcz makes the assumption that pressure groups can all gain equal access to the policy 
decision-makers in order to impact the final outcome. The potential ideological burden 
of soliciting the attention of the media is that once a group presents its position on an 
issue, the media can create an ideological niche in which groups may find it difficult to 
change in spite of fluctuating situations. Unfortunately for a pressure group in this 
position, life is not static, the group wavers from its position, and the media reports 
this, it may create a feeling of distrust amongst the public and the membership (Sidle 
1993, 197). However, the media can also beneficially serve the newer, issue oriented 
groups, as well as the more seasoned groups in their efibrts to obtain and maintain the 
public's and politicians' attention. Going public is an important technique of 
communication that pressure groups rely upon to obtain and maintain public support for 
the policy positions the group feels the government should take (Pross 1994, 176). 
Because it is the function of the media in a democratic system to inform the public, the
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pressure groups with limited resources often create newsworthy events so that 
information about their group and their activities will be publicized without a  cost to the 
group (Jackson & Jackson 1998,488).
Direct Lobbying
Lobbying, with the knowledge of the policy process and skill in presenting a clients case 
to decision-makers, has become a fixture in our modem, extremely complex, 
governmental system (Pross 1994, 179). Lobbyists working within the Canadian 
parliamentary system face some daunting challenges. In order for a lobbyist to be 
effective, he/she must have reliable information about when, where, and how decisions 
are being made, along with an ability to penetrate the screening stmctures set up to shield 
decision-makers from unwanted entreaties (Wilson 1992, 117). A good lobbyist must 
earn good access to decision-makers as well as to those who supply the information and 
advice on which decisions are based. Wilson believes that it is essential to recognize the 
power of those who shape Cabinet ministers’ perceptions of problems and solutions.
For direct lobbyists, Wilson (1992, 117) details how lobbyists are able to best address the
challenges:
- cultivate alliances; when the door of a new contact opens, make sure that one's 
homework is complete by understanding the audience;
- the higher up the ladder the bureaucrat is, the more valuable their time is; be concise 
and provide illustrations if possible;
72
-  the art of successful negotiation requires that a person understand what his/her 
adversaries value and need as people - and give it before he/she is able to receive it;
- build personal rapport with people who are sympathetic;
- figure out a  strategy for building coalitions across parties; and
- follow-up is critical (i.e. credit those deserving credit).
The list provides some general guidelines considering that there is considerable variation 
across both pressure groups and issues. The extent of variation includes the degree of 
access to decision-makers and in the extent to which access translates into influence. It 
has been found that access and influence are generally better where the issue is not 
perceived to entail major and visible redistribution of scarce resources among pressure 
groups or government agencies (Wilson 1992, 118).
In spite of lobbying being a fixture in our modem and complex government system, there 
continues to be a degree of distmst towards lobbyists. The efficiency at which most 
lobbyists operate has inevitably drawn suspicion. Even the firms who fulfill their 
objectives with integrity are observed with suspicion because of the fact that the wealthy 
are most likely to succeed in the policy process because they can buy lobbying expertise. 
This is galling to many Canadians who believe in equal rights for all in a democratic 
society. The function and necessity of lobbying in the Canadian political culture has not 
alleviated the distaste for its existence. This situation may never resolve itself.
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Parliament
Parliament, a formal channel o f access, has become an important target for groups 
wishing to publicize their demands and receive the legislature's support (Sidle 1993,
194). With the participation and endorsement of Parliament regarding the efforts of a 
specific pressure group comes the interest from other pressure groups to also get 
Parliament on-side, hi spite o f the fact that some MPs subscribe to the argument that the 
Canadian Parliament has been highjacked by pressure groups, there is a more prominent 
view that groups make a useful contribution by providing information, proposing 
policies, and providing reaction as to whether legislation and regulations will be 
workable. This has been reiterated by such well known environmental activists as 
Elizabeth May. She has stated that she works extensively with MPs individually and 
members of standing and legislative committees (Sidle 1993, 200).
Pross believes that the more direct-action methods such as blockades, placard carrying, 
and boycotts do not work in the long run (Pross 1993, 150). In short term, the action may 
result in a decision being turned around, but to change policy groups need to be close to 
government thinking. Groups also need to overcome the barriers created by 
administrative secrecy, and become knowledgeable about where and when to intervene as 
a pressure group.
In spite of Parliament's potential limitations, it has become a valuable tool amongst the 
leaders of pressure groups. Because of the fragmentation of election discourse as a result 
of the increasing role of pressure groups, the parties' ownership claim on the election
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stage has become the subject of considerable debate (Hiebert 1991, 3). The increase in 
election involvement by pressure groups has introduced a new dynamic to election 
contests and the parliamentary process, as well it has raised questions regarding the 
fairness and appropriateness of the present regulatory regime (Hiebert 1992, 4). For 
example, some are in favour of allowing pressure groups to participate financially in 
elections and the parliamentary process through actions such as donations towards 
specific political parties and more ready access to pre-policy development. In allowing 
this, groups force parties to address issues that they would otherwise be reluctant to have 
put on the political agenda (Hiebert 1991, 8). However, unless the legislation enacted in 
1974, which prohibits pressure groups from incurring expenses to promote or oppose 
candidates or parties, is addressed (Hiebert 1991, 13), the level of participation by 
pressure groups in formal elections will remain limited.
In spite of the limitations on participation of pressure groups in the formal political 
channels, there has been a recent increase in the chorus of criticism regarding the election 
activities of organized pressure groups. There is the perception that these rapidly 
proliferating bodies - representing diverse interests - are becoming more organized and 
openly political (Tanquay & Kay 1993,77). The tactics employed have resulted in the 
general fear that pressure groups may influence electoral outcomes by hijacking the 
political agenda, thereby diminishing the role o f the traditional representative institutions 
in a democracy - the political parties. The fear is that ultimately this could lead to 
government by special interests, with political parties and individual candidates
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becoming increasingly accountable to a few wealthy groups with the resources to 
propagate their views (Tanquay & Kay 1993,78; White 1998, 85).
Protests
Nonviolent demonstrations are used as a  means of securing publicity for a group's cause. 
Both violent and nonviolent protests do not fit within the norms of mutual 
accommodation between pressure groups and policy-makers in Canada (Jackson & 
Jackson 1998,483). As a result, Jackson & Jackson believe that groups who employ the 
protest tactic risk being ignored, discredited or pacified with purely symbolic action. As 
well, the use of protests, and other well publicized attempts to influence legislators, such 
as bombarding representatives with petitions, letters, and telegrams, tend to bear out the 
generalization that noise accompanies political weakness (Ball 1993, 112; Danielian & 
Page 1994, 1057). Ball suggests that governments and pressure groups operate within a 
web of political values and attitudes that provide other variables to determine group 
effectiveness (Ball 1993, 115). The result is that pressure groups are expected to learn 
the already established intricacies of policy development and abide by them in order to be 
effective in impacting the outcome of policies.
As stated earlier, Pross also believes that confrontation is deemed dysfunctional for 
groups in the long run (Pross 1993, 150). However, in the early life of pressure groups, 
protests can be very important tools, sometimes they are essential. The less organized, 
policy-polished groups lack the influence within the policy community. The lack of 
influence may be countered by exciting public discussion on the issues that concem them.
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The essentials for participating in policy discussions - standing in the policy community, 
knowledge of the policy process, and the language used - are lacking in a lot of groups. 
Consequently an appeal to public opinion may be the best way - sometimes the only way 
- to challenge speciHc decisions or to object to an undesirable policy and to embarrass 
governments into taking action (Pross 1992, 124). Actions are often in response to an 
issue already in the presentation stage. Pressure group options are limited as to how to 
stop the progression they oppose. As a  result, only those actions with the most media 
grab can be considered. By making use of protests, a  group is able to make use o f the 
media's ability to influence the only decision-makers who may still be able to change the 
course o f events - the politicians (Pross 1993, 150).
Phillips, in defense of the various actions employed by pressure groups, including 
protests/demonstrations, states that all political issues and discourses are Altered through 
values and ideologies, thus, meaning is always constructed or framed (Phillips 1994,
194). Pressure groups do not accomplish the hraming of issues "... by locking themselves 
away in offices, but by being visible to people, demonstrating the injustices, the causes, 
and reasons for working for change” (ibid.). Phillips believes that by getting people to 
act, the group reinforces a collective identity and communicates its frames' to others.
The wide-spread acceptance of the projected frames by groups does not occur as the 
result of a single event, histead, it can take many actions and efforts which can span over 
months, years, or generations.
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There are numerous opinions offered regarding the degree of effectiveness o f protests in 
impacting the outcome of a policy or other issue. Some theorists believe that protests are 
necessary within certain criteria, a  tool that should be accessed as frequently as deemed 
necessary. Others believe it should never be accessed for the result will not be suitable 
for all parties involved and the group employing the action will marginalize itself further. 
One could also look at it simply from the stance that as long as the average citizen is 
being drawn into political participation, then varying degrees of effectiveness have been 
accomplished. Ball supports this summation in stating that by encouraging wider 
political participation, pressure groups are said to extend the liberal democratic concept 
of representative government, and in some instances groups provide the only source of 
opposition to the united front imposed by the political parties (Ball 1993, 117).
4.5 Pressure Groups from an Environmental Perspective
There is interest in Canadian society to press for policy change. Two notable examples 
of this in all Western democracies since the late 1960’s are the rise of women’s and 
environmental movements (Richardson 1993, 7). The environmental movement 
appeared in western societies as people became concerned about the deteriorating quality 
of the natural environment and the depletion of world resources (Jackson & Jackson 
1998,495). The emergence of new and more outspoken organized environmental 
pressure groups is linked to the progress of scientific discovery. This growth and 
increased vigour of pressure groups has resulted in the policy process being crowded and 
the ability to reach agreements within the process has become more difffcult (Richardson 
1993, 8). The existence of groups is a constraint on governmental action, but this caimot
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be helped for the role of government is to hold societies together. To do this, 
governments must accommodate the major sections of interests in society.
Environmental pressure groups can be differentiated from other Qrpes of pressure groups, 
such as the industry-business and professional association pressure groups. As stated 
earlier in the review, pressure groups like these latter ones are formed to represent the 
interests of their members, but not typically the Canadian collective good. O f course, 
some of the indirect results of these organizations can have a collective good (i.e. 
Canadian Medical Association ensures their members are good standing in order to 
practice medicine in Canada), but this is not the primary objective of these organizations; 
the interests of their members are primary. Environmental pressure groups, on the other 
hand, are composed of members who have an interest in the natural environment and its 
continued health. The natural environment, being a collective good (we all rely on a  
healthy environment for the continuation of humans and other animals) benefits from the 
efforts of these groups. This part of the review will delve further into the role 
environmental pressure groups have had and continue to have on the Canadian political 
landscape.
From its inception, environmental pressure groups have been treated as a threatening 
phenomenon by such interests as big business and industry (Wilson 1990, 143). Wilson 
believes that this is due to industry's conviction that any systematic threat to the sancti^  
of the status quo undermines its leverage in financial markets. Environmentalism, in its 
entirety, imperils the unwritten code of speculative rights in the capitalist system in
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Canada, thus threatening a system that has long legitimized a  profitable flow in access to 
public resources (Wilson 1990, 143; Stefanick 1996, 271). Environmental groups face 
corporate-govemment alliances determined to resist fundamental challenges to "business 
as usual" patterns of resource development (Wilson 1992, 124). As a  result of the 
perceived threat by environmental pressure groups, environmental groups, by and large, 
remain outsiders in the Canadian policy process. Due to a high level of “issue 
commitment” among enviromnentalists, these groups have been able to largely overcome 
the various problems which affect the abilities of other groups to attract and retain 
members, and have largely avoided the trend towards dependence on government 
resources (Wilson 1990, 145). Due to factors such as limitations in resources, 
environmental groups have moved little towards the establishment of hierarchical, over­
arching group structures (with obvious exceptions like Greenpeace, Sierra Club of 
Canada, World Wildlife Fund, etc.). This has limited the ability in the establishment o f 
stable and binding deal-making arrangements with the government and industry. These 
types of linkages are considered highly suspicious by most environmental groups, and 
they are therefore not keen on such co-optation.
Environmental groups vary considerably in size, generally have low overhead operations, 
require deeply committed volunteers, and have a tendency to reject complex, formal 
structures (Wilson 1990, 149). These groups vary also in decision-making approaches, 
but most can be characterized as benign, open oligarchies. The main motivation for 
members of an environmental group is the desired result; the intrinsic worth or dignity of 
the ends themselves are regarded by most members as justifying effort. Broadly
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speaking, environmentalists themselves regard economic growth as less important than 
the protection of 'quality of life’ (Jackson & Jackson 1998,495), thus making them a  
threat to all other pressure groups and governments who exist to protect the continued 
growth in the Canadian economy in spite of the impacts to the natural environment.
Along with size, environmental pressure groups can be differentiated according to 
various criteria. As discussed earlier, Pross describes groups who would be presented as 
issue-oriented groups, or, at the other end of the spectrum, institutional groups. 
Listitutional groups include groups like Greenpeace, Sierra Club, and World Wildlife 
Fund. These types o f groups have an established hierarchical, over-arching group 
structure. Issue-oriented groups, however, envelope numerous other types of 
environmental groups. Issue oriented groups spring up at a  moments notice, then 
typically disband when the issue has been addressed. Occasionally, however, they keep 
on playing a part in politics and slowly become recognized voices in policy-making 
(Pross 1993, 149). In order to reach this point, groups must become more highly 
organized, developing a particular competence to communicate their policy views to 
government. Since the early 1970s, a number of environmental pressure groups have 
made the transition, in effect engaging in the process of institutionalization. This 
transition does not happen quickly or completely. In fact, very few groups progress' to 
the institutional status, instead most being described as fledgling or mature groups (Pross 
1993, 150).
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There is a tremendous degree o f diversity within the environmental movement. The 
movement's diversity represents an important political asset. The organizations within 
the movement are able to cover a  range of tactical bases. There is typically some 
segment of the movement that can usually be counted on to gravitate quickly to the 
approach deemed most appropriate in a  particular situation (Wilson 1990, 150). Because 
of the diversity within the environmental movement, interests opposing the efforts of 
environmental groups have found their various objectives very difQcult to obtain, and 
impossible in some cases.
The diversity of environmental pressure groups also shows in the methods applied by 
these groups in order to accomplish their goals. The goals of the group influence how the 
group attempts to realize those aims. Groups with aims hostile to important aspects of 
the existing political system cannot hope to exert influence on the administration and 
legislature in the way legitimized business groups would do (Ball 1993, 109; Stefanick 
1996,50). The type of approval that the group possesses affects its methods. Those 
groups without approval (such as Greenpeace) have to resort to national campaigns and 
programmes of civil disobedience. However, the groups deemed acceptable by 
government and other participants in the policy process, ones who do not threaten the 
status quo, will be called upon for active participation in policy decision-making 
(Stefanick 1996, 15). It is these groups that are able to use their participation as a 
powerful tool in any negotiation with the government.
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There are, however, the environmental pressure groups who do not enjoy the approval of 
the various levels o f government, or by other powerful pressure groups like industry- 
business groups. These groups do not share the privileges of access and do not have a 
vested interest in keeping issues out of politics. Because these groups lack power, and 
are excluded from securing power and influence, public debate is seen as a way of 
obtaining power and influence (Pross 1992, 159). These groups are prepared to challenge 
the status quo and bypass the Canadian capital in their search for environmental solutions 
(i.e. economic boycotts), which can result in volatile relations between the government 
and members of the policy community (Boardman 1992, 240; Gamer 1990,4). Groups 
like Friends of the Environment and the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society refuse to 
play the game of pressure politics because the groups believe their objectives are 
qualitatively different from those of other pressure groups, in particular the industry- 
business groups (Tanguay & Kay 1991, 84). The outcome has been that relations 
between environmental groups and members of the policy community are often 
particularly hostile, perhaps because environmentalism attacks the ideological 
underpinnings of much of the economic activity in Canada.
The subject of resources has been already discussed in a previous section o f this review.
It was found that the level of resources available to pressure groups determines, to 
varying degrees, the effectiveness of the group. In an attempt to overcome the limitations 
imposed by the lack of resources, environmental groups have developed numerous 
alliances, referred to in this review as networks. The formation of a number of issue- 
specific alliances have enabled environmental groups to overcome problems that could
83
have been expected otherwise (i.e. lack of personnel due to limited finances is alleviated 
somewhat with the sharing of information, research, and actions by various other like- 
minded groups). As well, the high level of issue commitment prevailing among group 
members enabled groups to counteract shortages of resources, thus enabling 
environmental groups to maintain lobbying and public relations efforts (Wilson 1990, 
163).
It is the limitations in resources, as well as ideological constraints imposed on 
environmentalists by themselves, that has encouraged environmental groups to gamer 
support from the general public in creative ways. The massive mobilization of support 
from the public depends largely on actions like the capturing of media attention. Both 
Pross (1986, 154) and Love and Goyer (1983, 85) acknowledge the importance of this 
route of influencing public opinion and generating wider participation in the policy 
process (Gardner 1990, 16). The dependency o f  environmental groups on media contacts 
to compensate for their weak position, with respect to interests that are well entrenched in 
government policy, is expected due to the groups' lack of traditional political power. The 
group with the least power to sanction has less incentive to play by the rules. In addition 
to the media, the point of access to policy most used by environmental pressure groups on 
the national level is the lobbying of federal politicians (Pross 1986, 165). Signs of 
institutional and political change as a result of the efforts of environmental groups are 
appearing (Gamer 1990, 25). Worldwide, campaigns by environmental groups have 
aroused public opinion, and decision-makers are increasingly obligt 1 to consider
84
carefully what the public is likely to tolerate or reject in terms of environmental impact 
(Lowe & Goyder 1983,79; Coleman & Skogstad 1989, 132).
4.6 The Future of Pressure Groups in Canada
The increasing role of pressure groups in Canadian policy development, as well as in the 
overall political culture, has been found to have several effects. From a  democratic 
participation standpoint, pressure groups have increased the sum total of public 
participation and influence on government policy (Presthus 1978, 69). One outcome of 
the increased role of pressure groups in Canadian politics has been that such groups 
(except perhaps poverty and minority groups) tend to represent social interests that are 
already highly advantaged. As a result, they put government in the position of protecting 
the strong against the weak. This, o f course, is not a general application for even though 
environmental pressure groups have shown to be effective in influencing the policy 
process on a site specific basis, their successes have not constituted a strong position 
when compared with the industry-business pressure groups. Other effects that have been 
noted with the increasing role of pressure groups have been the participation o f the 
general public in the Canadian democracy, increased awareness of the intricacies of the 
policy process, and the increase in the representation of previously underrepresented 
groups within the Canadian society.
It is widely known that both the organizational structures and the multi-media 
communications abilities are constantly expanding to bring together the forces of like- 
minded individuals and pressure groups across national boundaries (Dobell & Steenkamp
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1993, 574 from Pal 1997,209). The new 'hypermedia' (electronic mail, internet, video 
conferencing, etc.) enables groups from across the world to communicate, develop 
networks, and track the actions of other groups, industry, and government in every 
continent. Stanbury & Vertinsky (1994, 14) outline some o f the potential impacts o f the 
new communication and information technologies on pressure groups. The new 
information technologies are: making it less expensive for groups to operate; enabling 
organizations to seek out more easily others with similar interests; enabling easier 
communication, more often, and for longer periods of time; enabling ease in raising 
funds, to acquire information, monitor issues, communicate views; and enabling the 
mobilization of members to a  threat or opportunity for group action (Pal 1997,210).
Pressure groups have been found to perform various functions vital in the policy process, 
as well as in the Canadian political community in general. Pross details four of the most 
important functions performed by pressure groups: they play communication roles in 
politics, they transmit demands from sectoral constituencies to public authorities, they 
carry messages and demands from the authorities to their members, they help build public 
support for programs and policies, they administer various programs for government, and 
they often engage in regulatory activities (Pross 1993, 14-15). It was found in the first 
part of the review that there are various types of pressure groups, each performing a role 
in democracy. Pross has long argued that as political power becomes more diffused, the 
political system becomes increasingly dependent on policy communities' to articulate, 
implement, and monitor the general will (Johnson 1996, 13). Because of the growing 
complexities in life, pressure groups have come to fill a political representation void, and
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the need is expected to continue to grow. The long term direction of change is toward 
democratization, decentralization o f policy to local communities, debureaucratization o f 
government structures, and the forging of parmerships with communities, business, and 
pressure groups of all types (Pross 1993, 203).
As we come to understand how it is that some pressure groups survive in the Canadian 
political system, to become influential and organizationally sophisticated, while other 
groups quickly disappear, there is the opportunity to learn a great deal about pressure 
group interior life and about their particular policy environment (Pross 1993, 148). 
Pressure is a group phenomenon which indicates the push and resistance between groups. 
It is the balance of the group pressures that results in the existing state of society (Bentley 
1993, 19). And, as suggested by Pross, it is in the best interests o f both the political 
parties and the pressure groups to reach an understanding of the role each can best play in 
the Canadian political system and to work out an arrangement - balance - within that 
understanding (Pross 1994, 184). In doing so, all pertinent values have the opportunity to 
be represented in the policy process, and democracy is preserved.
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Chapter Five: Policy Analysis
Policy analysis is part of the fîrst step in attempting to address the thesis question. In 
order to efficiently perform the analysis, policy models will be used to better understand 
the progression of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision. Models are used to describe and 
generate explanations of, or predictions about, social or political phenomena (Salazar & 
Alper 1996, 384). Models are representations of selected elements in which political 
actors are able to choose tactics based on displays of how power is configured. Power 
may be found to be widely distributed or concentrated in a polity. As a result, political 
actors estimate where they are likely to have leverage, based on the information provided 
by a model analysis, and utilize resources to influence particular targets. These models 
are used as strategic resources (ibid.). People acting on the basis o f models will target 
particular actors and institutions and employ particular tactics (Salazer & Alper 1996, 
387).
The following is a summary of both Kingdon’s and Pross’ policy models based on the 
graphic display in the Appendix (see Appendix; Models).
5.1 Kingdoms Declslon-maklmg Model
Kingdon’s decision-making model enables an analysis of a  policy to be broken down into 
specific, separate components in order to better understand the process which led to the 
policy decision. By applying his three streams in the analysis, the researcher is then able 
to realize why or why not a policy was influenced or developed. The following is a  
summary of the structure of Kingdon’s decision-making model.
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The three streams that determine whether or not a policy is put in place are: 1) the 
Problem Stream; 2) the Policy Stream; and 3) the Political Stream. These streams (see 
Appendix: Models - Kingdon’s) must merge to create a “window of opportunity” in 
order to impact a public policy or change an already existing one.
The following details each o f the streams that make up Kingdon’s Decision-Making 
Model.
1) The Problem Stream: indicators show that there is a  problem.
Kingdon states that there has to be some kind of problem that emerges. Quite often, 
when looking specifically at environmental issues, it is of crisis proportions (i.e. global 
warming, hole in ozone, acid rain, etc.). There is a  sudden deep concem for an issue 
because the public is made aware of the problem; the problem emerges out of unforeseen 
awareness that something is wrong.
2) The Policy Stream [solutions]: Policy communities are composed of specialists in a 
given policy area such as health, housing, environmental protection, criminal justice. The 
policy communities interact with one another and exist independent of such political 
events as changes of administration and pressure from legislators’ constituencies’ 
(Kingdon 1984, 123-4). It is within these policy communities that the second stream can 
be found. The second stream must be in place; there actually has to be a policy.
Someone has to already be thinking about a solution within the policy conununity 
(Kingdon 1995, 172). If there is not a solution, then the widow of opportunity will not
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open because the policy makers do not want to be involved in something they cannot
address.
The selection of a policy is very deliberate. Through the imposition o f selected ideas, 
some policies are selected out for survival while others are discarded (Kingdon 1995, 
200). The criteria in deciding which ones are sifted out include technical feasibility, 
acceptability with the values of community members, and the knowledge o f future 
constraints - including budget constraints, public acceptabiliQr, and politicians’ 
receptivity (ibid.).
3) The Political Stream [the political will]: “Rowing along independently of the 
problems and policy streams is the political stream, composed o f such things as public 
mood, pressure group campaigns, election results, partisan or ideological distributions in 
government, and changes of administration” (Kingdon 1984, 152).
The third stream, the political stream, can also be referred to as the political will stream; 
the desire to do something about the issue. Because you might have a very serious 
problem, and in fact there may already be a solution, you have to have the political will. 
In order to get it into the public realm where it is actually going to be created as policy, 
where government cares enough to do something about the issue, you have to have the 
political will. Sometimes this can be driven by the sheer magnitude of the problem. An 
alarming problem can cause enough public opinion that the political stream may worry 
that inaction could cause political problems.
!
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Within the political stream are the participants in the policy process. The participants 
include levels of government, stakeholders, and interested groups. There is also what 
Kingdon refers to as the “policy entrepreneur”; a fancy way of describing a  politician 
who takes on a pet interest/issue. The policy entrepreneur brings several key resources 
into the policy process; their claims to a  hearing, their political connections and 
negotiating skills, and their sheer persistence (Kingdon 1995, 205). The policy o f focus 
may come to light because the politician’s constituents present the issue o f concem to 
them and request action, or because it is of personal interest to the individual politician. 
The issue is taken on by that one person, who then may go to caucus or to their party and 
say that the issue is serious enough that it requires address.
The participants within the policy process must keep in mind, throughout the process, 
that the progress of the three streams may discontinue. This may occur because windows 
of opportunity can close as abmptly as they open. Two notable reasons for the windows 
of opportunity to close are a change in the political stream, and a new problem captures 
the attention of government ofHcials. With this realization, some participants within the 
policy process, seeking to push their agenda, cannot avoid maintaining a  feeling of 
urgency throughout the process.
It has been established that all three streams have to occur in order to merge at the same 
time for the window of opportunity to open to influence or create a  policy. There is also 
the fact that the window of opportunity naturally opens and then closes during the
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cyclical nature of the political system (Kingdon 1995, 166). As well, there is always the 
potential that a new issue erupts that is critical enough to capture the attention of 
government officials. It takes a knowledgeable “entrepreneur” to anticipate this moment 
and capitalize on the potential
The knowledgeable entrepreneur must also realize that the window of opportunity 
remains open for a limited amount of time; the duration in which no one can be 
completely sure (Kingdon 1995, 195). As a result, interested groups and individuals must 
act when the opportunity presents itself for fear of “missing the boat” altogether.
As mentioned previously, there are times within the political arena that a policy analyst is 
able to predict when certain occurrences generally occur. These are moments of 
opportunity that interested groups and individuals would be best served in utilizing.
There are also the notable “unpredictable windows” that even the policy entrepreneur is 
unable to accurately predict resulting in decision-makers scrambling to react. A  crisis 
can potentially best serve an interest or be quite the opposite; hence the term 
unpredictable.
Kingdon’s decision-making model is useful in that it describes the policy process in three 
simple streams. The researcher is able to break down any process leading up to a policy 
decision and decipher questions like: Was there the political will? and Where was it 
from? hi studying the policy process, these questions can be paramount.
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5.2 Pross’ Policy Communia Model
Pross’ policy com m unia model is designed to identify the various levels o f 
players/actors involved in policy development or change. Policy communities include all 
actors who have an interest in a policy area, who share a common policy focus, and who 
help shape policy outcomes (Whitaker 1995,430).
When looking at Pross’ model one can see that there are numerous actors involved in 
policy development (see Appendix: Models - Pross’). There is the bureaucracy trying to 
get their ideas through, and the various levels of government acting in the interests o f 
their own mandate. There is also the pressure from other political parties to pursue other 
actions, and there is the interested groups at the lower portion of the model. There are the 
stakeholder groups trying to pressure government to make decisions in their favour. 
Included are the "interested groups” (as well as interested individuals) who focus only on 
specific polices that effect them. There are also the pressure groups composed of 
individuals who come together to get something done then disband once the goal has 
been accomplished. Finally, there are the interest groups more like Greenpeace; a group 
that is continually trying to create a whole new ethos in society. This type of interest 
group not only creates an issue but also creates a whole new social movement in order to 
get people to think in a new way (Summerville 1999).
One actor in policy development that has not been included by Pross, but has been 
included in the model, is the media. The media influences policy development by simply 
presenting the public, politicians, bureaucrats, and policy makers with stories that can
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potentially become issues (Kiogdon 1995, 57). As stated in the literature review, media 
coverage has clearly had an important role in promoting concern. There is also strong 
circumstantial evidence that the priorities of policy-makers and the general public are 
influenced, though not determined, by the issues stressed in news coverage (Retcher 
1992, 180). Groups influence public opinion through advertising, via direct lobbying, 
and by capturing media attention (Pross 1992, 166). The potential impacts of media 
coverage is unpredictable and site specific, depending on the issue at hand. For example, 
the general public is the target of mainstream media. Depending on the issue, be it local, 
regional, national, or international, the public targets their concern (and perhaps outrage) 
at the level of government applicable. Private interests, like the energy resources field, 
may, in response to a media effort, pressure officials from the federal energy department 
and their counterparts in energy producing provinces such as Alberta and British 
Columbia to assert their interests (Whitaker 1995,430). In light of the connection 
between media and its impacts on policy development, one realizes that media plays a 
considerable role in public policy. As a result, media holds a place in the policy 
community showing no connection to one actor over another.
Pross states that one must look at how each of the policy communities interact. Whitaker 
observes that these policy “conununities” have grown up around particular policy areas 
involving bureaucrats from the federal government, their counterparts in the provincial 
bureaucracies, and the interested private-sector organizations, including companies, trade 
associations, and pressure groups (ibid.). hi essence, what these communities have 
accomplished is an expansion of access to relevant information and the establishment of
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external bases of potential support for specialized bureaucrats in their policy fields. The 
increase of interaction due to the creation of policy communities has also allowed 
alliances to be made - as indicated by the crossing over of circles in Pross’ model. These 
alliances are made when the opportunity arises. When these alliances are no longer 
useful, they are discontinued. Hence the name “talking chameleons” (penned by Pross); 
interested groups are capable of changing their colour to suit the issue, unlike political 
parties.
Pross’ model is also very good at showing the different levels o f progression in policy 
development. The progression, interaction and influence of the various communities are 
on a site speciOc basis depending on the issue. The researcher must look at the origins of 
influences in order to realize where the power is for each policy decision. By applying 
Pross’ policy communities model, the researcher may realize where the power lies in a 
policy decision, as well as realize what the chain of events were leading up to the policy 
decision, realize who came together and what kind of pressure they exerted, and whether 
there was any success in that pressure.
The above policy analysis portion will aid in understanding the following case study 
focusing on the Clayoquot Land Use Decision.
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Chapter Six: Clayoquot Land Use Decision - A Case Study
Clayoquot Sound is located on British Columbia’s Pacific Rim, on the west coast of 
Vancouver Island. The Sound has been the focus of intense public debate with attention 
on land use. First Nations land rights, ecosystem protection, aesthetic values, and 
resource development since 1980 (Province 1993a, 1; Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 11). The 
Sound consists of a significant wilderness area, with biogeoclimatic zones ranging from 
snow-capped mountains, to massive ancient rain forests, to sandy beaches. It 
encompasses 3,000 square kilometres (350,000 hectares) of land and water, running from 
Hesquiat Peninsula down the west coast of Vancouver Island for 65 km (Staniforth & 
Lydon 1996, 10; Province 1993a, 1). Nine o f Clayoquot Sound’s primary watersheds 
(watershed basins that drain directly to the sea) of 1000 hectares or more are essentially 
natural (Province 1993a, 2). Six of these watersheds together form the largest continuous 
block of natural primary watersheds left on Vancouver Island.
There are over 4,500 known plant and animal species in Clayoquot Sound, including 
black bears, wolves, cougars, Roosevelt elk, and 249 species of birds (Staniforth &
Lydon 1996, 10). In the spring, grey and orca whales feed offshore while hundreds of 
sea lions feast on the large herring schools moving inshore to spawn. The most 
politically notable plant species in the Sound are the ancient trees. Some of the world’s 
biggest and oldest Sitka spruce, western red cedar, Douglas fir, hemlock and balsam - up 
to 1700 years old and 200 metres tall - exist in the Sound. It is their notable beauty and 
commercial value that has sparked an intense conflict for almost thirty years, attracting 
attention from around the world.
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Clayoquot Sound is part o f the Regional District o f Aibemi-Clayoquot. There are four 
communities within the Sound; the Nuu-chah-nulth communities o f Ahousaht, Tla-o- 
qui-aht, and Hesquiaht (with a  combined population of less than 1000), and Torino 
(Province 1993a, 3). The economy of the Regional District relies heavily on timber, 
tourism, risheries, mining, and aquaculture (ibid.). The principle tourism attraction in the 
Sound is Paciric Rim National Park Reserve.
The following case study focuses on the Clayoquot Land Use Decision (released to the 
public April 13, 1993) as a public policy example. As stated previous, to analyze this 
policy decision the two policy models used are Kingdon’s Decision Making Model and 
Pross’ Policy Communities Model. The key areas to be addressed in the case study are:
1) the actors/participants, 2) the relations of power (alliances), 3) the interests served in 
the outcome, and 4) the resources necessary to participate. The overall objective is to 
understand the policy decision using the models.
The case study begins with a time line and summary up to the ‘Moment in Time’. This is 
followed by a detailed description of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision. From there, 
Kingdon’s model is the rirst policy model to be applied in this research, followed by 
Pross’ model.
97
Time Line: (The sequence of events listed below was extracted from “A Report by the 
Friends o f Clayoquot Sound, & the Friends o f Clayoquot’s Forest Watch Program.” The 
Friends of Clayoquot Sound. 1998.)
1980 - MacMillan Bloedel (MacBlo) announces its intention to log Meares Island, 
sparking the formation of Friends of Clayoquot Sound (FOCS), an advocacy group 
dedicated to the preservation of the rain forest (Ecotrust 1997, 101).
1984 - MacMillan Bloedel prepared to log Meares Island; a  large old-growth island in the 
Tla-o-qui-aht and Ahousht First Nations territories. It was at this time that local First 
Nations and environmentalists came together in BC’s first blockade to stop logging. 
MacBlo responded by applying for and receiving an injunction to stop the blockades. The 
Tla-o-qui-aht and Ahousaht Nations declared the island a Tribal Park (Ecotrust 1997, 
101), and applied for, and received, a  counter-injunction based on outstanding land 
claims; the injunction remains in force today.
1988 - Sulphur Passage (north of Flores Island) is blockaded to stop a logging road being 
built by BC Forest Products and Fletcher Challenge. The blockade resulted in 36 people 
being arrested.
Late 1980s and early 1990s - the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force, 
and later the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Strategy Steering Committee, 
brought together local and provincial governments, industry, labour, and
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environmentalists to develop a land-use plan. An attempt at the use o f consensus-based 
decision-making and resource planning was made. Both processes failed.
1989 - The Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force collapses over 
disagreement over interim logging and representation at the negotiation table (Ecotrust 
1997, 101).
1990 - A study by Sierra Club revealed that of 60 primary watersheds larger than 5000 
hectares on the west coast of Vancouver Island, only five remain unlogged, including 
three in Clayoquot Sound (^ o tru s t 1997, 101).
1991 - The BC government establishes Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development 
Strategy Steering Committee. Shortly thereafter, environmental representatives walked 
out following a decision to approve interim logging (Ecotrust 1997, 101).
Summer 1991 -  A logging bridge over the Kennedy River was deliberately burnt by 
members of Friends o f Clayoquot Sound. There were road blockades and arrests 
(Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 13).
October 1991 - The New Democratic Party (NDP) formed a  new provincial government 
(Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 13).
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January 1992 - The new NDP government announced the formation of the Commission 
on Resources and the Environment (CORE). Despite CORE’S mandate to develop a 
comprehensive land use planning process for the province, the Clayoquot Sound Steering 
Committee process was exempted (Hoberg 1996, 276). hi protest, sixty-five people were 
arrested in a blockade at the Clayoquot Arm bridge (^ o tru s t 1997, 101).
October 1992 - Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force disbanded, unable 
to come to a consensus-based decision on land use (Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 13).
February 1993 - The BC government bought $50 million worth of shares in MacMillan 
Bloedel. An inquiry held concluded there was no ‘conflict of interest’ on the part of the 
provincial government (Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 13).
April 13, 1993 - Clayoquot Land Use Decision Announced
Following the failure of the Steering Committee to reach full agreement on areas to be 
protected. Premier Harcourt flew his entourage and the press corps to an isolated hilltop 
in the Sound to announce the government’s Clayoquot Land Use Decision. This decision 
claimed to be a balance between the area’s economic, environmental, and social needs 
(Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 13). The decision protected the Megin Valley and other 
smaller areas, but still left 74% of Clayoquot’s productive old growth forests open to 
logging. In protest, the Friends of Clayoquot Sound organized a blockade at Kennedy 
bridge. As well, in protest, the environmental representatives resigned from CORE 
(Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 13).
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July 5, 1993 - Opening of Clayoquot Blockade at Kennedy River Bridge.
Summer 1993 - Daily blockades and arrests totaled 857, culminating on August 9 when 
over 1000 people join blockade and 309 people were arrested. This was the largest civil 
disobedience action in Canadian history (Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 13).
The summer of 1993 concludes the intended extent of the time line and summary up to 
the moment in time. The events preceding the summer o f 1993 are detailed throughout 
the remaining case study.
6.1 The Clayoquot Land Use Decision
The following details on the Clayoquot land use policy decision are largely derived from 
the government document Clayoquot Sound Land Use Decision - Background Report 
unless otherwise cited.
The Clayoquot Land Use Decision was a policy decision made by the government at the 
provincial level. The government put forth with the decision principles underlying the 
policy. The stated principles are:
The decision:
•  builds on the limited agreement that was reached with the Clayoquot Sound
Sustainable Development Steering Committee (the Committee). While recognizing 
that no consensus was achieved on the total land use issue, the Committee process did
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result in an understanding on some areas that should be designated for development 
and on some areas that should be designated for protection;
•  utilizes the extensive resource information that was collected by both the Clayoquot 
Sound Sustainable Development Task Force (Task Force) and the Committee (list of 
participants in both found below);
• is consistent with policy directions that were recommended in the Protected Areas 
Strategy and the Forest Practices Code;
• reflects the approach that any future forest harvesting in sensitive areas should be 
carried out under stricter guidelines for protecting environmental and tourism values 
than in the past;
• ensures that timber harvesting will utilize alternate strategies to avoid extensive 
clearcuts and to maintain visual qualities in important areas; and
• reflects a balanced approach between protecting the significant environmental values 
of the Sound, while ensuring stability for workers, local communities and their 
economies (Province 1993a, 6).
The Clayoquot Sound Land Use Decision was broken down into two main sections:
Protected Areas and Litegrated Resource Management Areas (see Appendix - Map).
1) Protected Areas
The Clayoquot Land Use Decision gives protected status to 48 500 hectares; 18
percent of the land area (Province 1993a, 7). Combined with the existing protected area
of 39 100 hectares, the result is a total of 87 600 hectares, or 33 percent, of the Clayoquot
Sound land area is in protected area These areas are reserved from any new (italics
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mine) resource development or allocation, including timber harvesting, mineral claim 
staking and Land Act tenures. Treaty rights have yet to be settled and include protected 
areas in the negotiations (ibid.). (italics mine)
2) Integrated Resource Management Areas
The majority o f the Clayoquot Sound land base is designated as integrated 
resource management areas. It is these areas which contain the “working forest” 
(Province 1993a, 10) (See Clayoquot Sound Forest Practices Standards for details on the 
working forest). These areas will continue to support various types of economic activity, 
including timber extraction, fisheries, wildlife, tourism, recreation and mineral 
exploration and development. Aquaculture activity can be conducted on the shoreline 
areas that adjoin integrated resource management areas. Economic assurance is provided 
with the Clayoquot Land Use Decision for forest workers, their communities, and the 
forest industry. The policy decision resolves the outstanding land use question in 
Clayoquot Sound.
The goal for the working forest is a  sustainable harvest level of 600 000 cubic metres per 
year. The actual levels of harvest are tentative for the actual changes in allowable annual 
cut (AAC) are determined by the province’s Chief Forester. Some of the details guiding 
the allocation are based on the following:
- The government will amend the areas of Tree Farm Licenses (TFLs) 44 and 54 
and the Arrowsmith Timber Supply Area (TS A) to delete the areas identified for 
protection.
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- The Chief Forester will require that the TFL holders in the area prepare revised 
i'FL Management Plans.
- The Ministry of Forests will complete a  new timber supply analysis for the 
Arrowsmith TSA.
- Changes to the TFLs and TSA will reflect the requirements of the special 
management areas and the application o f new forest practices.
- The small dispersed cutblocks will be reforested, on average, within 3 to 5 years 
following harvest.
- An emphasis on more environmentally sensitive harvesting systems will result 
in more jobs. Aerial systems which suspend the logs in the air will be required.
- Harvesting methods such as single-tree selection and group selection methods 
will be utilized in sensitive areas within the scenic corridors.
- Sixty-two percent o f the land base o f Clayoquot Sound remains available for 
mineral resource extraction and development (Province 1993a, 10).
A policy of performance-based operations will guide timber resources development in the 
integrated resource areas. “Performance-based” means that forest companies, must, on 
an on-going basis, demonstrate ‘good performance’ in meeting harvesting and 
environmental standards. New operations will be approved only when monitoring 
indicates that operations have been conducted to these standards (Province 1993a, 11).
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The Land Use Decision requires timber harvesting plans to incorporate smaller dispersed 
cutblocks. Lower road densities are required, instead utilizing skyline and helicopter
harvesting systems.
Participants o f the TaskForce &. the Committee
Participants in the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force (Task Force) 
and the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Steering Committee (Committee) can 
be limited to five categories: resource development and extraction interests (aquaculture, 
fishing, labour, mining, small business, timber, tourism), environment. First Nations, 
bureaucrat (government employee), and politician (elected official). The number of 
participants in each are as follows:
Task Force





Residents of Tofino 2
The Provincial government initially included the Nuh-Chah-Nulth Tribal Council (NTC) 
on the Task Force without consultation, resulting in disinterest and distrust by the native 
residents of Clayoquot Sound. In an attempt to resolve the lack of First Nation’s 
representation, the Province conducted separate discussions with the mediator and the 
NTC requested six representatives - one for the Council and one for each o f the Tla-o- 
qui-aht, Ahousaht, Hesquiaht, Toquaht, and Ucluelet Bands (Darling 1991, 16).
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The Committee (Darling 1991 in Appendix 5 ,1 )





6.2 The Outcome of the Clayoquot Sound Decision-Making Processes
The Clayoquot Sound decision-making process was a  failed test o f an innovative and 
promising experiment in democratic governance (Hoberg 1996, 274). This failed 
alternative model o f governance, known as consensus-based negotiation, or shared 
decision-making, was first applied by the provincial government in Clayoquot Sound.
There were two attempts to reach consensus on land use decisions in the Sound. Both 
attempts were hindered by the same issue; the issue of what logging should proceed while 
negotiations were in progress. The Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task 
Force was the first attempt, formed by the provincial government in August 1989 
(Hoberg 1996, 275). A broad range of interests were represented including: labour, 
industry, environmentalists. Natives, and government. The task force’s mandate was to 
develop a long-term sustainable development plan for the region, as well as approving 
short-term decisions about where logging would occur on the interim. It was the issue of 
short-term logging that resulted in the task force falling short o f their stated goals 
(Darling 1991, 37).
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The task force then recommended the creation of an alternative process, the Clayoquot 
Sound Sustainable Development Steering Conunittee, which was established in October 
1990 (Darling 1991,45). It was agreed by the task force that the mandate of the steering 
committee was to develop a  long-term land use plan. The issue of short-term logging 
was left up to a panel consisting o f officials from the Ministry of Forests and the Ministry 
of Environment (Hoberg 1996, 275). The decision of this newly appointed panel to allow 
interim logging created a major stumbling block for the consensus process. Individuals 
and groups representing environmental interests were outraged that the panel decided to 
permit logging in the Bulson Creek area, which was considered to be an unlogged 
watershed. The environmentalist interests saw this decision as an absence of a 
commitment to negotiate in good faith. They saw irreversible decisions being made on 
the very issues they were suppose to be addressing at the table, leaving them with the 
impression that they were falling into a “talk and log” trap (Hoberg 1996, 276). They had 
already agreed to give up one unlogged watershed, Tofino Creek, when they entered the 
original task force. Not wanting to lend legitimacy to the process, they resigned from the 
steering committee in May 1991 (ibid.). There are two reasons cited as to why the 
Bulson Creek watershed was slated for logging in spite of its “unmodified” state:
• From the perspective of industry, labour, and government, the watershed had already 
undergone some development so additional logging there was not considered 
unreasonable;
• Timber supply in the region was sufficiently tight that in order to keep the workers of 
the Ketmedy Lake Division employed, access to Bulson Creek was deemed necessary 
(Hoberg 1996, 276).
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In spite of the lack of environmental representation, the steering committee continued. 
The committee membership believed that environmental views were still being 
represented in the committee by representatives from Tofino, the tourism sector, and the 
Ministry of Environment (ibid.). However, once the official environmental 
representatives left, the conunittee lost its most forceful advocates of the preservationist 
position.
The new NDP government announced the formation of the Commission on Resources 
and the Environment (CORE) in January of 1992 (Hoberg 1996, 276). Despite CORE’S 
mandate to develop a  comprehensive land use planning process for the province, the 
Clayoquot Sound Steering Conunittee process was exempted. There are conflicting 
reasons given for this decision;
• The official government explanation is that more than two years had already gone into 
the local process and it was deemed unfair to the participants to preempt it at that 
point.
• The NDP was looking out for the interests of the hitemational Woodworkers of 
America (IWA), which was concerned that CORE would become captured by 
environmentalists, and that it would be unfair to ‘reward’ them for walking out on the 
steering conunittee.
•  The NDP wanted CORE to succeed, and including the Clayoquot Sound issue in the 
process would have potentially doomed the process from the start (Hoberg 1996,275).
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In spite o f the environmental interests not being represented within the steering 
committee, the committee still could not come to a consensus (Hoberg 1996, 276). There 
was the presentation o f what was called “Option 5”, but the “greener” members of the 
committee from Tofino and the tourism sector would not agree to it. As a result, the 
steering committee disbanded in October 1992 without coming to any consensus on the 
land use issues.
After the committee process ended, the coalition supporting Option 5 organized to 
present what it called the “majority option” (Hoberg 1996,277). This option was 
supported by ten of the thirteen interests at the table. The thirteen did not include the 
Native groups for they did not take a position on it, nor did it include the 
environmentalists who had walked out of the negotiations. The three dissenting groups 
were Tofino, tourism, and mining; Tofino and tourism thought it was not preservationist 
enough, whereas mining thought it was too preservationist. Ultimately, the two co-chairs 
of the failed steering committee issued a report to cabinet in January 1993 laying out 
various options (ibid.):
• Option 5
• A more preservationist option - the Tofino Option
• The option to refer all parts of the decision to CORE
With the failure of the steering committee process, policy was then developed as it had 
always been, at the highest levels of government in a  lengthy cabinet debate. It was this 
decision that was announced April 13, 1993 by then BC Premier Mike Harcourt in
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Clayoquot Sound (Hoberg 1996, 277). The decision was found to be more 
preservationist than the “majority option”, but did not protect nearly as much of the land 
base as the environmental interests had sought. It was this decision that sparked the 
massive protests during the summer of 1993 leading to over 800 people being arrested for 
blocking logging roads into Clayoquot Sound.
6.3 Summary of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision
The failure of the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force to reach a 
consensus, later the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Strategy Steering 
Committee, resulted in the government presenting their own Clayoquot Land Use
Decision.
The summer of 1993 proved to be very memorable for most people o f British Columbia. 
W hat first appeared to be a difficult local issue in land management became an 
international issue putting Canada’s west coast on the international media scene (Hoberg 
1996, 277). Despite opinion polls showing general public approval within the province 
for the government’s compromise decision (although, soon after over 800 protesters were 
arrested in acts of disobedience in Clayoquot Sound, the government had only a 22 
percent approval rating on environmental issues (Harrison 1996,295)), concerns raised 
by the internationalization of the issue forced the cabinet to rethink the decision (Hoberg 
1996,277). The obvious reversal of the decision was not a politically viable option. 
Instead, the government took two major steps that produced similar results of a  reversal 
without having to publicly acknowledge doing so.
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jPost-Clayoquot Land Use Decision
The first step made by the government, faced with few options of appeasing all interests 
(at the prodding of CORE Commissioner Stephen Owen), was to engage in an impartial 
mediator role appointing people well-known for their said environmental sympathies.
The appointed people served as co-chairs. In addition, foresters, hydrologists, biologists, 
and others were appointed to a new panel of scientists to draft recommendations “to make 
forest practices in Clayoquot not only the best in the province, but the best in the world” 
(Report 5, I). This new panel was named the Scientific Panel for Sustainable Forest 
Practices in Clayoquot Sound, known as the “Scientific Panel” for short. It was realized 
at this point, by the BC Ombudsman in a report released in November of 1993, that the 
local First Nations had not been adequately consulted about the Clayoquot Land Use 
Decision (McCallum 1997). As a result, four First Nations representatives were included 
on the Panel to integrate Traditional Ecological Knowledge into the new discussions.
In April 1995, the panel recommended extremely stringent forest practices that would 
ultimately make logging in the sound far more expensive, in some cases prohibitively so 
(Hoberg 1996, 277). hi spite of this, due to pressure from the public, in July of 1995, the 
government announced that it was adopting all the recommendations put forward by the 
scientific panel.
The second step made by the government was to enter into an “interim measures 
agreement” in March 1994 with the Nuu-chah-nulth tribes, creating what Hoberg refers
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to as a co-management agreement between the First Nations in the Sound and the 
provincial government (Hoberg 1996, 278).
6.4 The First Nations in Clayoquot Sound
The role o f First Nations in Clayoquot Sound has not been explored in detail up to this 
point. In order to better understand the events surrounding the Clayoquot Land Use 
Decision, it is necessary to include the role of the local First Nations in this study.
The environmental controversy surrounding Clayoquot Sound has had a relatively long 
history, beginning with MacMillan Bloedel (MacBlo) proposing to log Meares Island in 
the early 1980s. It was then that the Tla-o-qui-aht First Nation and environmentalists put 
up the first logging blockade in Canadian history (Staniforth & Lydon 1996, 13). The 
blockade was constructed to stop the passage o f logging equipment into the Tla-o-qui-aht 
Nations’ traditional territory. The Tla-o-qui-aht Nation, at this time, declared Meares 
Island a tribal park. The First Nations and MacMillan Bloedel went before the provincial 
Supreme Court, each seeking an injunction to stop the activities of the other (Tennant 
1996, 55). The judge granted MacBlo its injunction; the First Nations appealed the 
decision. The province’s Court of Appeal reversed the lower court decision and ordered 
that logging be halted pending progress in resolving the Nuu-chah-nulth land claim 
encompassing Meares Island (ibid.). These land claim negotiations continue today.
The success of the Tla-o-qui-aht Nation was, unfortunately, saddled with tremendous 
debt. It was the strain of this debt that would serve as a strain on the alliance between the
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First Nations of Meares Island and the environmentalists who worked along side them. 
Francis Frank, an elected chief of the Tla-o-qui-aht, reflecting on the Meares Island 
dispute said, “They [environmentalists] said they were with us, and clearly they weren’t.’ 
(Mcllroy, June 27, 1993). Frank is referring to the $1.2 million in legal bills the tribal 
council was left with as a result of the court battle with MacBlo. This perceived breach 
of trust has resulted in the First Nations of Meares Island refraining from forming 
alliances with environmentalists to address the Clayoquot Sound issue.
In defense of fellow environmentalists. Friends o f Clayoquot Sound director Valerie 
Langer responded by saying, “Nobody knew their debt was that much.” (Mcllroy, June 
27, 1993). Langer, like many other environmentalists working to preserve BC’s forests, 
is aware of the potentially powerful alliance that can be realized between the First 
Nations and environmentalists. During the Clayoquot Sound protests in the summer o f 
1993, the Friends of Clayoquot Sound (FOCS) held off blockading logging roads until 
they received permission from the local First Nations. “An alliance with the natives is 
the best thing that could happen and I think the most frightening for the government, ” 
says Langer (ibid.).
The maintenance of this desired alliance may, however, require compromise on the part 
of the environmentalists. The natives in Clayoquot Sound are opposed to the Clayoquot 
Land Use Decision announced by Premier Harcourt, and to the methods used by the 
logging companies, including the giant clearcuts. However, it is here that the First 
Nations part company with the environmentalists and where compromise on the part of
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the environmentalists is seen as necessary in order to maintain an alliance with the First 
Nations. “We aren’t opposed to logging,” says Frank. “How can I  say that when 
unemployment in some of our villages is 70 percent. But I can say we would only log in 
a selective, sustainable way.” (Mcllroy, June 27, 1993). The degree of willingness to 
compromise on the part of the environmentalists in order to build/maintain First Nation 
alliances was later revealed in the Clayoquot Sound land use issue with the creation of 
the company lisaak (detailed on page 89).
Clayoquot and the Future o f Policy Development
Before the late 1980s and the issue of Meares Island, BC forest policy was conducted 
through a traditional regime that emphasized the mutually compatible interests of 
industry and government, with environmentalists and First Nations on the periphery 
(Hoberg & Morawski 1999, 387). The Clayoquot Land Use Decision o f April, 1993, 
combined with the Meares Bland outcome, resulted in dramatic policy changes in BC 
involving both Aboriginal policy and forest policy. (The actual land use decision in itself 
may not have had quite an impact on policy regimes except that it was accompanied by 
an Interim Measures Agreement with the Nuu-chah-nulth (ibid., 399; Johnston 1999, 6).) 
Hoberg and Morawski refer to this type of dramatic change as a “policy sector 
intersection” (1999, 390).
The concept of sector intersection involves the overlap of actors and institutions that 
comprise the policy regimes for different sectors. Hoberg and Morawski identify two 
forces required in order for the intersection to occur: 1) some type of significant
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disruption - economic, social or political; and 2) the result of the strategic actions of 
political actors (ibid.). Both forces, no matter how deliberate, can potentially produce 
unintended consequences, as well as intended ones.
Hoberg and Morawski applied the concept of policy sector intersection to the case o f 
Clayoquot Sound. As stated, prior to the late 1980s, BC forest policy was administered 
through a traditional regime that emphasized the interests of industry and government. 
Aboriginal policy was dealt with in its own distinct policy regime. However, the 
combination of events involving the land use issues in Clayoquot served as catalysts 
resulting in these two policy regimes converging and producing notable policy changes 
(Hoberg and Morawski 1999, 391). These changes include 1) the creation of a Forest 
Practices Code to implement what is considered more stringent regulation for harvesting;
2) an increase in the amount of wilderness protected from logging throughout the 
province; and 3) a comprehensive inventory analysis continues throughout the province 
to provide recalculations of the allowable harvest levels (Hoberg and Morawski 1999, 
393). These changes have resulted in policies that have been reported to have reduced 
the annual harvest levels of between 8 and 17 percent (ibid.).
The impact of these changes on BC’s Aboriginal population has been notable. 
Throughout this most recent transition in forest policy, the First Nations of Clayoquot 
Sound have participated in a selective manner. The initial occurrence concerning Meares 
Island involved the cooperation between environmentalists and the local First Nations. 
However, throughout the sununer of 1993 in Clayoquot Sound, the First Nations
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remained quiet (Hoberg and Morawski 1999, 394). The reasons for this lack of 
involvement was the lack o f trust in alliances on the part of the First Nations, and that the 
First Nations throughout BC were, and continue to be, involved in the process o f altering 
the political landscape of aboriginal policy through treaty negotiations (ibid.).
The application of treaty negotiations will alter the relationship First Nations have with
government and impact the practice of resource management in the province of British
Columbia. First Nations involvement will progress from the provincial and federal
government being the dominant actors in the control over land and resources in
traditional territory, with aboriginal groups largely excluded from meaningful
participation, to the First Nations assuming administrative control over negotiated
sections of land. This transition symbolizes dramatic changes in the status quo policy
regime; what Hoberg and Morawski referred to as ‘policy sector transition’.
“Unlike environmental groups. First Nations groups have difficulty using public 
opinion as a resource to motivate policy-makers to address their concerns.
Instead, their major political resource has proven to be the power of law.”
(Hoberg and Morawski 1999, 392).
Beginning in the late 1960s, the courts began articulating the specifrc rights of the First 
Nations people of Canada (Hoberg and Morawski 1999, 395). This progressively 
allowed First Nation people a  powerful position in the policy network. The legal force 
behind a land claim is the recognition by governments and the courts of aboriginal title. 
The establishment of the treaty process in BC has forced resource extraction industries to 
recognize the First Nations as potential competitors to the resource and/or as potential 
partners.
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In Clayoquot Sound, MacBlo has chosen to take the later approach. MacBlo has publicly 
supported First Nations and their quest for lesource-management responsibilities: ‘Tirst 
Nations should have a central decision-making role in ... resource development,” and 
‘T irst Nations should share in the economic benefits from resource development within 
traditional territories.” (Hoberg & Morawski 1999,403). hi April 1997, MacBlo entered 
into a  joint-venture forest company with the Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations (Hoberg & 
Morawski 1999,404), hsaak. MacBlo maintains 49% control o f  lisaak, with the Nuu- 
chah-nulth First Nations maintains the remaining 51% (Johnston 1999, 3). The new 
company assumed control over MacBlo’s operation in the northern part of the Sound. In 
taking this step, the First Nations in the region became not only part of the government, 
but also part of the forestry business. As a  result, when environmentalists oppose logging 
in Clayoquot Sound, their opponents now not only include industry and government, but 
also the First Nations.
On June 16th, 1999, the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Clayoquot’s
new joint venture company lisaak and various environmental groups was formally
signed. The purpose of the MOU is
“to promote the resolution of the historic land use conflict in a way which 
respects First Nations’ traditional ownership of their territories, enhances local 
sustainable economic development opportunities, provides stability for local 
communities by reconciling parties that have been involved in social conflict, 
and protects the natural beauty and bio diversity of Clayoquot Sound.”
(Johnston September 1999, 14).
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However, the key environmental group behind the organization of protests the summer of 
1993, Friends of Clayoquot Sound (FOCS), chose not to join the other environmental 
groups (Greenpeace, Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Western 
Canada Wilderness Committee) in the signing o f this MOU. Friends Of Clayoquot 
Sound acknowledges the key steps towards conservation included in the MOU, such as 
not logging in pristine valleys. However, since only 27 percent of Vancouver Island’s 
ancient forests remain standing, FOCS could not endorse any industrial logging of old- 
growth (Paone 1999, 16). histead, FOCS has taken on the role of monitoring lisaak’s 
logging activities.
The decision by FOCS’ to not sign the MOU with lisaak, thereby not supporting the new 
co-management arrangement encouraged by the interim measures agreement, is 
indicative of the considerable tensions between aboriginal groups and environmental 
activists (Hoberg & Morawski 1999,403). With the creation of lisaak, resulting in First 
Nations participating in industrial logging in Clayoquot Sound, environmental groups are 
obliged to forego previous agreements made with the First Nations. For example, in June 
1996, Greenpeace and FOCS initiated a blockade on a road accessing old-growth slated 
for active logging in the Sound (ibid.). This was done in spite of an agreement made with 
the Nuu-chah-nulth chiefs that approval would be sought before any actions were 
employed. This action angered the chiefs; they demanded that the blockades be removed. 
In justifying their actions, the activists noted that “the Nuu-chah-nulth chiefs approved 
the logging we were protesting... As with any government, we reserve the right to 
disagree with the decisions that cause irreparable ecological harm.” (Hoberg & Morawski
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1999,403). Actions like this further the wedge between First Nations and 
environmentalists.
As discussed, the concept o f policy sector intersection involves the overlap o f actors and 
institutions that comprise the policy regimes for different sectors. The two forces 
identified by Hoberg and Morawski that are said to be required in order for the 
intersection to occur are: 1) some type of significant disruption - economic, social or 
political; and 2) the result of the strategic actions o f political actors. Da reviewing the 
above discussion, one is able to identify the significant disruptions that occurred in the 
case of Clayoquot Sound, as well as the strategic actions o f the political actors. The first 
force, the internationally covered protests by the environmentalists and the land claims 
process, served as significant disruptions to the status quo in policy regimes. The second 
force consisted of notable events such as the introduction o f the forest practices code, the 
Clayoquot Land Use Decision, as well as the creation of the interim measures agreement 
between the provincial government and the Nuu-chah-nulth. These forces combined 
have resulted in profound policy transformation. Da the case of Clayoquot Sound, the 
regime governing First Nations has, in many cases, converged with the regime governing 
forest policy (Hoberg & Morawski 1999,406). The impact of this transformation in 
policy sectors was advantageous to the First Nation. However, for the environmental 
groups working to avoid the liquidation of the old-growth forests in Clayoquot Sound, the 
wedge driven between them and First Nations is counter to an advantageous alliance in 
the effort to maintain the ecological integrity o f the old-growth forests of Clayoquot 
Sound.
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In conclusion, the transformation in policy sectors has resulted in the establishment of 
alliances between the forest industry and the First Nations in Clayoquot Sound. This 
alliance has undermined the efforts of environmental groups such as FOCS As stated 
earlier. Langer realized that in the effort to halt industrial logging in the Sound, an 
alliance with the First Nations would help serve this objective. With the intersection of 
forest policy with Aboriginal policy, the interests involved in this intersection appear to 
have undermined future alliances between the First Nations and environmentalists. The 
overall result of the policy sector transformation on the effectiveness o f environmental 
groups to impact policy has been substantial. Environmental groups such as FOCS, who 
have been unwilling to compromise in the past (i.e. refusing to sign the MOU regarding 
lisaak), forego a potentially powerful alliance in their efforts to influence the impact of 
the Clayoquot Land Use Decision.
6.5 Policy Analysis of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision
Policy analysis involves the separation of the policy into its parts (i.e. events, actors, 
alliances) for individual study, hi order to properly examine the various parts of the 
Clayoquot Land Use Decision policy, one must ensure that the terms applied are 
generally understood, hi order to ensure this throughout the policy analysis, the 
following section is provided.
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6.5.1 Productive Vs. Non-Productive
When identifying the main actors in a  policy process, labels are used in order to simplify 
the model illustration and ensure optimum understanding of the process being illustrated. 
Pross’ Policy Community Model is no exception. Most of the terms used are 
straightforward in application. However, some of the labels require explanation.
The main actors in the Clayoquot Land Use policy analysis are mainly concentrated in 
three areas: bureaucratic, political, and interested groups. The labels applied in the two 
communities bureaucracy (government employed) and political (elected official) require 
little detailing for the labels used are commonly applied. However, the labels used in the 
area of ‘interested groups’ require further detail. The objective of this section is to first 
state the labels to be used, then define, and finally to justify why these labels are to be 
used and not others. The purpose of the objective is to reveal the potential 
misappropriation of labels which then form perceptions; perceptions and ultimately 
opinions and attitudes (Sherman & Gismondi 1997, 14; Tuan 1990, 70).
Hessing and Hewlett (1997,73), in their research on policy actors looking specifically at 
resource and environmental policy, have applied the terms “productive” and “non­
productive” when describing stakeholders and interested groups. They write,
“The institutional and economic advantage of actors with ‘productive’ interests 
in resource activities typically exceeds that of those representing non­
productive’ interests. This imbalance curtails the opportunities for, and the 




The ‘productive interests’, in Hessing and Hewlett’s case, are institutional and economic; 
gauges readily recognized/accepted and measured by mainstream economists and 
members of government. The ‘non-productive interests’, however, are interests that 
appear to not contribute either economically or institutionally. One could certainly argue 
that all interests serve a productive role institutionally in the development and influencing 
of public policy (ibid.). However, one cannot easily argue that ‘non-productive’ interests 
contribute equally economically. As a result, the advantage remains with the 
‘productive’ actors in the policy process. The productive actors remain at an advantage 
until one critically evaluates the term ‘economic’ and how this is calculated.
The case study in this research looks specifically at the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, 
developed in response to the controversy surrounding logging in Clayoquot Sound. In 
terms of ‘productive’ and non-productive’, these labels are applied to interested groups 
that either contribute to the economy by logging (productive) or do not contribute to the 
economy by focusing on the preservation of the old-growth forests (non-productive). 
Looking specifically at this application of labels, one could argue that both the extractors 
of the old-growth and the preservationists of the old-growth are both ‘productive’ 
interests. The economic value of the old-growth (without going into the entire debate in 
the inherent values of the preservation of old-growth) is shown to be far greater if left 
intact and unlogged (Schilder 1999, 18; Macy 1999,12; Freed 1996,211). The values of 
old-growth, if preserved, have been shown to contribute significantly to the local 
economies of the area in an economically sustainable fashion. The local economies are 
able to benefit from the protected old-growth through alternative economies such as low-
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impact tourism, wildcrafts, and seasonal product extraction (i.e. mushroom picking). The 
difference between the economy created/preserved through the protection of the old- 
growth forests and the logging of the old-growth forests may now be compared 
economically. Of course, one could then argue that preservationists, through the creation 
of an alternative economy, are ‘productive’ interests. The difference would be this 
‘protection economy’ is long-term with sustainable economic gain because the forests are 
left standing. Whereas, the logging of these same forests is productive’ but with short­
term, limited economic gain (because clearcut logging is short-term).
Upon using the terms productive’ versus non-productive’ using a vertical (protection - 
the trees are left standing therefore are not harvested) versus horizontal (logging - the 
trees are harvested therefore are not protected) analysis one can realize that the terms 
productive and non-productive are relative to context and application. One could further 
argue that the terms have been applied incorrectly; productive typically considered long­
term and non-productive typically considered short-term. However, for conformity sake, 
the terms ‘productive’ and non-productive’ will be applied throughout the policy model 
analysis as Hessing and Howlett intended them to be applied; ‘productive’ are the pro­
logging interests and ‘non-productive’ are the preservationists. The purpose of the above 
is to reveal the potential misappropriation of labels which then form perceptions; 
perceptions and ultimately opinions and attitudes.
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6.5.2 Analysis Using Kmgdon*s Model
By using the decision-making model by Kingdom, the researcher was able to establish a  
general overview of events and how they are organized into the three streams for 
describing how the window of opportunity was created. Kingdon’s model worked as a 
frame, which was then followed by Pross’ comm uid^ policies model. Pross’ model was 
used to identify essential events and actors leading up to the policy decision and 
announcement.
As detailed in the Policy Analysis section, Kingdon’s model enables an analysis o f a  
policy to be broken down into specific, separate components to better study the process 
which led to the policy decision. Kingdom breaks the analysis down into three parts: the 
problem stream; the policy stream, and the political stream. As one of the two chosen 
models for the research, this analysis will begin by breaking down the Moment-Ih-Time 
using Kingdon’s model.
1) The Problem Stream:
There are typically indicators that show there is a problem. In this case, the demise o f 
both the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development Task Force and the Clayoquot 
Sound Sustainable Development Strategy Steering Committee, as well as the continued 
pro and anti-logging pressures in Clayoquot Sound, serve as the indication that there was 
a land use pohcy issue. It was the provincial governments responsibility to address the 
problem.
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2) The Policy Stream
The policy stream focus is on the solution; the introduction of a new policy or the change 
of a policy. The Clayoquot Land Use Decision, made public April 13, 1993, was the 
solution; the introduction of a new policy.
3) The Political Stream
The political will, in the case of Clayoquot Sound, was driven by the sheer magnitude of 
the problem. The NDP government was faced with a problem which caused a strong 
enough public opinion that the government had to act. Had the government not acted, in 
spite of the public pressure, it would have risked political problems due to inaction.
In the case of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, all three streams occurred resulting in 
the window of opportunity opening and the introduction of the new policy. Using 
Kingdon’s model for this policy analysis, one was able to answer the two earlier stated 
questions: Was there the political will? and Where was it from? Both can be answered 
without complication simply because the situation surrounding Clayoquot Sound is fairly 
straight forward. There was the political will because o f the external pressures exerted by 
interest groups, interested individuals, stakeholder groups, politicians, and bureaucrats in 
the provincial government. The political will came from all policy communities who had 
an interest or stake in the outcome of the decision.
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6.5.3 Got Vs. Wanted
In any decision rendered by the state, there are perceived sides'. The Clayoquot Land 
Use Decision was no different. The 'sides' in this specific policy decision emulate the 
groups used in Pross' policy community model from the "Interest Groups Conununity".
In the "terminology " portion of the thesis, the two sides have been broken down into 
'productive' and "non-productive". In order to detail further the outcome of the policy 
decision, this next section identified who wanted what and who got what. As done in 
previous sections of this study, the division used to distinguish the two sides will apply 
the terms ‘productive’ and ‘non-productive’. The policy is detailed above (Section 6.1), 
outlining the government decision as it is to be applied to the land base. What was then 
required was a comparison of the actual policy decision with the desires and expectations 
of each of the sides. The objective was to draw out the winners’ in the policy decision, 
as well as the ‘losers’. From there, an understanding was gained as to why one side was 
seen as the losers and one side the winners, and the implications this has on the policy 
process in BC.
In order to accomplish the above, this next part o f the study looked at the actual policy 
decision (Section 6.1; as well as at the proceeding, supporting sections - Sections 6.2, 6.3, 
& 6.4), the media bytes, and the interviews. Via the policy decision, media bytes, and the 
interviews, one was able to examine 1) the participants, 2) the alliances, 3) the interests 
served in the policy outcome, and 4) the resources necessary to participate in the policy 
process.
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In examining the policy decision outcome from Section 6.1, one could simply state that 
because Clayoquot Land Use Decision allows for 74% of the Sound to be accessible to 
some form o f logging, the productive interests won; leaving the non-productive interests 
as the losers. Reviewing the numerous media bytes from both sides', one was left with 
the impression that the non-productive interests are indeed the losers. Specifically, after 
the announcement of the policy decision by Haicourt, The Toronto Star reports that the 
forest companies impacted by the decision "...said the decision will prevent sawmill 
closures and massive layoffs that could have devastated the Clayoquot communities o f 
Tofino and Ucluelet " (CP, April 14, 1993). This is supported by a report the same day in 
the Ottawa Citizen (Baldrey, April 14, 1993), stating that the forest companies in the 
Sound had expressed "...its cautious support for the decision, saying it will end 
uncertainty and instability in the region and allow for proper industrial planning." "In 
broad terms, we re pleased the cabinet has finally made a decision which should bring 
some stability," said Doug Cooper, interim manager of the coast forest sector for the 
Council of Forest Industries [productive interest] (ibid.). As well, a senior employee for 
MacBlo, Dennis Fitzgerald, stated that industry was satisfied with the Clayoquot Land 
Use Decision - “Yes, industry certainly accepted it and supported it” (Section 6.5.4).
The apparent satisfaction on the productive side runs counter to the level of satisfaction 
of the non-productive side. For example, Vicky Husband (an official with the Sierra 
Club) states after the announcement by Harcourt, "We [non-productive interests] feel 
betrayed, angry and frustrated, and I suppose more than anything else, sad (Baldrey,
April 14, 1993). Environmentalists [non-productive interests] said the government's
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decision effectively fragments the ecosystem in the Clayoquot area, opens the door to 
widespread devastation of old-growth timber, and is fraught with uncertainty about 
logging practices (ibid.). While the environmentalists were outraged with the Clayoquot 
Land Use Decision, the forest industry [productive interests] expressed relief that not 
only had the decision finally been made, but that it appeared to have struck the right 
balance. Fred Lowenberger, Vice President of Land Use for International Forest 
Products (Interfor), one of the two major forest license holders in the region, said the 
government had chosen a balanced approach. "It's a very realistic option. On balance, if 
you're sitting in cabinet and caucus and facing all the pressures they face, this is a 
balanced decision. " (ibid.).
Contrary to the perceptions of the productive interests, a “balanced decision” is not how 
the majority of the general public perceived the Clayoquot Land Use Decision. 
According to an Angus Reid poll (Bell, April 17, 1993), the NDP led by Premier Mike 
Harcourt was the least popular party in the province, with 75 percent of the public 
disapproving of its performance. Harcourt and the NDP had the support of only 14 
percent of British Columbians, while 75 percent said they disapproved of the party’s 
performance over the month of April. The poll, commissioned by the Vancouver Sun, 
indicated the provincial budget and the government’s handling of the Clayoquot Sound 
issue were among the issues that had eroded the party’s support. Pollster Angus Reid 
said the survey showed Harcourt was in “deep trouble” because of his “recent policies ”. 
Before April of 1993, the NDP approval rating was 35 percent. The poll suggested the 
NDP government had “grossly misread ” the people of the province.
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This discontent is echoed in the federal caucus of NDP. “Three federal NDP politicians 
say the provincial NDP government is not protecting enough old-growth forest around 
Clayoquot Sound” (Bohn, April 17, 1993). The strongest criticism came from Bumaby- 
Kingsway MP Sven Robinson, who declared he was willing to join a peaceful road 
blockade to stop logging. Robinson also called the new land use plan a “betrayal” of 
NDP environmental promises. Saanich-Gulf Islands NDP MP Lynn Hunter also reported 
to be disappointed with the decision not to protect more rainforest. She was quoted as 
saying, “This is not improving the world picture at all. When they say they have to 
balance jobs and the environment, most o f the jobs are lost because of technology.” hi an 
attempt to address concerns, Svend Robinson appealed to BC NDP government to 
reverse its decision to allow limited logging (CP, April 18, 1993). He believes that any 
logging in the region would mean the international view of BC would suffer; he accused 
the provincial NDP of betraying its own principles. He wanted the BC government “to 
reverse this decision, to reconsider, to recognize the enormously destructive impact this 
will have on the environment” (ibid.). He was also upset that the provincial government 
bypassed its own consultative process in the Clayoquot decision and believed strong 
public protests would force the NDP to backtrack. Robinson had said the Commission on 
Resources and the Environment should be involved in the decision. Environmental 
groups had asked Harcourt to refer the Clayoquot issue to the BC commission (ibid.).
The Clayoquot policy decision resulted in unrest within the provincial NDP membership. 
“The so-called tax revolt over the NDP government’s latest budget is not nearly as
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critical for the government as the fermenting furor over Clayoquot Sound” (Baldrey, 
April 23, 1993). The decision to allow logging in 74% of the Clayoquot Sound area was 
a much more sensitive issue for a p a r^  that liked to wrap itself in a dark shade of green. 
The Clayoquot Sound decision enraged the NDP’s own supporters. Several people who 
held positions in the party publicly split with the NDP and quit those positions. The 
decision itself shocked even some NDP caucus members and government officials, who 
were stunned that so much of the Clayoquot would be thrown open to logging. Stephen 
Owen, head of the government’s Commission on Resources and Environment, waded 
into the fray with thinly veiled criticism of the decision and demanded that conflict-of- 
interest commissioner Ted Hughes be asked to look at the government’s purchase of 
MacMillan Bloedel shares before it made the Clayoquot decision. If the government had 
turned down the request, it risked damaging the Owen Commission’s credibility and 
further alienating itself from the environmental movement (ibid.). Doing so could have 
hurt the NDP in the long run for there were a number of environmental activists who 
were important election campaign organizers.
Liberal environment critic Paul Martin (Lasalle-Emard MP) stated on May 26, 93 
(O’Neil, April 27, 1993), “The federal Liberal party will give Clayoquot Sound 
wilderness protection status if it wins this year’s election”. He went on to say that the 
Liberal government would launch negotiations with Victoria and the forest industry to 
determine compensation for lost logging rights. The report continues, stating that the 
Liberal party urged the federal and BC governments on April 8 to give Clayoquot 
wilderness protection status. There is support for park status based on the popularity and
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success of the Pacific Rim National Park, which is adjacent to the Clayoquot Sound 
region. Martin is quoted as saying, “One can justify the extension of the park obviously 
for the protection of the forest but also because o f the tremendous success of the existing 
park” (ibid.).
Internationally, the response to the policy decision was not any more favourable. Groups 
like the European Rainforest Movement (ERM) encouraged an international boycott of 
wood products coming from Clayoquot Sound upon hearing the Clayoquot Land Use 
Decision announcement (Hamilton, May 11, 1993). A  letter from ERM to the 
Ambassador Edward Lee in Vienna stated logging in Clayoquot Sound, an area 
containing rare and endangered species, violates the Biodiversity Convention which 
Canada supports (ibid.).
Locally, provincially, federally, and internationally, the response to the Clayoquot Land 
Use Decision was not favourable. The overwhelming majority of support for the decision 
was from the forest industry and the labour unions (productive interests). In fact, it was 
requested and suggested to government by a notable number of high profile government 
and non-productive interests to either modify the policy decision outright, or to allow 
CORE to be involved in the decision (CP, April 18, 1993). Mike Harcourt and the NDP 
party refused to consider such options, stating that the Clayoquot Land Use Decision 
would be “viewed as a paragon of balance between the interests of industry and those of 
the environment” (Seattle, May 1, 1993).
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Looking at both the productive and non-productive interests, from when the decision was 
announced to today's impressions, one can propose the following: the non-productive 
interests, without question, were extremely unsatisfied with the policy decision.
Whereas, the productive interests, overall, were satisfied with the policy decision.
Simply looking at it from this perspective, one can assume that the winners in the 
outcome of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision are the productive interests, and the losers 
are the non-productive interests. The decision resulted in 74% of the Clayoquot Sound 
being open to logging, in spite of the pressure from the non-productive interests. Based 
on the literature review, and looking at both ‘sides’, one is able to state that the lack of 
participant resources (as detailed in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2) on the part of the non­
productive interests appears to have greatly impacted the policy outcome. In realizing 
this, one is made aware of the importance of certain required participant resources 
identifîed by both the pressure group theorists and the activists themselves. Had the non­
productive interests been able to maintain alliances with the local First Nations (by 
providing Anancial and legal support), the policy outcome may have been more 
favourable to their interests. Perhaps if the non-productive interests were able to 
maintain more of a presence on both the Task Force and the Steering Committee, the 
policy outcome would have been more favourable. The non-productive interests (as was 
found in Section 6.5.1), however, are secondary to those of the productive interests in the 
policy process. As a result, their influence on the Task Force, the Steering Committee, 
and ultimately the Clayoquot Land Use Decision was limited.
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6.5.4 Interview Results
The results of the media bytes, and the ‘sides’ portrayed in the above section, are 
reflected in the interview results. The interviews provided updated impressions and 
perceptions of the decision, and provided further clarity as to which ‘sides’ expectations 
and desires were most satisfied. Each interview involved four questions (Appendix: 
Interview Questions). The following section provides a summary of the results o f the 
four completed interviews, progressing in the order of ± e  questions given. A summary 
and conclusion of the results o f the interviews will be used in the following fînal section 
of the research.
The Politician
The Erst interviewee was a senior politician (Independent) in Clayoquot Sound at the 
time the Clayoquot Land Use Decision was announced. He will be referred to throughout 
as the ‘politician’. The first question asked for the identification of the main participants 
in the policy process. The main participants according to the politician were: industry, 
NDP government. First Nations, and environmentalists.
The politician believes it was the lack of alliances that directed the progression of the 
policy process. The participants in the policy process could not come together to develop 
a community based policy. It was this lack of alliances that resulted in a politically 
motivated policy versus a community based policy. The politician believes there was a 
lack of an alliance between the First Nations (non-productive/productive interests) and 
environmentalists (non-productive interests) where one should have perhaps occurred.
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This was because of the distrust the First Nations have regarding the motives o f the 
environmentalists. The politician believes that the stand taken by the non-productive 
interests regarding old-growth logging (preservation) alienated themselves from the First 
Nations, the local conununities, and the labour sector in the Sound. This alienation 
resulted in alliances not being formed between these groups - a potentially powerful 
alliance. This lack of an alliance was believed to greatly hinder the progress o f the 
environmentalists. In spite o f the apparent polar interests of these two groups, one 
wonders if they could use each other in the form of an alliance - the same type o f alliance 
seen in other resource issues in Canada - as a means to an end.
The second question focused on the necessary resources, hi the interview process, each 
of the interviewees were asked the question which included the same brief list of 
examples each time for illustration purposes. The resources required in order for each of 
the participants to effectively partake in the policy process was not specifically listed in 
the interview with the politician. Instead, the politician simply stated that whatever 
resources were deemed necessary for full participation by the key players in the policy 
process should have been provided for. Without providing the necessary participant 
resources, the provincial government could not ensure a community based policy 
decision that reflected the interests of all the main participants. Instead, the participants 
with the necessary resources were effectively represented, providing a non-representative 
policy. Another risk to not providing the necessary resources was the threat of a  policy 
decision being made externally, outside the communities impacted by it. The result, as
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had happened with the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, would be the lack of endorsement 
and ownership by the communities involved.
When asked how the politician believed the Clayoquot Land Use Decision was made, he 
stated that the policy process was a process set up to fail. While he believes that the NDP 
government provided the forum for the consensus decision-making, this effort on the part 
of the government was deliberately deceiving. While providing the forum, the 
government was aware of the polarized views that were to be represented at the table.
The provincial government, realizing the consensus process was unfamiliar and untested 
in EC’s forest policy process, was essentially “keeping the kids busy in the sandbox” 
while the politicians and bureaucrats worked on a politically motivated policy; the 
Clayoquot Land Use Decision.
While unable to substantiate this perspective, one is able to speculate that there was a 
tremendous degree of distrust for the government’s conduct, as well as strong evidence of 
the feelings of futility on the part of the participants in the policy process. This senior 
politician, who served on various tables in the early 1990s in Clayoquot Sound regarding 
resource use in the area, can be said to be unsatisfied with the policy process. He posits 
that the Clayoquot Sound Land Use Decision was politically motivated with little 
consideration for the “facts and figures”. He believes that the underlying factor in the 
policy decision was the treaty negotiations; the government was attempting to appease 
the First Nations, as well as the environmentalists. The politician credits the non­
productive interests for raising the issue of the old-growth liquidation that was occurring
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in the Clayoquot Sound, but then followed by saying that these same groups went too far 
in their efforts. The non-productive interests wanted preservation instead o f 
conservation, in spite of the fact that there were communities in the Sound that relied on 
the forests for their livelihood.
The Politician believes the First Nations benefited from the agreement indirectly, because 
of the agreement came the Interim Measures Agreement providing them with an 
increased role in the economic benefits of resource extraction in the Sound. The 
conununities within the Sound benefited from the land use decision indirectly as well. 
The events following the announcement of the policy resulted in the small conununities 
gaining notoriety, increasing the levels of tourism which continues today. According to 
the politician, the outcome of the policy satisfied some of the groups in question, 
including industry. The productive interests were believed to have gained by the policy 
simply because it involved “bailouts”. The politician believes that the logging companies 
operating in the Sound were generally satisfied with the policy. The implications o f the 
policy provided compensation for the existing licenses, thus relieving these companies of 
what was seen as expensive, in some cases prohibitively so, logging options (Smyth,
April 15, 1993). The only group involved that can be said to be entirely dissatisfied with 
the policy decision are the non-productive interests (environmentalists). The politician 
believes that because of the non-productive interests’ hard stance against any further 
industrial logging in the Sound, the government was unable to provide any level of 
satisfaction to them.
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Interfor (International Forest Products)
This next interview involved a senior employee of one of the two main logging 
companies operating in Clayoquot Sound, International Forest Products (Literfor). 
Throughout this section this participant will be referred to as ‘Interfor’.
The main participants in the policy process, according to Interfor, were 
environmentalists, industry, local communities and community groups, labour unions 
(specifically IWA), the NDP government, the Social Credit, and the local First Nations. 
Interfor speculates that Bill Vander Zalm, of the Social Credit party, merits mention 
because Vander Zalm, in response to the environmental pressure in the late 1980s, 
visited a clearcut and burned area in Clayoquot Sound described as the “Black Hole” and 
was reported saying “this is a  disgrace”. His description was thought by hiterfor to lend 
credibility to the efforts of the non-productive interests and contributing to the provincial 
governments move to start land use planning in Clayoquot Sound.
Amongst the main participants there were alliances identified by interfor as being part of 
the policy process. One such alliance was between the First Nations and 
environmentahsts. He cited this alliance as being mutually beneficial for different 
objectives (First Nations for land claims and environmentalists for parks). Another 
alliance identified was one that included First Nations and environmentalists, but also the 
NDP government. Literfor believes that the provincial government was “more focused 
on ‘green’ decisions in the early 1990s than they are today”, thus, he believes, benefiting 
the environmentalists. A separate alliance identified was that between the IWA and the
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NDP government. Interfor believes that the forest companies “did not really exert all that 
much influence on the NDP in the early 1990s on [the issue of] Clayoquot Sound”.
The resources identified by Literfor as necessary for effective participation in the policy 
process reflected what was found in the literature review. Literfor believes that, in the 
specifîc incidence o f the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, the environmentahsts’ resources 
were the abihty to blockade (volunteers, connections to the grassroots), their access to 
money (source not stated). First Nations support (alhances), and firiends in government 
(political support) enabling them to effectively participate in the pohcy process. The 
First Nations, he beheves, had access to money (source not stated). The IWA had its 
membership and the influence on the NDP government as their necessary resources. 
Literfor does not provide any insight as to what the productive interests had to be 
effective participants in the pohcy process.
In addressing the forth question in the interview, Literfor presents his perspective in the 
form of a progression of events, beginning in the 1960s, to explain how the Clayoquot 
Decision was made. The 1960s witnessed the building of the first logging road through 
the Sound that allowed access to the west coast (previously accessible only by air or 
water). The logging road enabled recreationahsts to access Long Beach for camping and 
hiking. This road also provided a route to remote areas on the coast desired by people 
seeking an ‘alternative’ hfestyle. Li 1972, the Pacific Rim National Park was created, 
attracting more people to the Sound. With the addition of recreationahsts and people 
seeking alternative lifestyles to the Sound, which had already been occupied by the
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various First Nations groups, combined with the logging activity, caused resource use 
conflicts to develop. These resource conflicts increased over the years until the late 
1980s when pressure from the non-productive interests resulted in the provincial 
government having to address the land use issues. The provincial government imposed 
various decision-making processes specifically dealing with Clayoquot Sound (see 
Section 6.2) in an attempt to address the various land use conflicts. It was the failure of 
these decision-making processes that precipitated the Clayoquot Land Use Decision. 
However, as detailed by Interfor, the Sound already had a  history of land use conflict 
prior to the 1993 policy decision.
MacMillan Bloedel
This interview involved a senior employee of the other main logging company operating 
in Clayoquot Sound, MacMillan Bloedel (MacBlo), Dennis Fitzgerald.
The main participants who influenced the policy outcome, according to Fitzgerald, were 
those who participated in the Task Force and the Steering Committee (Section 6.1). As 
participants, the First Nations fulfilled more of an ‘observer stams’ because they felt that 
their participation potentially compromised their land claims and their negotiations with 
the provincial government. The environmentalists participated for a short while until 
they realized that the government was going to allow logging in the contentious areas in 
Clayoquot Sound throughout the processes.
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Fitzgerald identified various alliances as being part of the policy process. The first 
alliance identified was between the First Nations and environmentalists. Fitzgerald stated 
that this alliance had been maintained since the Meares Island issue (detailed in Section 
6.4). The alliance between First Nations and environmentalists is described as a “long­
standing marriage of convenience”. They had certain common objectives. They also had 
certain fundamental differences. Depending on the situation, these differences would 
either be obscured (“shoved into the background”) or come to the fore. The First Nations 
were “shut out of the economy - forest industry”. They believe that this land belongs to 
them and are pursuing this in land claim negotiations. This was not always the case (First 
Nations were active participants in the forest industry right up to the early 1980s; they 
would fish, then when that was done they would work in the forest industry. As long as 
the jobs were there they could work. With the changes in the forest industry and less 
jobs, the ones who worked periodically did not have seniority and were the first to go.) 
First Nations were able to form a common cause with the environmentalists who wanted 
to stop logging, but their interests were contrary to one another. The First Nations 
objective was to enter the forest economy, whereas the environmentalists objectives were 
to hinder the industrial forest economy. There were conflicting interests, but they (First 
Nations and environmentalists) used each other. The First Nations shared the 
environmentalists disapproval o f the logging practices. The First Nations wanted things 
done differently in the industry. However, the company of the two interests parted when 
it came to what each interest wanted for the land base. Li the long term, these interests 
diverge, but in the short term they were able to find common ground.
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Labour and the NDP government was another alliance identified by Fitzgerald. As well, 
industry, throughout the dispute, had made alliances with labour, as well as with the local 
communities (mostly Uclulet than Tofino - there has been a  split in the two communities. 
The split in the two communities was the result o f the main industry offices being moved 
out of Tofîno to Uclulet. This resulted in Uclulet becoming the industry-based town, and 
Tofino the tourism-based town. This polarized the interests of the communities because 
each relies on opposite resource interests. Significant anim osi^ has been created 
between the communities as a result; since the late 80s.).
Fitzgerald did not specifically identify the resources necessary for the effective 
participation in the policy process. He did state that the process itself was well-resourced 
externally by the provincial government. As a forerunner to the CORE process, it was 
much more extensive and intensive in comparison in regards to the amount o f participant 
resources (‘resources’ includes access to scientific data, accurate geographical 
information, meeting locations, honorariums, etc.) allotted by the provincial government. 
Any resources deemed necessary were forthcoming. Fitzgerald believed that the 
participation of the environmentalists and First Nations were not deterred due to a lack of 
resources in the process because there were avenues provided by government to meet 
their needs.
Fitzgerald thought it important to recognize that, when detailing how the Clayoquot Land 
Use Decision was made, the decision was from the two very long processes before it, 
beginning in 1989 under Vander Zalm. Robert Prescot Allan and Jim Walker facilitated
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the Task Force group. This group was given the impossible task of reaching a  consensus 
on a recommendation for Clayoquot. In the context of those times, there was simply no 
mood for the possibility for the parties involved in reaching an agreement (unanimity).
At the time, the processes were progressive initiatives by the government. These 
government initiatives were new in terms of being multi-stakeholder conflicts. Everyone 
approaches the negotiating table, they lay out their positions, then the facilitator must try 
to move these positions together as close as possible to build some sort of compromise 
that nobody is totally happy with, but hopefully nobody is totally unhappy with. “The 
decision couldn’t hold politically”. Logging on the interim of these processes is what 
killed the processes. The first third of the processes were spent trying to find the most 
contentious areas to set aside and the areas where logging could continue.
There was the “majority position” (Option 5) put forward that did not have tourism’s, 
mining’s, or First Nations’ (no position given) support. Mining would not support any 
protected areas because they felt that they could not agree to setting aside land that may 
have future development potential (they asserted that the economic costs - opportunity 
costs- had to be realized first). The remaining majority of participants did sign-off on the 
agreement. The agreement lacked support from what Fitzgerald referred to as the 
“critical groups” (First Nations and environmentalists).
With the overall results from the Task Force and the Steering Conunittee, Cabinet went 
away and made their decision. Fitzgerald believed that here was not much more
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conversation that went on between the time of the conclusion of that process, to when the 
facilitators filed their report, to the Cabinet decision.
Fitzgerald believed that the NDP always had their environmental wing and their labour 
wing. The government had to make a compromise between the two. The Cabinet 
decision went beyond the required protected area requirements. The process o f the Task 
force resulted in further polarizing the main participants. The environmental position 
came further towards total protection; nothing should be logged. The final Cabinet 
decision was not viable as judged by the First Nations and environmental participants.
Fitzgerald further elaborated on the process and the events surrounding the release of the 
policy. He stated that overall industry appeared fairly satisfied with the Clayoquot Land 
Use Decision, but environmentalists and First Nations did not. Fitzgerald believes that 
given where industry started out - their initial position at the negotiations (Task Force) - 
they had moved substantially in the accommodation of other interests, hidustry had come 
to terms with the reality that there had to be compromise - whereas the environmentalists 
did not. When the policy came out, industry was already resigned to some form of 
compromise, whereas other participants were not. First Nations were in a special 
position; it was found that they were not consulted. They were primarily offended by the 
fact that they were not consulted.
According to Fitzgerald, “Industry certainly accepted [the decision] and supported it”. 
Industry came to the position over the course of several years to where the policy was
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found to be acceptable. However, this same position proposed several years before may 
not have been supported and accepted. What was considered acceptable changed over
several years.
Premier
The final interview involved the then premier of the province, Mike Harcourt. Harcourt 
listed environmentalists, local commerce, community organizations, logging companies, 
unions, the various local communities. First Nations, Cabinet, NDP caucus, key 
ministries - forestry, environment, and Aboriginal Affairs as the main participants in the 
Clayoquot Land Use Decision.
The Premier lists only one alliance in the policy process; one that he describes as a 
dishonest one. The alliance between the environmentalists and First Nations was a 
dishonest one. The environmentalists were basically saying that they were on the First 
Nations side, but weren’t because the Nuu-Chah-Nuith wanted to log and be involved in 
the economic activities in the area. The environmentalists were misleading the First 
Nations; “It was a higher priority for them (environmentalists) to have the whole thing 
preserved than for the Aboriginal people to work their way out of poverty.” Harcourt did 
not believe that this was necessarily deliberate on the part of the environmentalists, “but 
they were not being up-front”. It was this alliance that Harcourt believed influenced the 
land use decision.
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The resources necessary in order for the participants to effectively participate in the 
policy process were not directly listed by Harcourt. However, he does list the main 
participants whom he believe did have the necessary resources to effectively participate 
and the ones who did not. The companies and the unions had the necessary resources, 
and the Aboriginals as well to a certain extent (although they are talent and leadership 
thin with all the demands placed upon them). Harcourt believes that the individual 
citizens, and non-productive groups, lacked the necessary resources to effectively 
participate in the land use process.
Harcourt suggests some resources required by participants in the policy process. He 
believes there needs to be a well-informed process with good information available to all 
interests at the negotiation table. Harcourt suggests that there needs to be some 
compensation for travel and accommodation, and honorariums for the participants who 
do not have access to sufficient financial sources in order to participate.
Harcourt believes that the NDP was committed to taking a balanced approach to land use 
decisions, so those who wanted no logging, and those who wanted to over-log, would not 
be satisfied. With the release of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, 80-90 percent o f the 
islands citizens accepted it. The policy was a compromise between the extremes; the 
policy was made on compromise.
Harcourt further elaborated on the policy process and the events surrounding the release 
of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision. He states that there were extremists on both sides -
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environmentalists (particularly Rainforest Action Network, Friends of Clayoquot Sound, 
Greenpeace, and the Western Canadian Wilderness Committee) who wanted all o f  the 
Sound to be park, and pro-logging who wanted the status quo. However, the NDP made 
it clear that they were not going to preserve the entire Sound, nor were they going to 
allow the ‘old’ way of management to continue. A mistake by the provincial government 
was to have not consulted and/or done some interim measures with the Nuu-Chah-Nulth 
before hand.
Summary
The above interviews are summarized in the order of the questions given. The main 
participants in the Clayoquot Land Use Decision according to the participants 
interviewed consisted of: the logging companies (industry), the NDP government. First 
Nations, environmentalists, local community members and organizations, labour unions, 
local commerce. Cabinet, and the key ministries. Each o f these have been mentioned by 
one or all of the interviewees. The participants listed above reflect those identifled in 
Pross’ Community Policy Model. The participants lacking in the model are the local 
community members and organizations. These have not been identifled in the model nor 
were they listed as participants in the Clayoquot Sound Sustainable Development 
Steering Committee (Section 6.1). However, the list of participants for the Clayoquot 
Sound Sustainable Development Task Force does list, as one of the categories of 
participants in the policy process, two residents of Toflno (Section 6.1).
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The alliances between participants that may have influenced the policy decision, as 
identified by the interviewees, are: First Nations and environmentalists; First Nations, 
environmentalists, and the NDP government; industry and labour; industry and the local 
communities; and IWA (labour union) and the NDP government.
The absence of identified alliances between industry and the NDP government at the time 
of the CLUD is not curious; the NDP government’s alliances have historically been with 
labour and other ‘left’ interests. However, based on the literature on pressure group 
theory and the prevalence of alliances between productive groups and government, as 
well as with other productive interests, government typically aligns itself with corporate 
interests. However, had the provincial government been under Liberal government 
leadership, the apparent lack of an alliance may not have existed.
Judging by Interfor’s response, one is led to believe that the forest companies did not 
maintain any alliances. This would run counter to what was believed by the non­
productive interests at the time the policy was released to the public. Specifically, in the 
video Futy in the Sound (Wine 1997), the non-productive interests assert that the 
productive interests exerted tremendous influence on, and maintained a strong alliance 
with, the provincial government throughout the policy process and the events following 
the announcement of the policy. There was the suggestion that the government bowed to 
the economic pressure applied by the productive interests and allowed logging in over 
74% of the Sound (Baldrey, April 13,1993). This same pressure by the productive 
interest was said to have been applied to allow the RCMP to arrest a perceived ring
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leader’ who was not breaking the law at the Kennedy Road protests in the summer of 
1993. It was also this pressure that was believed to be applied to the provincial court to 
alter the charges against the protesters at the “mass arrests” (standing in the middle o f a 
logging road in an attempt to stop the logging trucks from accessing the Sound) from 
civil to criminal, resulting in the incarceration of protesters, some for more than four 
months. This perceived alliance between the productive interests and the provincial 
government did not exist according to Ihterfor.
Interfor’s perception of alliances also runs counter to what was described in Section 
6.5.3, and what is illustrated in Pross’ Policy Community Model. The productive 
interests are shown to have closer alliances with both the Government and the 
Bureaucracy Communities compared with the non-productive interests.
The majority of the interviewees (excluding the politician) identified an alliance between 
the First Nations and environmentalists in the policy process. Fitzgerald describes this 
alliance as “one of convenience”, and Harcourt descibes it as a “dishonest alliance”. 
Interfor supports Fitzgerald’s assertion. Each interviewee believes that in spite o f these 
two groups having apparent contrary objectives, their temporary alliance was seen to 
serve both their goals effectively. The politician, however, believed that there lacked an 
alliance between these same two interests, thus compromising the influence each had on 
the policy process.
1 4 8
On the question of necessary resources, two of the interviewees choose to avoid listing 
specific resources (in spite of the researcher including with the question examples to 
establish the direction o f the question). Instead they stated that whatever resources were 
required were provided or should have been provided. The other two interviewees 
provided conflicting views on the question of resource availability. Fitzgerald asserted 
that all interests (productive and non-productive) had access to all necessary resources to 
effectively participate in the policy process. However, Harcourt believed that only the 
productive interests (except not as much for First Nations) had the necessary resources. 
Harcourt believes that the non-productive interests lacked the necessary resources to 
effectively participate in the policy process.
The participant resources that were identified as necessary by the interviewees consisted 
of: the ability to blockade (volunteers; connections to the grassroots); money, alliances, 
political support, membership, access and influence; well-informed process; and good 
information. Each of these resources are included directly and indirectly in the survey list 
(Appendix: Survey). The actual resources listed by the interviewees are not contrary to 
the survey results, but what is contrary to the survey results is who the main participants 
were perceived as having these necessary resources. For example, one questions how the 
non-productive interests and First Nations are perceived by hiterfor to have had all of the 
necessary resources in order to effectively participate in the policy process when one 
looks at the outcome of the policy (Section 6.5.3) and the history of forest policy 
development in the province (Section 6.4). Both groups have traditionally been on the 
periphery (as noted in Section 6.4). It was found in previous sections that neither group
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had the necessary resources in order to alter their status, nor that there was an alliance 
between them. In fact, it was only with the outcome o f the Clayoquot Land Use Decision 
that the First Nations in the Sound found themselves as participants in forest policy, after 
the fact. However, throughout the process the productive interests were represented, 
which can also be seen in their level of satisfaction with the policy outcome. This cannot, 
however, be said o f the non-productive interests.
Along with the resources identified as necessary by the interviewees was the mention 
about the lack of necessary resources to the participants (see Section 6.5.4 - Politician 
and Premier). The Politician stated that whatever resources deemed necessary for full 
participation by the key players in the policy process should be provided for by the 
government. In neglecting to do so, the government would be unable to provide a 
community based policy decision that reflected the interests of all of the main 
participants. Premier Harcourt also stated that in order to ensure all interests are 
represented and able to participate in the policy process, the necessary resources must be 
provided. Harcourt, however, stops short of suggesting that this responsibility should be 
the provincial governments.
The final question focuses on how the each of the interviewees perceive process by which 
the land use decision was made, hi summary, the first interviewee perceived the policy 
decision as one that was set up to fail; it was one that was deliberately designed so that 
government could dictate how the policy was to be designed. The second interviewee 
perceived the policy decision as one that naturally progressed based on the history in
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Clayoquot Sound and the evolving land use issues. The third interviewee perceived the 
policy decision as one that evolved out of the efforts of the Task Force and the Steering 
Committee with interests and alliances evolving with these processes. The final 
interviewee describes the land use decision as one of design based on compromise 
between the various productive and non-productive expectations. The prevalence o f the 
role o f government in the development of the land use decision is noted in at least two of 
the interviewees responses. This point will be explored further in the following section.
The interview participants provided insight into the events surrounding the Clayoquot 
policy process. After much effort in inviting the views of the other main participant 
groups (First Nations, bureaucracy, and non-productive) with no response, the researcher 
was forced to rely on the extensive information provided by media sources during the 
period in question, as well as on the survey responses, for their input. The above section 
(Section 6.5.3), combined with this section provides the basis for the next and final 
section of analysis.
6.5.5 Analysis Using Pross* Model
This next portion o f the research will look at the case study in more detail using Pross’ 
Policy Community Model. This model was designed to show the players/actors involved 
in policy development or influence. It shows that policy communities include all actors 
who have an interest in a policy area, who share a common policy focus, and who help 
shape policy outcomes (Appendix: Models - Pross ).
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The policy communities include various actors who have an interest in this particular 
policy area, they share a common policy focus, and all play a role in influencing and 
shaping the policy outcome. Each of the many actors involved in the case study have 
been listed, as well as, where possible, their role/position during the policy process. The 
next step in the policy analysis, using Pross’ model, was to look at how each o f the policy 
communities interact.
The policy communities’ interactions are illustrated in Pross’ model. By detailing the 
interaction of the policy communities in the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, this analysis 
was able to provide insight into how the interactions between each community influenced 
the policy decision. The following model analysis details each of the main conununities, 
as well as some of the sub-communities where necessary. Some of the sub-communities 
list only those members mentioned in the information sources available. This list is not 
all inclusive; there may be other participants within the sub-communities that were not 
mentioned in the information sources.
It should be noted that an entire political community is rarely involved in a specific 
policy decision (Pross 1995,264). The process leading up to the release of the land use 
decision, like other policy decisions, involved specific actors from various communities 
according to their specialization. The Bureaucracy Community (Bureaucracy) is the first 
conununity of focus in Pross’ model. The Bureaucracy involved the Lead Department 
Agency - Ministry of Forests (along with the supporting agencies: Ministry of 
Environment, Lands and Parks & the Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs). The Sponsoring
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Minister - Minister of Forests - served as the liaison between the Bureaucracy and the 
Government Community (Government).
Cabinet, which is tied to both the Government and the Bureaucracy, served in its official 
capacity regarding the land use decision (Cabinet’s purpose is to direct the business of 
Parliament, administer individual departments of government, pass Orders-In-Council, 
and formulate and discuss policy (Smith 1995,391)). Cabinet’s role in the Clayoquot 
Land Use Decision was to formulate the policy with the demise o f the Clayoquot Sound 
Sustainable Development Strategy Steering Committee (Hoberg 1996, 277). Cabinet and 
the Sponsoring Minister served as the link between the Bureaucracy and Government.
Within the Government Community there was the provincial government sub-community 
consisting of members such as the Premier, the Attorney General and the Finance 
Minister. The local government is illustrated as being neither closer to the provincial 
government sub-community or the official opposition. This is because the views 
expressed indicated that the local government favoured neither the views of the Official 
Opposition nor those of the provincial government (detailed in Section 6.5.4). The 
Official Opposition sub-community is illustrated in the model apart from the provincial 
government due to its obvious function in the Government. The final sub-community 
within the Government is the Interested hidividuals. This group is illustrated as a 
periphery group due to their limited influence on the process. Like other such groups in 
other processes, this periphery sub-community is not static in membership; the 
membership changes with the issue.
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The third and final policy conununity to be detailed is the Interest Groups Community 
(IGC). Within the IGC is the Stakeholder Groups (productive) sub-community. 
Interested Groups (productive) sub-community. Interested Groups (non-productive) sub­
community, and International Interested Groups (non-productive) sub-community. Each 
of these sub-communities are illustrated according to the role and influence they had on 
the policy process. The Stakeholder Groups are placed in the model closer to both the 
Bureaucracy and Government based on what was found in the research; 1) The literature 
review on pressure groups found that stakeholders generally enjoy better access to the 
policy makers due to their access to the necessary resources, as well as their economic 
role in the provincial economy; and 2) The research shows that the typical role of the 
stakeholder was evident in the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, especially when one 
gauges their level of satisfaction in the policy decision compared with the non-productive 
Interested Groups in the IGC. Within the stakeholder group is the Tribal Council. The 
purpose in placing the First Nations within the stakeholder group labeled as productive is 
due to their claim on the land and resources through traditional territory. As well, the 
First Nations became ‘official’ productive interests with the completion of the Interim 
Measures Agreement.
The Interested Groups (productive) and Interested Individuals (productive) are shown in 
the model as attached, but separate from, the Stakeholder Groups. These three sub­
communities are separate, but there is obvious overlap when one looks at the interests of 
one compared with the other. The stakeholder groups are supported by the productive
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interested groups for it was in the best interests o f the productive interested groups to do 
so. Members within this sub-communiQr rely on the stakeholder group for employment, 
therefore they support the stakeholder groups in the land use decision making process.
The non-productive Interested Groups, both Canadian and international, are illustrated as 
being further away from the Bureaucracy and Government. This reflects the events in the 
Clayoquot Land Use Decision, supported by the results of the pressure group literature 
review. This sub-community was shown to generally lack the necessary resources to 
provide the stakeholder groups and interested groups (productive) with competition for 
the attention and consideration of the policy makers. As well, the non-producitve 
interests were shown in the research to generally lack the political alliances entertained 
by the productive interests. This was shown in the two processes leading up to the 
Clayoquot Land Use Decision; they lacked non-productive interested groups’ input (see 
Section 6.2). The land use decision did not reflect the expectations and desires of these 
two sub-communities, especially compared with the productive sub-communities. Pross’ 
model reflects the position of the non-productive Interested Groups’ position in the policy 
process.
Media is also illustrated in the policy model (as detailed in Section 5: Pross’ Policy 
Communities Model). It has been placed in two places to illustrate its prevalence 
throughout the Clayoquot Land Use Decision. The model illustrates that throughout the 
land use decision, no one group lacked the representation offered by the media. This is 
simply because the land use issues surrounding Clayoquot Sound during this period
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produced what may be referred to as a “media frenzy”. The media was utilized by all 
policy communities, and all policy communities were utilized by the media.
Pross’ model concludes the Clayoquot Land Use Decision case study. Before detailing 
the results of the research, the following section highlights the survey and questionnaire 
completed by numerous environmental activists from across the nation.
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Chapter Seven: Results of Survey and Questiouuaire
Survey
The survey was completed by a total o f 37 environmental activists from across Canada.
In order to obtain participants, a general request was sent out utilizing electronic mail via 
various mailing lists available through organizations such as the Canadian Environmental 
Network and the Environmental Studies Association of Canada (ES AC). All participants 
who responded to the general request, and accepted the conditions detailed (Appendix: 
Letter of Request - Survey), were included in the study. Unfortunately, due to time 
constraints and the need to further focus on the Clayoquot Sound case study, only one 
question has been highlighted and included in the research. (For the complete list of 
survey questions see Appendix: Survey. This question (question eleven) was part of the 
survey sent out during the month of November of 1998.
Questionnaire
Following the survey was a sociodemographic questionnaire (Appendix: 
Sociodemographic Questionnaire). This questionnaire provided a breakdown on details 
such as gender, age, level of education, occupation, and income. The results from the 
questionnaire are provided below in order to afford a basic profile of the respondents.
The following offers a summary of this questionnaire.
There were a total of 29 respondents to this questionnaire (not all of the participants of 
the main survey chose to participate in the sociodemographic questionnaire) resulting in a 
generous amount of data. Confidentiality was the basis of participation, therefore the
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The volunteer/professional categories refer to the capacity in which each of the 
respondents involve themselves in the environmental Held, ^consistencies occurred 
because some respondents chose not to respond to either category, and because some 
other respondents stated as being involved both professionally and as a volunteer. All o f 
the respondents achieved some level of post secondary education ranging from 
college/technical to a  doctorate. The age distribution of the respondents ranged mostly 
between 20 and 60 years of age, with the remaining respondents above 60 (none of the 
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The level of income, if charted, would illustrate a  type of ‘u’ shape with the majority of 
respondents either at less than $20,(XX) per year or at a more comfortable $41,000 to 
$50,000 per year annual income. (Interestingly, as a side note, when the level of income 
is cross-referenced with gender, the data showed that the two lowest income brackets are 









The respondents, when asked how many years they have been active in the environmental 
movement in Canada, are evenly distributed throughout the year ranges with the majority 
having been involved for six years or more.
Prov./Terr. 






19 7 2 18 7
The provincial/territorial distribution of the respondents indicates a western provincial 
slant, which coincides with the fact that the four western provinces are home to less than 
30% of the population, but with almost half of Canada’s environmental organizations 
based there (Stefanick 1996,71). Perhaps not of particular surprise is that the majority of 
respondents are urban dwellers. And finally, when asked the question as to the position 
held within an environmental organization, 93 percent o f the total respondents stated as 
being involved in some capacity. The involvement ranged from a door-to-door 
campaigner to a director.
Survey Question
The following is question eleven of the survey. The question asked of the respondents 
that will be considered herein was: What do you consider necessary resources in 
environmental activism (i.e. money, time, volunteers)?
The following table provides the results from question eleven, as well as the results from 
the pressure group theorists (taken from the literature review). In both of the columns 
below, the resources are listed according to priority based on the number of times each 
one was listed as necessary in the survey and literature review. Next to each of the 
resources listed are the number of times that the resource was mentioned. The "(1)...”
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indicates that the resources following are mentioned once. The table includes a bottom 
column listing the resources deemed necessary by one, but not reiterated by the other.
Question 11 of Survey
11) What do you [the activist] consider 
necessary resources in environmental 
activism (i.e. money, time, volunteers)?
Resources Defined as Essential hy 
Pressure Group Theorists from the 
Literature Review
• money (27) •  leadership skills (4)
• time (20) • money/large budgets (3)
• volunteers (19) • membership (well informed) (3)
• staff (4) •  expert advice/knowledge (2)
• scientific data (3) •  knowing access to appropriate policy
• leadership & motivation (3) makers (2)
•  education (to radicalize our citizens to • strategy (1)....
action) (2) •  legitimacy (with gov’t, public, and
• people power (2) politicians)
• media support (2) •  access & influence (legislators &
• network of connections (2) bureaucrats)
• visionaries (1).... •  communication skills
• direction and information • paid staff
• connections to the grassroots •  an appealing issue
• patience •  permanent organizational structure
•  expertise • flexibility
•  clear, distinct policies • cooperation (gov’ts want advice &




• a good cause
• solid beliefs and values
• commitment
• excellent intelligence gathering and
sharing
• networking and communication
• clear objective with multiple ways of
achieving it
•  community support




people who are good with the media
Resources Declared Necessary by Either Activists or Pressure Group Theorists that 
were Not Mentioned in Neighbouring Column
•  time (20) • permanent organizational structure
• education (2) ( D -
• media support (2) •  flexibility
• patience (1).... • cooperation (gov’ts want advice &
• clear, distinct policies technical info)
• open minds
• solid beliefs and values
• commitment
The priority placed on each of the resources by both the activists and the theorists 
indicates that money was found to be the most essential resource. Money would allow 
participants in the policy process to concentrate on the issue instead of having to deal 
with the hurdles imposed because of the lack of access to the necessary fînances (i.e. 
transportation costs, administrative costs, fees to access information, consultative fees, 
etc).
Followed by money was the need for ‘time’. Time can initially be seen as a resource not 
easily addressed by the facilitators of policy development. However, if participants were 
able to concentrate on their participation in actions such as the policy process, instead of 
on their lack of monetary requirements, the issue of time (of the lack thereof) may largely 
be addressed.
The fact that pressure group theorists asserted leadership skills as a priority resource over 
money may indicate that without good leadership, no amount of money could ensure
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success. It could also, however, indicate that theorists (compared with the activists in 
the field’) are somewhat out of touch in terms of what are truly priori^ resources. It 
could also be that due to the limitations imposed by the lack of money, good leadership 
goes largely under utilized.
It was also found that both the activists and the theorists agreed that the participation of 
members of the public are essential resources (membership & volunteers); people are 
seen as essential. Volunteers are necessary, especially with persistent fiscal restraint. A 
solid membership is also necessary in order to organize and present a ‘strong front’ in 
any policy process.
Another resource identified was the need for, and access to, information, scientific data, 
and expert knowledge. These are considered essential resources by both the activists in 
the survey and the theorists in the literature review. Accurate information was found to be 
necessary in making appropriate decisions and planning courses of action.
The priority placed on the resources by one group and not by the other provides 
opportunity for speculation as to why this may be. For example, activists indicated that 
time was one of the top priorities in terms of resources, whereas pressure group theorists 
failed to mention this resource at all. This may be, as mentioned above, because activists 
are in the field and therefore would know first hand the difficulties incurred due to the 
lack of essential resources. They have experienced the difficulties of trying to be 
effective activists, but because of the lack of time are largely unsuccessful.
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The same can be said o f the other priorities cited by one and not the other. Activists are 
able to provide insight into an area of policy influence (via activism) that theorists 
cannot. Activists are in the Geld, and therefore are able to provide first-hand knowledge 
of what are necessary resources, and the level of priority for each one. Pressure group 
theorists may largely be divorced from the activism but are perhaps better at ‘stepping 
back’ and providing an objective analysis. A theorist’s analysis of the policy process, 
and the identifrcation and prioritization of necessary resources, may be seen as more 
credible due to their seemingly neutral position.
The results from question eleven and the literature review have demonstrated parallels 
between what activists ‘in the field’ believe are essential resources in order to be 
effective, and what pressure group theorists believe to be essential resources in order for 
activists to be effective. By combining the input from both activists and theorists, a 
comprehensive list of necessary resources have been developed. However, it is 
interesting to note the lack of priority placed on one specific resource by both groups; 
political alliances. Political alliances were found to be the most important in the 
interviews, as well as by Hessing and Hewlett. Whereas political alliances were not 
specifically listed by either the activists or theorists, histead, the activists alluded to this 
resource by listing “network of connections ”, and the theorists list “access and influence 
(legislators and bureaucrats)”.
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Ideally, with this information, government and other participants in policy development 
are provided with a list of necessary requirements in order to ensure that all participants 
at ‘the table’ are able to contribute equally. This would certainly be true provided the 
government is able to meet the demand of each of the necessary resources.
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion
The results from the survey question sent out to Canadian environmental activists in 
November of 1998 can be seen in Appendix: Survey, which has been matched with the 
results of the participant resources deemed essential by pressure group theorists (from 
literature review). These two columns have resulted in a final summary of what both 
pressure group theorists and Canadian environmental activists consider as necessary 
participant resources in order for pressure groups to accomplish their goals. These results 
were then combined with the Clayoquot case study and policy analysis (including the 
interview results). By applying Kingdon’s Decision-making model to this study, the 
policy, politics, and problems were identified. Using Pross’ Policy Community model, 
the policy decision was further explored: who were the actors, what paiticipants were 
found to have won and to have lost, and how the views of the participants were reflected 
in the policy. The final outcome, combining the results o f each part of the research 
effort, allowed the researcher to put forth the following:
1) The main participants in the Clayoquot Land Use Decision announced on April 13, 
1999 (Sections 6.5.4 and 6.5.5; Appendix: Models - Pross ).
2) Identified the interactions/alliances between participants that may have influenced the 
policy decision (ibid.).
3) Identified the resources participants deemed necessary in order to participate in the 
public policy process, and the resource necessary to influence the policy outcome 
(Section 6.5.4; Chapter 7).
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4) Based on the perceptions of the participants interviewed, combined with the 
perceptions provided via media bytes, an outline of how the Clayoquot Land Use 
Decision was made (Sections 6.5.3 and 6.5.4).
As stated in the section on pressure groups (Chapter 4), the institutional and economic 
advantage of some pressure groups, the productive actors, in the policy process typically 
exceeds that o f other pressure groups, those representing the non-productive actors 
(Hessing & Howlett 1997,73). This was also supported in the research on the Clayoquot 
Land Use Decision (see Section 6.5.4: Harcourt; Wine 1997); the productive participants 
had access to more o f the necessary resources required to effectively impact the policy 
process and outcome than the non-productive participants - notably political alliances. 
The limitations of these participant resources for some groups compared to others played 
a role in the outcome of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision in terms of the main 
participants who were found to have won and to have lost. The literature and the 
research indicate that the limitation of political alliances curtailed the effectiveness of the 
non-productive actors. The following details the reasons for the curtailment of the non­
productive participants in the policy process and decision.
1) The productive participants in BC forest policy enjoyed a traditional regime 
that emphasized the mutually compatible interests of the productive participants and 
government, with non-productive participants on the periphery. The importance of 
access to policy makers, legitimacy with government, and alliances/networks has been 
emphasized in the literature review and survey. The relationship enjoyed by the
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productive participants with government was not also enjoyed by the non-productive 
participants in the policy process.
2) The NDP government has long been tied to the labour sector in British 
Columbia. The labour sector, in the case o f Clayoquot Sound, represents the forestry 
worker; the very group that felt threatened by the efforts o f  the non-productive 
participants (environmentalists). As detailed in the pressure groups literature review, the 
requirement for alliances - especially political alliances - cannot be undervalued in the 
policy process.
By analyzing the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, combined with interviews o f some o f the 
participants in the case study, and the results from the survey and pressure group 
literature review, extraction o f the following was possible: the necessary resources in 
order to participate in the policy process, the necessary resource (political alliances) 
required to influence policy decisions, the participants that had access to these necessary 
resources, and how this impacted the outcome o f the policy decision. The study’s 
findings provide the information required in order to address the thesis. The Clayoquot 
Land Use Decision can be said to support what pressure group theorists and activists 
suggest are essential for participation in the policy process. As well, the research reveals 
that political alliances are necessary for an interest group to be influential in the public 
policy outcome. The research has shown that not all participants involved in the 
Clayoquot Land Use Decision had access to the required resources to participate in the 
policy process, or influence the policy outcome. The productive interests participated in 
the policy process largely with the necessary resources, whereas the non-productive
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interests were found to be lacking in these same necessary resources. The disparity 
between the productive and non-productive interests influenced the equality in the 
participation of these interests in the Clayoquot policy process and their level o f influence 
on the actual Clayoquot Land Use Decision.
The implications of the study's findings for the policy process concentrate on the 
requirement for representative participation during the policy process, and influence on 
the policy outcome. This study shows that the Clayoquot Land Use Decision, although 
presented as a “balanced decision”, was not. The productive interests were better 
represented in the final decision due to their economic position in the province within the 
status quo political and economic paradigm. They were shown to have access to the 
necessary resources to effectively participate in the policy process, and to have the 
political alliances to effectively influence the policy outcome. The productive interests, 
compared with the non-productive interests, in the policy process have traditionally had 
access to the necessary resources due to their role in the economy. The productive 
interests’ access to resources has afforded them an imbalanced influence over the policy 
process and the overall decision.
In order to ensure that the policy process and outcome is indeed representative o f the 
communities it will impact, the bias shown to the productive interests by the policy 
process must be addressed. Throughout the Task Force and Steering Committee 
processes, there was the assertion by the non-productive interests that the government 
favoured and better served the productive interests. The bias shown to the productive
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interests was not unique to these processes. As detailed by Hessing and Howlett (1997, 
73), the institutional and economic advantage afforded the productive interests has been 
quite typical in the resource and environmental policy process in Canada. Regardless of 
whether or not the participant resources are provided to all of the main interests in the 
policy process, if the bias o f government towards the productive interests is not 
addressed, the policy process will remain imbalanced and non-representative.
Another area of the policy process that requires attention is the terminology used to 
define the interests involved. As shown in Section 6.5.1, the terms under which the 
various main interests are defined require redress. The current placement of economic 
value in the policy process (in natural resource economics in general) is found to be 
subjective and perhaps even ‘old fashioned’. Because institutional and economic gauges 
are readily recognized, accepted and measured by mainstream economists and members 
of government, they remain the preferred way of evaluating one interest from another, 
regardless of accuracy. This subjective preference precedes actual value resulting in the 
potentially biased labeling of productive’ and ‘non-productive’ interests.
Representative participation by all of the main interests involved in the policy process 
can result in a policy that meets the needs o f each of the main participants who represent 
the various sectors in a commun!^ .  A policy that is truly representative minimizes the 
risk of negative backlash being directed at the policy makers. It is in the interests of all 
parties involved to avoid outcomes such as that of the Clayoquot Land Use Decision with 
the ‘Summer of Protest’ in 1993 in Clayoquot Sound. In order to ensure proper
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representation in the policy process, participant resources must be provided to all 
participants. As well, political alliances that favour productive over non-productive 
interests in the policy process need to be addressed. And finally, the terminology applied 
in the natural resources policy sector requires re-evaluation in order to realize the true 
value of each of the main interests participating in the policy process. Primarily, there 
requires a change in the use o f the misleading terms ‘productive’ versus non­
productive’ when categorizing the interests participating. Until these areas are addressed, 
there will always be the possibility of other summers of protest, causing great expense 
and inconvenience to those involved.
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Intemational Forest Products (Intetfor) 
Alberai Woodland 







Chief Francis Frank (elected) 
Interested Individuals (productive)




Share the Clayoquot Sound 
Canadian Pulp and P ^ e r  Association 
Council of Forest Industries (COFI) 
Interested Groups; Canadian (non-productive) 
Friends of Clayoquot Sound 
Western Canada Wilderness Committee 
Sierra Club o f Western Canada 
Valhalla Society 
World Wildlife Fund 
The Clayoquot Biosphere Project 
The Society Protecting Intact Kinetic 
Ecosystems 
Boreal Forest Alliance 
Coeur Du Bois 
Greenpeace Canada 
Interested Groups: International (non-productive) 
The Sea Shepherd Society 
The Natural Resources Defence Cotmcil 
Greenpeace Intemational 
Greenpeace US
European Rainforest Movement 
Rainforest Action Network
Bureaucracy Community
Lead Department Agency 
Ministry of Forests
Forests Minster - Dan Miller 
Sponsoring Minister
Minister of Forests - Dave Parker 
Commissmn on Resources & Environment (CORE) 
Commissioner - Stephen Owen
Government Community
Provincial Government
Premier Mike Harcourt 
Attorney General: Colin Gabelmaim 
Finance Minister Glen Clark 
Local Govenunent
Tofino Mayor Frank Van Eynde 
Diterested Individuals in Government
NDP MP (Bumaby-Kingsway): Sven 
Robinson
NDP MP (Saanich-Gulf Islands): Lyim Hunter 
NDP MP (Skeena): Jim Fulton 
Liberal MP (Lasaile-Emard): Paul Martin 
Federal Forestry Minster: Frank Oberle 
Canadian Council of Forest Ministers 
OfBcial Opposition
Liberal Forest Critic - Wilf Hurd
Cabinet
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UNBC Ethics Com m ittoe
July 10, 1998
Ms. Christine Callihoo 
c/o UNBC
D ear Ms. Callihoo;
T he UNBC Ethics Com mittee to review  your eth ics proposal entitled "C anadian
Environm ental Activism”.
I am  p leased  to tell you th a t the  com m ittee h a s  granted  approval and  you m ay




Letter of Request — Interview
Greetings!
Thanks so much for agreeing to participate! I  am a  graduate student attending the 
University of Northern BC in the Natural Resources Management program. I am 
currently completing research on pressure groups and their role in policy development -  
looking specifically at the Clayoquot Land Use Decision announced April 13, 1993. One 
of the objectives of the research is to gain a better understanding of how policy decisions 
are made, and the role of pressure groups in this process. By searching through various 
secondary sources, your name and comment has been collected and has become part of 
the case study data. In order to substantiate the comments collected, I  am hoping you 
will agree to answer a few questions regarding the events leading up to the Clayoquot 
policy announcement. I  am seeking your perception o f the events surrounding the policy 
decision; the ‘power plays’, who the main actors were, etc. The questions I  am hoping 
you are able to answer are:
1) Who do you think the main participants were in the Clayoquot Land Use 
Decision?
2) Identify, if you can, the interactions/alliances between participants that may have 
influenced the policy decision.
3) Identify the resources ± a t each participant needed in order to influence the policy 
decision.
4) Based on your response above, outline how you perceive the Clayoquot Land Use 
Decision was made.
Realizing it has been a number of years since the Clayoquot Land Use Decision was 
announced, please answer as best as possible. You may elaborate on any point or add 
other comments that you think are relevant. You can either e-mail me your response, or 
e-mail me with a date (as soon as is convenient), time, and phone number and I will 
phone you at that time to conduct an interview. My research is wrapping-up at this time. 
As a result, your promptness is truly appreciated. I  would be happy to provide you access 
to a copy of the research results. Please inform me that you have received this letter, and 
if you are able to participate (vie e-mail or phone 250-964-4964). Thank you very much 
for your consideration.
The answers provided to me will be treated with strict confidentiality. My adviser is Dr. 





University of Northern BC
Prince George, BC
ccall ihoo @ hotmail.com
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Letter of Request -  Survey
I thank each of you for generously donating your time to my study. The vast majority of 
you identiAed the need for folks within the movement to share information, ideas, and 
resources as “what needs to be addressed within the environmental activist arena in order 
for activists to be more effective or more able to address the issues at hand”. Your 
insight certainly furthers this effort.
Since distributing the survey, members of my committee have suggested I  send out a 
brief form to obtain vital sociodemographics. In doing so, I  will be able to more fully 
analyze the information gathered in the survey. The information will be put into context 
once I combine the survey results with this new information. I would really appreciate it 
if each of you could take the few minutes required to complete the below and send it back 
to me. Li order for me to realize my goal of producing a product that is useful in the 
environmental fîeld in Canada, I need more detailed information.
As before, anonymity is assured and upheld, and the information gathered will be held in 
confidence. If you have any questions or comments, contact myself 
fccallihoo @ hotmail com or 25-964-4964) or my supervisor Dr. Annie Booth 
Cannie@unbc.ca or 250-960-5555).
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S u rv e y
Brief summary of yourself (group you represent, area of focus, etc):
1) How would you define activism?
2) W hat percentage of your time (in hours per week) do you devote to activism? ____
3) How is your time divided between the following types of activities?
i) meetings ____
ii) administrative work ____
iii) reading and writing ____




viii) monkey wrenching ____
4) In your personal experience, what are some of the things that you have done that have 
resulted in accomplishing the goal in mind? Explain with specific instances in order to 
illustrate the point being made.
4.1) As a member of an organization, what do you think has been the major success to 
date? Why?
5) What do you deem as effective in terms of evaluating what the/your action has 
accomplished?
6) W hat are some of the things that you have seen in your time within the environmental 
arena, not necessarily done by yourself or someone within your organization, that you 
have thought was an effective approach to accomplishing environmental activist goals?
7) What causes do you see as important; what motivates you to participate in an action?
8) What do you think needs to be addressed within the environmental activist arena in 
order for activists to be more effective or more able to address the issues at hand?
9) What do you see in the future of environmental activism in Canada (politically, 
economically, socially, etc.); what will shape activism in the future?
10) Does Canadian activism have a  distinct personality ; what makes Canadian activism 
Canadian?




Please mark as they apply to you:
Gender: Male Female
Age: <20 20-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 >60
Highest level of education completed: <high school high school
college/technical undergraduate graduate Ph. D.
Paid Occupation: Non-paid Occupation:




Years active in enviroiunental movement in Canada: <3 3-5 6-8 9-11 12-15
>15
Province/Territory of origin (indicate one that best describes):




Pross’ Test fo r  Distinguishing Pressure Groups from Other Elements in the Political
System
Test Criterion: A full-fledged Pressure 
Group will:
Organization: Does the group possess a 
formal organization?
possesses a formal organization;
Membership: Is membership inclusive of 
the interest community; self-elected from 
that community; or selected from that 
community by the existing membership?
derive its membership in one of these ways;
Power: Does the group seek power or 
simply influence?
seek only influence;
Resources Use: Is the group free to deploy 
and manage its resources as its members 
see fit?
substantially determine its use of resources 
autonomously;
Common Interest: Is the common interest 
determined internally?
determine its own common interest and its 
own long-term goals.
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